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This Final EnvironmentalImpactStatement(FEIS)addressesthe proposed
actionof completingthe preparationand operationof the Galileo
spacecraft,includingits plannedlaunchon the Space TransportationSystem
• (STS)Shuttlein October]989,and the alternativeof cancelingfurtherwork
on the mission.
The Tier I (programlevel)EIS (NASA1988a)consideredthe Titan IV launch
vehicleas an alternativeboosterstagefor launchin May 1991 or later.
The May 1991Venus launchopportunityis considereda "planetaryback-up"
for the Magellan(VenusRadar Mapper)mission,the Galileomission,and the
Ulyssesmission. Planswere underwayto enablethe use of a Titan IV launch
vehiclefor the planetaryback-up. However,in November1988, the U.S. Air
Force,which procuresthe Titan IV for NASA, notifiedNASA that it could not
providea Titan IV vehiclefor the May 1991launchopportunitydue to high
priorityDepartmentof Defenserequirements.Consequently,NASA terminated
all missionplanningfor the Titan IV planetaryback-up.
A minimumof 3 years is requiredto implementmission-specificmodifications
to the basic Titan IV launchconfiguration;therefore,insufficienttime is
availableto use a Titan IV vehiclein May 1991. Thus, the Titan IV launch
vehicleis no longera feasiblealternativeto the STS/InertialUpper Stage
(IUS)for the May 1991launchopportunity.
Since the environmentalconsiderationsof a May ]991STS/IUS launchare i
essentiallythe same as for an October1989 launch,the delay alternative
was eliminatedfrom furtherconsideration. _
The only expectedenvironmentaleffectsof the proposedactionare '
associatedwith normallaunchvehicleoperation,and are treatedin
publishedNationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct (NEPA)documentson the Shuttle
(NASA ]978) and the KennedySpace Center(NASA ]979),and in the KSC
EnvironmentalResourcesDocument(NASA1986) and the GalileoTier I EIS
(NASA 1988a).
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The environmentalimpactsof a normallaunchwere deemed insufficientto
precludeShuttleoperations. Environmentalimpactsmay also resultfrom
launchor missionaccidentsthat could releaseplutoniumfuel used in the
Galileopower system. Intensiveanalysisof the possibleaccidents
associatedwith the proposedactionrevealsmall healthor environmental
risks. There are no environmentalimpactsin the no-actionalternative.
The remotepossibilityof environmentalimpactsof the proposedactionmust
be weighedagainstthe large adversefiscaland programmaticimpacts
inherentin the no-actionalternative.
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EXECUTIVESUMMARY
' The proposedactionaddressedby this Final EnvironmentalImpact
Statement(FEIS)is the completionof preparationand operationof the
Galileomission,includingits plannedlaunchon the SpaceTransportation
! System (STS)Shuttlein October1989.
i PURPOSEAND NEED FOR THE ACTION
The Galileomissionis part of the NationalAeronauticsand Space
Administration's(NASA)SolarSystemExplorationProgram. The Galileo
i missionwill orbitJupiter,probethe Jovianplanetaryatmosphere and study
the fourmajor moons and the planet'sextendedelectromagneticenvironment.
;_ This missionfollowsup on the Pioneerand Voyagerflybymissions,and
beginsthe intensivestudyof the outer solar system.
?
ALTERNATIVESCONSIDERED
The proposedactionis the completionof preparationand operationof
the Galileomission,includingits launchon the Space Shuttlein October
i 1989. The launchconfiguration,STS/InertialUpper Stage (iUS),will
requirea Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist(VEEGA)trajectory,in which a
Venus and two Earthflybysare requiredto providesufficientvelocityfor
the spacecraftto reach Jupiter.
The alternativeto the proposedactionis no-action;that is, terminate
_ furthercommitr_entof resourcesto the mission.
The Tier 1 (programlevel)EIS (NASA1988a)consideredthe Titan IV
launchvehicleas an alternativeboosterstage for launchin May 1991or
later. The May 1991Venus launchopportunityis considereda "planetary
back-up"for the Magellan(VenusRadarMapper)mission,the Galileomission,
and the Ulyssesmission. Planswere underwayto enablethe use of a Titan
IV launchvehiclefor the planetaryback-up. However,in November1988,the
U.S.Air Force,which procuresthe Titan IV for NASA, notifiedNASA that it
couldnot providea Titan IV vehiclefor the May 1991 launchopportunitydue
to high priorityDepartmentGf Defenserequirements.Consequently,NASA
terminatedall missionplanningfor the Titan IV planetaryback-up.
A minimumof 3 years is requiredto implementmission-specific
modificationsto the basicTitan IV launchconfiguration;therefore,
insufficienttime is availableto use a Titan IV vehiclein May 1991. Thus,
the Titan IV launchvehicleis no longera feasiblealternativeto the
STS/IUSfor the May 1991 launchopportunity.
Since the environmentalconsiderationsof a May 1991STS/IUS launchare
essentiallythe same as for an October1989 launch,the delay alternative
_ was eliminatedfrom furtherconsideration.
ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCES
The only expectedenvironmentaleffectsof the proposedactionare
associatedwith normallaunchvehicleoperation. These effectshave been
consideredin the previouslypublishedEISson the Space ShuttleProgram
iii
1990012831-005
(NASA1978) and the KennedySpace Center (NASA1979), and in the Final EIS
for the Galileo and Ulysses Missions (NASA1988a) and the KennedySpace
Center (KSC) Environmental Resource Document(NASA1986). The expected
environmental conseqdencesof Shuttle launches have been deemedinsufficient
to preclude Shuttle operations.
In the event of (1) an accident or mission abort during launch, or (2)
reentry of the spacecraft from Earth orbit or during an Earth flyby, there
are potential adverse health and environmental effects associated with the
possible release of plutonium-238 from the spacecraft's Radioisotope
Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) and the Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUs).
The potential effects considered in preparing this EIS include risks of air
and water quality impacts, local land area contamination by plutonium-238,
adverse health and safety impacts, the disturbance of biotic resources, the
occurrence of adverse impacts on wetland areas or in areas containing
historical sites, and socio-economic impacts.
An intensive analysis of the safety and environmental consequencesof
launch or mission accidents indicates very small risks to humanhealth or
: the environment.The resultsof the detailedanalysesare summarizedfor
each missionphase usingthree scenarios: the most probablecase, the
" maximumcrediblecase, and the expectationcase. These cases are definedas
follows:
• Mo@t ProbableCase: The highestprobabilityaccidentin a mission
phase leadingto a releaseof plutonium.
• MaximumCredibleCase: The accidentin a missionphase that
leadsto a releaseof plutoniumwith the most severeimpacton
human health.
• ExpectationCase: The probabilityweightedsum of all accidents
in a missionphase.
For this FEIS,a valueof iQ-7 was a_optedas the limitingprobability.
This compareswith valuesof 10TM and 10-Q generallyused to definemaximum
credibleaccidentsin analysesof nuclearpower plants. The lower figure
was used herebecausethere is a more limitedexperiencebase than in power
plant analyses. The expectationcase was calculatedwithoutregard to the
limitingprobability.
Human healtheffectsare presentedbothwith and withoutconsideration
of "de minimis." The de minimisconceptrefersto a dose at and below which
no healtheffectsare expected. In thisdocument,a de minimisdose level
of I mrem/yrwas used basedon U.$. Departmentof Energy(DOE)and Nuclear
RegulatoryCommission(NRC)considerationand documentationfor the National
Councilon RadiationProtectionand SpaceMeasurements.A more complete
discussionof the analysisand of the basis for use of a de minimislevel is
given in Section4. Section4 also presentsestimatesof areas of plutonium
depositionresultingfrom accidents.
For the missionas a whole,the most probableaccidentis an IUS
failure(Phase4) duringdeploymentwhich leads to spacecraftbreak-up,
reentryof the RTG modules,and impactof the moduleson hard rock leading
iv
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rto a release. The probability of release is 4X10-4, or 1 in 2,500. The
collective population dose over a 70-year period would be 4.6 person-rem
(1.3 person-rem above de minimis). This has been demonstrated by test and
operational experience that showsthat RTGshave survived Earth orbital
reentry heating conditions with no release of plutonium.
The maximumconsequencecase is an inadvertent reentry during a VEEGA
flyby (mission Phase 5). In thts accident, the RTGmodules, under reentry
heating, release their graphite impact shells (GISs), which also experience
heating, and then three GISs hit hard_rock and release their plutonium fuel.
The probability of release is 1.1X10-1, or about 1 in 9 million. The
collective population dose is estimated as 51,700 person-rem over a 70-year
period to arl affected population of 71,310 persons. As discussed more fully
in Section 4, even in the extremely rare event of this accident, the health
and environmental effects are very small. On average, over the exposed
population, the dose is less than one-fifth of the normal backgrounddose.
" The expectation case analysis for each mission phase is used, in
Section 4, to derive an individual risk value for fatality resulting from
" possiblelaunchor missionaccidents. The largestindividualrisk is about
9XI0"_, or slightlymore than ! in 100 million. This figuremay be compared
with CensusBureaudata on individualri_k of fatalityby variouscauses.
These data show risks varyingfrom 7X]O-a for death fromdiseaseto 7XI0"7
for deathdue to lightning. The risk of the proposedactionis two orders
of magnitudelower than any tabulatedvalue.
There are no environmentalimpactsassociatedwith the no-action
alternative.
There are severeadversefiscaland programmaticimpactsinherentin
the no-actionalternative.As of October1988,$800 millionhad been
expendedon the Galileomission. No furtheractionwould renderthat
expenditurea sunk cost and entaila largerscientificloss in terms of
humanresourcesand effortsand the scientificknowledgethatwould result
from the mission. These grave economicand scientificimpactsof no-action
must be weighedagainstthe great benefitand small risk associatedwith the
proposedaction.
This mission-specificEIS followson a program-levelEIS (NASA Ig88a)
and providesupdatedand more detailedinformationto supportdecision-
makingregardingthe completionand operationof the Galileomission.
V
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I. PURPOSEAND NEED FOR ACTION
1.I BACKGROUND
The Galileo mission, as part of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA)Solar System Exploration Program, is designed to
study Jupiter, its four major moons, and its extended electromagnetic
environment.
This Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) has been
prepared to provide updated information necessary to support decision-making
associated with implementing the Galileo mission. The proposed action
addressed in this FEIS is the completion of preparation and operation of the
Galileo mission in uctober 1989 as presently planned, using the Space
Transportation Sy,tem (STS) Shuttle with an Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) and a
Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist (VEEGA)trajectory. This document succeeds
a program level Final EIS (Tier 1) for the Galileo and Ulysses Missions
(NASA1988a).
The Galileo m;Rsion supports NASA'sSolar System Exploration Program
. and its continuingresponsibilityto engagein the scientificexplorationof
the solarsystemusing Earth-basedobservations,spacecraft,laboratory
studies,and theoreticalresearch. The goals of this Programare as
follows:
I) To furtherthe understandingof the originand evolutionof the
SolarSystem
2) To furtherthe understandingof the originand evolutionof life
3) To furtherthe understandingof Earth by comparativestudiesof
the other planets.
The Galileomissionhas beendesignedto furtherthesegoals.
Solarsystemexplorationgenerallyconsistsof three phases:
reconnaissance,exploration,and intensivestudy. These phasesare
characterizedby missionsas follows: reconnaissanceusing remote
observationsfromflybymissions,such as Pioneers10 and 11 (1973,1974)
and VoyagersI and 2 (1977);exploration_enerallyinvolvingorbiters,such
as MarinerIX and Galileo;and intensivestudyusing landers,such as the
Apollomissionsto the Moon and the Vikingmissionto Mars.
'_ Developmentof the Galileomissionwas initiatedin October1977 as the
first step in the explorationphase studyingthe outer planets,Jupiter,and
beyond,which had been reconnoiteredby the Pioneersand Voyagers.
Implementationof the Galileomissionhas been postponedbecauseof the
seriesof delaysand changesin launchconfiguration(e.g.,the Challenger
accidentand subsequentcancellationof the Shuttle-Centaurupper stage).
1-I
1990012831-014
w, Ir
].2 PURPOSEOF THE PROPOSEDACTION [
The scientific objectives of the Galileo mission are to conduct
comprehensive investigations of the Jovian planetary system by making
measurementsof the planet, its environment, and its satellites. Jupiter is
the largest and most massive planet in the solar system, and is unique
becauseit emitsmore energythan it receives. Togetherwith its moons, the
planetalmostcomprisesa mini solar system. Close-upstudiesof the planet
and its principalsatelliteswill greatlyextendthe knowledgeof the Jovian
systemand provideinsightsintothe complexand analogousrelationships
existingbetweenthe Sun and its planetarysystem.
The Galileoobjectiveswill be accomplishedthroughtwo separate
missionelements:
• An orbiterwill tour and studyJupiterand the Jovian satellites
over a 20-monthperiod.
• A detachableatmosphericentry probewill descendthroughthe
atmosphereof Jupiterand,duringa periodof roughlyI hour, will
relay scientificmeasurementsof the atmosphericprofileto Earth
via the orbiter.
The Galileomissionwill study the entireJoviansystemand will focus
on threebroad scientificobjectives: (1) the structureand compositionof
Jupiter'satmosphere;(2) the compositionand physicalstate of the four
. largestsatellitesof Jupiter;and (3) the structure,composition,and
dynamicsof the Jovianmagnetosphere.
Previousmissionsto Jupiterhave made only remotemeasurementsof the
Jovianatmosphere. Scientistsbelievethat Jupiteris composedof the
originalmaterialfromwhich stars,and most specificallyour Sun, are
formed. The atmosphericentry probe shouldprovidedata, during a l-hour
atmosphericdescentperiod,on the Jovianatmosphericcompositionto a depth
of 10 to 20 times the sea-levelpressureon Earth. It is anticipatedthat
this will includeall the major cloud layersof the Jovianatmosphere,
greatlyenhancingthe presentunderstandingof the Jovianatmosphereand of
planetaryatmospheresin general. It may be possibleto acquireknowledge
of the conditionsin the solarsystemat the time of planetaryformation.
The abundanceof heliumand raregases in the Jovianatmosphereare
importantindicatorsof conditionsin the early solar systemand of how the
giant planetskept their atmospheres,it is possiblethat the outerJovian
atmosphereis representativeof the unmodifiedmaterialthat subsequently
formedthe Sun, the planets,and other solarsystemobjects. Other ,
informationthat will be obtainedfromthe atmosphericentry probe includes
the locationand characterizationof the Jovianclouds,an analysisof how
solarenergy is absorbedand the quantityof energythat is flowingout of
Jupiter'sstill-cooling interior,a determinationof lightningfrequency,
and a determinationof whetheror not smallquantitiesof organicmolecules
are beingcreatedfrommethaneand ammonia.
1990012831-015
The 20-monthperiodduringwhich the orbiterwill be obtaining
informationwhile in orbit aroundJupiterwill providenew informationon
the deep interiorof Jupiterthroughmeasurementsof the Jovian
• gravitationalfield.
The Joviansatelliteswill be investigatedat _angesfrom 20 to 100
times closerthan earliermissions,typicallyat rangesof 1,000 kilometers
or less. This proximitywill permit imagesof 20 metersresolutionthat are
comparableto the Viking imageryof Mars. This increasedresolutionwill
resultin new and detailedknowledgeof the surfacesof the satellites,
includinginterestingfeaturessuch as the activevolcanoesof Io, the
innermostof the fourJovian satellites. It shouldbe possibleto determine
the composition,temperature,and activityof Io'svolcanicplumes and
volcanicflows over the durationof the orbitalinvestigations.In a manner
. similarto the investigationof the interiorof Jupiter,gravitationdata
r may determinewhetherIo has a completelymoltencore, as some theories
suggest.
i The Jovianmagnetosphereis the regionof space under the dominant
. influenceof Jupiter'smagneticfield. It is an immensestructurethat, if
visiblefrom Earth,would appearseveraltimes largerthan the full moon.
The resultsof brief flybymeasurementsof four previousspacecrafthave
, determinedthat the Jovianmagnetosphereis much more complexand dynamic
. than had been anticipatedfrom Earth-basedmeasurementsand theoretical
extrapolationsfrom the Earth'smagnetosphere.The outer regionsof the
Jovianmagnetosphereexpandand contractby millionsof kilometersin
;_ responseto solarwind and internalforces. (Thesolar wind comprisesthe
magneticfields,protons(hydrogennuclei),electrons,and ions of other
elementsfromthe Sun.) The innerregionsof the Jovianmagnetosphereare
influencedby Jupiter'srapid spin (onerevolutioneach IO hours)and by the
large quantitiesof sulfurand oxygenatomsemanatingfrom Io. Jupiter_Iso
is a "laboratory"for studyingphenomenaapplicableto other astrophysical
objectsand to processesof ionizedgases in general. The Galileomission
will explorethesephenomenawith new and more sophisticatedinstrumenta-
tion. Furthermore,the investigationsof thisdynamicenvironmentwill
exte_,dover nearly2 years. New regionsof the outer magnetospherewill be
explored,as well as repeatedpenetrationsintothe innerregions. The
missionwill includeat least one longorbit intothe "magnetotail,"a
distended,cone-shapedregionformedas the solarwind sweepsthe magnetic
field back away from the planet. This missionwill providethe resultsof
measurementsthat, in detailand specificity,cannotconceivablybe made
from Earth or from Earthorbit.
During its journeyto Jupiter,Galileowill performadditional
observationsof the planetVenus,the Earth/Moonsystem,and a flyby with
one or possiblytwo asteroids. The specificl_unchdate within the Galileo
launchwindowwill determineif flybyswith both asteroidsGaspra and Ida
are possible. These additionalplanetarydata collectionopportunities
fully exploitthe sciencereturnpossibilitiesof the Galileomission.
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1.3 NEED FOR THE ACTION
It is vital,at this stageof planetaryscience,to conductin-situ
measurementsof the planetJupiterand its satellites. For example,the
atmosphericprobewill returndata an the composition,temperatureand
pressureof the atmospherethat can be attainedby no othermeans. So, even
thoughscientistswill continueto studyJupiterfrom Earth orbit and
ground-basedtelescopes,the in-situdata from the Galileomissionwill
* provideotherwiseunattainabledata to anchorthose complementary
investigations.
The Galileomissioncan be launchedonly duringspecificperiodsin any
given decade,dependingon the positionof the planetsand the capabilityof
availablelaunchvehicles. Presently,the first availablelaunch
opportunityfor GalileooccursduringOctober/November1989;the next
feasibleopportunitydoes not occur untilMay 1991. The proposedactionis
neededto implementthe missionat the earliestavailableopportunity.
1.4 CONTEXTOF DECISION-MAKING
NASA regulationsrequirean EIS for all spacemissionscarryingmore
than trace amountsof radiologicalmaterials. The EIS processis being
completedat this time becauseof major programchanges,such as the mission
redesignand changein upper stage followingNASA'scancellationof Centaur
G-Primed_velopment.
lhis EIS is intendedto supportdecision-makingwithinthe NASA Space
Scienceand ApplicationsProgram. Programmanagementand decisionauthority
for the Galileoprogramrestwith the AssociateAdministratorfor Space
Scienceand Applications.The decisionhere will be betweenthe stated
alternatives:to completeGalileodevelopmentwith the full intentionof
implementingthe mission;or, at this time,to cancelfurtherwork on the
program.
The launchdecisionfor the Galileomissionwill includeother
officialsand will be made on the basisof additionalinformationsuch as
rangeand vehiclereadiness,statusof prior approvals,and so forth.
I-4
1990012831-017
2. ALTERNATIVES,INCLUDIt_$THE PROPOSEDACTION
2.I ALTERNATIVESCONSIDERED
This Final (Tier2) EnvironmentalImpactStatement(FEIS)considersthe
followingalternatives:
• ProposedAction: Completionof preparationand operationof the
mission,includingits plannedlaunchon the Space Transportation
System/InertialUpper Stage (STS/IUS)vehiclein October1989.
• NO-ActionAlternative: Cancellationof any furthercommitmentof
resourcesto the mission.
-The Tier I (programlevel)EIS (NASA1988a)consideredthe Titan IV
launchvehicleas an alternativeboosterstage for launchin May 1991 or
later. The May 1991Venus launchopportunityis considereda "planetary
back-up"for the Magellan(VenusRadarMapper)mission,the Galileomission,
and the Ulyssesmission. Planswere underwayto enablethe use of a Titan IV
launchvehiclefor the planetaryback-up. However,in November1988,the
_' U.S.Air Force,which procuresthe Titan IV for NASA, notifiedNASA that it
couldnot providea Titan IV vehiclefor the May 1991 launchopportunitydue
to high priorityDepartmentof Defenserequirements.Consequently,NASA
terminatedall missionplanningfor the Titan IV planetaryback-up.
A minimumof 3 years is requiredto implementmission-specific
modificationsto the basic Titan IV launchconfiguration;therefore,
insufficienttime is availableto use a Titan IV vehiclein May 1991. Thus,
the Titan I_ launchvehicleis no longera feasiblealternativeto the
STS/IUSfor the May 1991launchopportunity.
Since the environmentalconsiderationsof a May 1991STS/IUS launchare
essentiallythe sameas for an October1989 launch,the delay alternativewas
eliminatedfrom furtherconsideration.
2.2 DESCRIPTIONOF THE PROPOSEDACTIONTO PROCEEDAS PLANNEDWITH
COMPLETIONOF PREPARATIONSAND OPERATIONOF THE GALILEOMISSION,
INCLUDINGITS PLANNEDLAUNCHON THE STS IN OCTOBER1989
2.2.1 MissionDesian
No combinationof launchvehiclespresentlyavailableto NASA has the
capabilityto place the Galileospacecrafton a directtrajectoryfrom Earth
to Jupiter(NASA 1988a). Therefore,Galileowill first fly to Venus and then
returnto Earthfor the firstof two Earthflybys. These flybysallowthe
spacecraftto use the gravitationalfieldsof Earth and Venus to gain
sufficientvelocityto proceedto Jupiter. Figure2-I illustratesthe
Galileospacecraft'sVenus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist(VEEGA)trajectory.
After arrivingat Jupiter,the orbiterwill fly by the moon Io prior to
orbitingJupiter. The orbiterwill conducta studyof Jupiter'satmosphere
and the characteristicsof the space environmentsurroundingJupiter. The
atmosphericentry probe,which is to be releasedprior to the arrivalof the
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orbiterat Jupiter,will descendintoJupiter'satmosphere. Duringthe
descent,scientificmeasurementswill be made to determinethe structureand
compositionof Jupiter'satmosphere.The data will be relayedto Earth by
the orbiter.
2.2.1.1 LaunchOpportunityConsiderations
The Galileo_issioncan be launchedonly during specificperiods
dependingon the positionsof the planetsand the capabilitiesof the STS/IUS
launchvehicle. Due to programmaticconstraintsassociatedwith resumption
of Shuttleoperations,the first periodfor the launchof Galileooccurs
duringOctober/November1989. After 1989,the next feasiblelaunchperiod
for Galileooccursin May/June1991. For each day of eitherthe 1989 or 1991
period,the rotationalpositionof the Earth limitsthe launchfrom a few
minutesto an hour of each day.i
When a missiondelay causesa launchopportunitytu be missed,
spacecrafttrajectoriesand missionoperationsmust be redesignedand
! generallymissionbudgetsmust be augmented. The redesignof the mission
operationsrequiresnew plans for communications,spacecrafttracking,and
missionoperationfacilitiessupport. These new plans affectnot only the
delayedmissions,but alsoothermissionsthat dependon the resourcesof
these facilities. Becauseof the specializednatureof spaceexploration
I missionssuch as Galileo,trainedpersonneland the use of supporting
facilitiesmust be retainedwhen missionsare delayedbetweenlaunch
opportunities.These factorsall imply large costs associatedwith delaying
_ a mission.
Due to the gradualradioactivedecay of their plutoniumfuel,
RadioisotopeThermoelectricGenerator(RTG)power levelsdeclineover time.
Whendelaysoccur in the launchof an RTG-poweredspacecraft,missionplans
must be alteredto adjustto the lower level of availablespacecraftpower.
This can causemissionplannersto restrictmissionobjectivesor, in severe
cases,to undertakethe expensiverefuelingof the RTGs.
2.2.1.2 Trajectory(VEEGA)
To gain the velocityrequiredto reach Jupiter,the Galileospacecraft
will firstexecutea Venus gravity-assistflybyand then two Earthgravity-
assistflybys. This trajectoryis knownas the Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-
Assist,or VEEGA,trajectory, lhe VEEGAtrajectoryand an Earth avoidance
analysisare addressedin the Tier I FEIS (NASA1988a).
The trajectoryd_sign and navigationoperationsare being developed
consistentwith an Earthavoidanceplan to bias the spacecraft'strajectory
away from Earth betweenthe time of launchand any Earth flyby. Duringthe
majorityof Galileo'sinner solarsystemjourney,the spacecraftwill follow
a trajectorythat, withoutany furthermaneuvers,would miss the [arth by at
• least severalthousandkilometers. The spacecraftis placedon a trajectory
passingthroughthe requiredEarth flybypoint only 25 days prior to each
passage.
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On the final approachto each Earth flyby,additionaloperational
requirementsare being imposedto furtherensureagainstinadvertent
reentry. Continuoustrackingby the Deep Space Networkis plannedbeginning
35 days prior to each flyby. Around-the-clocktrackingand monitoringof
the spacecraftprovidesnear-real-timevidenceof any spacecraftanomalies.
Duringthe periodfrom the last spacecraftmaneuverI0 days out througheach
Earthflyby,no commandswill be sent to the spacecraftother than those
deemedessentialfor maintainingvehicleoperations,such as solar pointing
for thermalcontrol--thepremisebehindthis requirementbeing that minimal
spacecraftactivityyieldsa minimumprobabilityof occurrenceof unplanned
events. The GalileoEarth avoidancestrategiesresultin a total
proba)llltyof inadvertentreentryduringboth Earth flybysof less than
5XlO"'. For a detailedVEEGAdiscussion,see Section4.
2.2.2 SpacecraftDescription
The Galileospacecraftconsistsof an orbiterand an atmosphericentry
probe and weighsapproximately6,000 pounds(see Figures2-2 and 2o3). The
spacecraftis spin-stabilized,but incorporatesa separatesectionthat does
not spin. The "spun"part of the spacecraftspins at about three revolutions
per minuteto allow its instrumentsto "sweep"the sky continuouslyto make
theirmeasurements. The spinningpart of the spacecraftcontains
communicationantennas,the spacecraftpropulsionand power subsystems,most
of the electronicsand communicationsequipment,and variousscience
instruments.The non-spinningpart of the spacecraftprovidesa stable
platformfor remote-sensinginstrumentsthatmust be preciselypointed. The
non-spinningpart also accommodatesthe atmosphericentry probe and
supportingelectronics.
The spacecraftelementsthat are relevantto the assessmentof potential
environmentalimpactsare the two RTGs in the power subsystem,the
RadioisotopeHeaterUnits {RHUs)in the temperaturecontrolsubsystem,and
the propellantsin the propulsionsubsystemand the attitudecontrol
subsystem.
2.2.2.1 Power/HeatSources
RadioisotopeThermoelectricGenerator)(RTGs)
An RTG(see Figure 2-4) is a device that converts the heat from the
natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238 (a non-weaponsgrade of plutonium)
to electricity for spacecraft instruments. RTGshave been used on 22
previous space missions, including someof NASA'smost successful ones (e.g.,
Voyager, Pioneer, Viking, and all but the first of the mannedApollo landings
' on the Moon). The Galileo spacecraft will have two RTGs, each generating
approximately284 watts of electricalpower.
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The U.S. Departmentof Energy(DOE) safetyphilosophyfor the designof J
the RTG requirescontainmentor immobilizationof the plutoniumfuel to the
maximumextentpossibleduringall missionphases,includingground handling,
launch,and unplannedeventssuch as reentry,impact,and post-impact
situations(Bennett1981). As indicatedpreviously_the dominantform of
plutoniumused in RTGs,plutonium-238(seeTables2-i a=)d2-2), is not the
type used in nuclearweapons(i.e.,plutonium-23g).
An RTG consistsof two major elements: (1) a heat _;ourcethat contains
the plutoniumfueland (2) a thermoelectriconverterthat convertsheat to
electricity.The heat source,referredto as the GeneralFurposeHeat Source
(GPHS)containsthe plutonium-238fuel in a stackedcolumnof 18 individual
modules. Eachmoduleconsistsof a graphiteblock that encasestwo graphite
cylinders(seeFigure2-5). Each cylindercontainstwo pelletsof plutonium-
238 dioxideencasedin iridium. In the event that the modulesare released
in a launchaccidentand fall backto Earth,the graphiteblock construction
protectsthe modulefrom burning-upin the atmosphereand releasingany
plutonium. The graphite_ylindersprotectthe plutoniumpelletsfrom impacts
with the groundor debms. The iridiummetal containsthe fuel and provides
an additionallayer of protection.
Light-weightRadioisotopeHeaterUnits (RHUs)
Engineershave determinedthat the Galileospacecraftcould requirethe
use of up to 131 light-weightRHUste maintainportionsof the orbiter/
atmosphericentry probe temperaturewithinacceptablelimits,to minimize
the use of electricalpower for thermalcontrol,and to reduceelectro-
magneticinterference.EachRHU providesaboutone Watt of thermalpower
derivedfromthe radioactivedecay of 2.7 grams of plutonium-238.The
plutonium(in the formof a plutoniumdioxidepellet)of each RHU is
containedwithin a platinum-rhodiumalloy capsule. Similarto the RTGs,
each RHU is encasedin a graphiteinsulatorsurroundedby a graphiteblock
to provideprotectionfromatmosphericheatingand groundor debris impact
in the event of an accident(seeFigure2-6). The RHUs are designedto be
light-weightunits capableof containingthe plutoniumdioxidefuel in both
normaloperationsand accidents. The locationsof RHUs on the Galileo
spacecraftare shown in Figure2-7.
The only alternativeto the GalileospacecraftRHUswould be the
additionof anotherRTG,whichwould resultin an unacceptableweight
increasefor the spacecraft.
In the periodof time betweenthe issuanceof draft EIS and the
issuanceof this final EIS, it was learnedthat the finalnumberof RHUs
. installedonboardthe spacecraftwould be 120 insteadof I31. Since that
reductionis small in termsof the totalnumberof RHUs,especiallyin terms
of the total amountof radiologicalmaterialonboardGalileo,and since the
reductionwould tend to reauceany possibleenvironmentalimpact,NASA has
chosennot to modify its analyses. Analysisof I3] insteadof the correct
number,120, shouldbe consideredan additionalelementof conservatism.
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TABLE 2-1. ISOTOPICCOMPOSITIONOF RTG FUEL
Weight
Percent Radioactivity Tot_
Plutonium at Half-Life (Curies/gramof Curies
Isotope Manufacture (Years) plutonium*) (II/89)
236 <10-6 2.85 532 <1
238 *83.880 87.7 17.1 *'130,050
239 13.490 24,100 0.0621 80.2
240 1.900 6,560 0.227 41.3
241 0.379 14.4 103.2 2,650
242 0.124 376,000 0.00393 <!
OtSer TRU
isotopes 0.228 .... 3.3
TOTALS 100.00 *'132,825
* The radioisotopefuel is a mixtureof plutoniumdioxide(Pu02)
containing83.5 percent(plusor minus I percent)of Pu 238 {DOE 1988a).
** Based on valuesfromTable A-I in DOE 1988a,which reflectthe isotopic
contentof the F-I, F-3, and F_5 RTGs at time of manufacturein 1982and
1983. The valuesin thistable differfrom those in Table B-I, Vol. Ill
(Book2) of the FSAR (DOE1989a)becausethose representthe 1982
contentof the F-I unit only,while these valuesrepresentthe content
expectedat launch(correctedfor radioactivedecay).
TABLE 2-2. ISOTOPICCOMPOSITIONOF LWRHU FUEL
Weight
Percent Radioactivity Total
Plutonium at Half-Life (Curies/gramof Curies
Isotope Manufacture (Years) plutonium*) (10/89)
236 <10.6 2.85 532 <1
238 82.47 87.7 1/.1 3,990
239 14.8 24,100 0.0621 2.6
240 2.10 6,560 0.227 1.35
241 0.29 14.4 103.2 84.8
242 0.14 376,000 0.00393 <1
Other TRU
isotopes 0.20 .... 1.9
TOTALS 100.00 4,_01
* Based on values from Table B-2 in WE 19_f.
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2.2.2.2 RTGand GPHSDes!qn and Performance History
The GPHS,which is the source of energy for the RTGson the Galileo
spacecraft, is the culmination of almost 25 years of design evolution of heat
' source technology. Safety is a principal engineering design goal of the heat
source. The safety-related design goals are to: 1) contain or immobilize
._ the fuel to the maximumextent possible under normal and accident
environments, and 2) ensure compatibility with the power generation system.
The following is a brief summary(Bennett 1987) of relevant __Cety
_. environments and GPHSresponse:
• Liquid Propellant Fires: The GPHSmodules survive the most severe
fires that can result from on-pad events.
• Solid Propellant Fir_s: The GPHSsurvives fires in contact with
" the burninq solid propellant.
• Explosions: Bare GPHSmoduleswere shownte survive up to
: _pproximately1,070psi overpressures,and moduleswithinan RTG
converterhousingwere shownto surviveapproximately2,200 psi.
• _velocity Fraqments: Test data for bare fuelclads impacted
by flyer platesrepresentativeof structuresinvolvedin External
Tank (ET)explosions(i.e.,aluminumof thicknessof approximately
3.5 mm) were onlyminimallybreachedat velocitiesbetween349 and
1,173m/s (1,145to 3,838 f/s). Furthertests representativeof
Solid RocketBooster(SRB)fragments(I/2inch thick stainless
steel)show the RTG to survivef_agmentvelocities,with a face-on
impactup to 700 f/s,with no releaseof fuel; edge-onSRB
. fragmentsbreachedthe RTGsat velocitiesof 95 m/s (312f/s).
• Reentry: GPHS modulessurviveEarth-escape-velocity-reentry
ablationand thermalstresswith wide margins.
• Earth Impact: GPHS moduleswere designedto surviveimpacton
hard surfaces(granitc/steel/concrete)at terminalvelocity;
53 m/s (172f/s). Test resultsshowno failuresof clads against
sand up to 250 m/s (820f/s), no clad failuresagainstconcreteat
terminalvelocity,and smallreleasesabainststeelor graniteat
terminalvelocity. Clads alone showedsmall releasewhen
impactingat terminalvelocityon a hard surface.
• Ocean Impact: GPHSmodulessurvivewater impactand will resist
significantfuel releasefor virtuallyunlimitedperiods.
• The designfeaturesfor the GPHS incorporatemany safety-related
considerations,The f_el used in the GPHSdesign is plutonium-238dioxide,
high-firedand hot-pressedinto62.5 Watt capacityceramicfuel pellets. In
this form,plutonium-238Is virtuallyinsolublein groundor sea water should
suchexposureoccur.
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The primary protective material used to encapsulate the fuel is an alloy
of iridium. Iridium is a unique noble metal found in deposits of gold and
• platinum. It is compatiblewith the fuelmaterialto over 1,500uc(2,700UF), i
resistsoxidationin air to 1,000°C(1,800°F),and melts at 2,447°C
, (4,437°F). Each clad also containsa fritvent designedto releasethe
heliumgeneratedby the fuel alphaparticledecay and to preventthe release
of plutonium.
The graphiticmaterialsin the GPHS performseveralfunctions. The
primaryfunctionis to providereentryprotectionfor the fueledclads. .
This is the job of the aeroshell. A secondmajor functionis impact
protection. This is accomplishedby both the aeroshelland the impactshell.
The impactshell also servesas a redundantreentryaeroshell. The third
functionis to providea mountingstructurefor the clads to survivenormal
groundhandlingand launchdynamicloads. The materialused for the
aeroshelland impactshell is calledfineweave,piercedfabric (FWPF). FWPF
is a carbon-carboncompositematerialwoven with high-strengthgraphite
fibersin three perpendiculardirections. Upon impregnationand
graphitization,the materialhas an extremelyhigh thermalstressresistance
as requiredfor reentryprotection. FWPF has a very fine structurethat
r' resultsin uniformablationcharacteristicsleadingto high confidencein
ablationmargins. This material,used primarilyby the Air Force for missile
nose cones,is one of the best availablefor reentryapplications.
• i
The GPHS deliberatelywas designedto be composedof sma}l,modular
units so that reentryheatingand terminalvelocitywould be lower than they
,- were for previousheat sources. A modularheat sourcetends to minimizethe
amountof fuel that can be postulatedto be releasedin a given accident.
* For example,for a high-velocityfragmentimpactresultingfrom a severe
explosionthat penetratesthe GPHS, only a few of the fueledclads would be
expectedto releasefuel. This is an improvementover earlierheat source
designs.
Overall,the U.S. Departmentof Energy(DOE)has spentg years in
engineering,safety,and environmentaltestingof the GPHS, buildingon the
experiencegained from previousheat sourcedevelopmentprograms. The test
programresultshave proventhe presentdesignto be the most successfulof
any heat sourcedevelopedfor past programs.
There have been threeU.S. spacecraftthat failedto achievetheir
intendedmissionincludedRTGsonboardthe spacecraft. Early RTG models
carriedrelativelymuch smalleramountsof radioactivematerialand were
builtto burn up at high altitudeduringaccidentalreentry. This design _"
requirementwas met in 1964duringthe malfunctionof the Navy'sTransit-
5BN-3navigationalsatellitethat carriedthe SNAP9A RTG.
.- Since 1964, RTGs have beendesignedto containor immobilizetheir
plutoniumfuel to the maximumextentpossibleduringall missionphases.
This designphilosophyhas performedflawlesslyin two missionfailureswhere
_ RTGswere present. A SNAP 19B2RTG landedintactin the PacificOcean in May
1968 after a NimbusB weathersatellitefailedto reach orbit. The fuelwas
recoveredand used in a latermission. In April 1970,the Apollo 13 lunar
modulereenteredthe atmosphereand its SNAP 27 RTG, which was jettisoned,
fell intactinto the 20,000feet deep Tonga Trenchin the PacificOcean.
Measurementsshowthat therewas no releaseof radioactivematerialintothe
atmosphere.
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2.2.2.3 SpacecraftPropulsionSubsystem
The Galileospacecraftusesmonomethylhydrazinefuel and nitrogen
tetroxideoxidizerfor its propulsionsubsystem. This propellantcombination
• is hypergolic(i.e.,the propellantsignitespontaneouslyupon contactwith
each other). The spacecraft'spropellanttanks are loadedat the Kennedy
; Space Center (KSC)with about807 poundsof monomethylhydrazineand 1,290
poundsof nitrogentetroxide.
2.2.3 STS/IUSLaunchVehicle
The STS/IUSlaunchconfigurationconsistsof the STS Shuttlebooster
with an IUS that is carriedto Earthorbit in the Shuttlebay. Figure2-8
illustratesthe configurationof the spacecraftin the Shuttlebay for
launch. The selectionof the STS/IUSlaunchvehiclewas addressedin the
Tier I FEIS (NASA 1988a).
The STS consistsof a pilotedreusablevehicle(theShuttle)mountedon
a non-reusableExternalTank (ET)containingliquidhydrogenand oxygen
propellantsand two Solid RocketBoosters(SRBs). The Shuttlehas three main
rocketenginesand a cargo bay 60 feet long by 15 feet in diameter(NASA
_ 1978).
_ At launLh,both SRBs and the Shuttle'srocketenginesburn
simultaneously.After approximately128 secondsintothe flight,the spent
SRB casingsare jettisonedand subsequentlyrecoveredfrom the ocean. The
E[ is jettisonedbeforethe Shuttlegoes into Earth orbit. The Shuttle's
J OrbitalManeuveringSystem (OMS)is then used to propelthe Shuttleintothe
desiredEarthorbit. Once the IUSwith its payloadis deployed,the OMS is
used to take the Shuttleout of orbit. The Shuttleis pilotedback to Earth
for an unpoweredlanding. A more detaileddescriptionof the Shuttlecan be
found in AppendixB and the ShuttleEIS (NASA1978).
Once deployedfrom the Shuttle,the IUS can propelpayloadsintohigher
Earth orbitsor to Earth-escapevelocitiesneeded for planetarymissions.
The IUS proposedfor use on the Galileomissionis a two-stagesolidrocket
(Boeing1984). Figure2-9 illustratesthe configurationof the Galileo
spacecraftassembledwith the IUS.
2.2.4 RanQe SafetyCon$iUerations
The EasternSpace and MissileCenterat PatrickAir Force Base is
responsiblefor range safetyfor any NASA/KSCspace launch. The goal of
Range Safety is to controland containthe flightof all vehicles,precluding
the impactof intactvehiclesor piecesthereofin a locationthat could
, endangerhuman life or damageproperty. Althoughthe risk can never be
completelyeliminated,Range Safetyattemptsto minimizethe risks while not
undulyrestrictingthe probabilityof missionsuccess.
Each STS flightvehiclecarriesa Range SafetyFlightTerminationSystem
(FTS). When activatedby an electronicsignalsent by the RangeSafety
Officer,the FTS activatesexplosivechargesdesignedto destroythe vehicle.
The STS FTS enablesthe Range SafetyOfficerto destroythe SRBs and ET if
the flighttrajectorydeviatestoo far from the plannedcourse.
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L2.2.5 Mission Conttnqencies
2.2.5.1 Intact Aborts I
The STS vehicle has an intact abort capability in the event specific
failures (e.g., engine loss, electrical/auxiliary power failure, etc.) occur
during the early phases of launch. Intact abort is defined as safely
returning the Shuttle crew and cargo to a suitable landing site. Five basic
abort modesexist providing continuous intact abort capability during ascent
to orbit: Return To LaunchSite, Transoceanic Abort Landing, Abort-Once-
Around, Abort-To-Orbit, and Abort-From-Orbit. These intact, safe abort
capabilities enable protection of the crew and the payload after anomalies
and may avoid loss of missions. Therefore, mannedsystems offer a capability
that does not exist on expendable launch vehicles. The planned intact abort
landing sites for the Galileo mission are as follows.
Type of Abort Site
ReturnTo LaunchSite KennedySpace Center
TransoceanicAbort Landing Ben Guerir,Morroco
Alternate-
Moron,Spain
Abort-Once-Around EdwardsAir Force Base,CA
Alternates-
White Sands Space Harbour,NM
KennedySpace Center
Abort-From-Orbit EdwardsAir ForceBase, CA
Alternates-
White Sands Space Harbour,NM
KennedySpaceCenter
2.2.5.2 ContingencyAborts
Contingencyabort conditionsare definedwhen two Space ShuttleMain
Enginesfailprior to singleengineTransoceanicAbort Landingcapabilityor
when three enginesfailprior to achievingan Abort-Once-Aroundcapability.
These conditionsresultin a crew bailoutand subsequentocean impactof tile
Shuttle.
There is a possibilityof performinga ReturnTo LaunchSite abort if
two or three main enginesfailwithin20 _econdsafter launchor a
TransoceanicAbort Landingif threeeng!nesfail duringthe last 30 seconds
of poweredflight. However,duringthe remainderof the ascentphase,two or
three main enginefailuresresultin a contingencyabort scenario.
2.2.5.3 On-orbitSpacecraftAborts
It is also possibleto abort the Galileomissionif problemsoccur after
deploymentof the Galileo/IUSfrom the STS Shuttleand beforeVEEGA
trajectoryinsertion. For example,shouldthe IUS fail to insertthe
spacecraftinto an Earthescapetrajectory,the spacecraftwill be separated
automaticallyfrom the IUS. The estimatedlifetimeof the spacecraftin low
Earth orbitwill be severaldays. In about 54 percentof the cases where an
IUS failureoccurs,the spacecraftwill eitherescapeEarth orbit or, using
the spacecraftpropulsionsystem,will achievea long-termstorageorbit.
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• 2.3 ELIMINATIONOF THE DELAYALTERNATIVE
! The Tier 1 (program level) EIS (NASA1988a) considered the Titan IV [launch vehtcle as an alternative booster stage for launch in May 1991 or
later. The May 1991 Venus launch opportunity is considered a "planetary
back-up" for the Magellan (Venus Radar Mapper) mission, the Galileo mission,
and the Ulysses mission. Plans were underway to enable the use of a Titan IV
launch vehicle for the planetary back-up. However, in November1988, the
U.S. Air Force, which procures the Titan IV for NASA,notified NASAthat it
could not provide a Titan IV vehicle for the May 1991 launch opportunity due
to high priority Department of Defense requirements. Consequently, NASA
terminated all mission planning for the Titan IV planetary back-up.
A minimumof 3 years is required to implement mission-specific
modifications to the basic Titan IV launch configuration; therefore,
insufficient time is available to use a Titan IV vehicle in May 1991. Thus,
the Titan IV launch vehicle is no longer a feasible alternative to the
STS/IUS for the May 1991 launch opportunity.
Since the environmental considerations of a May 1991STS/IUS launch are
essentially the sameas for an October 1989 launch, the delay alternative was
eliminated from further consideration.
2.4 DESCRIPTIONOF THE NO-ACTIONALTERNATIVE
The no-actionalternativewould resultin the terminationof the further
commitmentof resourcesto the mission. If NASA did not proceedwith the
Galileomission,the goals of the NASA Solar SystemExplorationProgram
(i.e.,the potentialscientificreturnsof this mission)would not be
attained.
2.5 COMPARISONOF ALTERNATIVES
The factorspertinentto a comparisonof the "ProposedAction"with the
"No-Action alternativehave been separatedinto those relatedto normal
missionsand to accidents. The comparisonis summarizedin Table 2-3.
2.5.1 [nvirQnmentalImpactsof the Mission
2.5.1.1 EnvironmentalImpactsfromNormalMission
h
None of the alternativesincludingthe proposedactionare expectedto
resultin any significantenvironmentalimpactsto the physicalenvironment,
The proposedactionwill resultin limitedshort-termair, water quality,and /
biologicalimpactsIn-theimmediatevicinityof the launchsite. These
impactshave beenpreviouslyaddressedin other NationalEnvironmentalPolicy ,
Act (NEPA)documents(NASA1985a,NASA )986,NASA 1988a,USAF 1986,USAF
. 1988b)and are associatedwith the routinelaunchoperationsof the STS and
Titan IV launchvehicles. The impactswere determinedby NASA to be
insufficientto precludeShuttleoperations. The followingsubsections
brieflysummarizethe impactsdescribedin Secion 4.
ProoosedAction
Short-termair qualitydegradationat the launchsite and downwindof
the launchwill occur from the HCl and aluminumoxide emissionsfrom the
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rTABLE2-3. SUMMARYCOHPARISONOF ALTERNATIVES
I PROPOSED ACTION
PROGRAMMATIC CONSIDERATIONS I NO ACTION
I STS/IUS
I IN 1989
"" .... "°'''''" "" ..... "°'''" ...... "'°" I ..... "" ''''''''''' .... " .... | ........ " ...............
SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
Expected (Normal Launch)
• Land Use No significant adverse No Effect
impacts on non-taunch
related tend uses.
• Air QuaLity Short-term degradation No Effect
of air quality utthtn
Launch cloud and near-
field (about 1,600 feet
from Launch pad).
No significant adverse
impacts outside the near-
field environment.
• Sonic Boom No significant adverse No Effect
impacts.
• HydroLogy and Water QuaLity No significant adverse No Effect
tong-term impacts.
Short-term increase in
the acidity of nearby
water impoundments.
• BioLogicaL Systems Short-term vegetation No Effect
damage contributes to
tong-term decrease in
species richness in
near-fieLd over time
uith ShuttLe operations.
Fish kiLLs in near-by
mosquito control
impoundments expected
utth each ShuttLe
Launch.
No significant adverse
effects outside the
near-fieLd.
h
• Endangered and Threatened No significant adverse No Effect
Species effects.
s Socioeconomic Factors No significant adverse No Effect
effects. Short-term
economic effects from
tourism.
I
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TABLE 2-3. SUMMARYCOMPARISONOF ALTERNATIVES(Continued)
PROPOSEDACTION I
PROGRANNATIC ONSIDERATIONS I NO ACTION
ST$/IUS I
IN 1989 I
.............. . .... . ................... . .... . ................... J ........................
Expected (Balance of Mission) No stgntftcsnt adverse No Effect
effects.
Potential Accidents:
Overall Probability of Pu-238 7X10"4 0
Release to Biosphere for Mission
Quantity of Pu-238 Released to
gio)phere in the Event of an
Accident during Mission
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
Release
Expectation 894 Curies at 3XI0 "4 None
MaximumCredible 1,860 Curies at 1X10"4
VEEGAAccident Causing Release
Expectation 12,900 Curies at 5X10"7 None
Maximum Credtbte 11,568 Curies at 1XlO"7
Lifetime Incremental Population
Dose in the Event of a Mission
Accident-Total; (above de minlmis)
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
Release
Expectation 821 person-ram at 4X10"6 None
(7 person-ram)
Maximum CredibLe 4,890 person-rem st 1X10"4
(3,710 person-rem)
VEEGAAccident Causing Release 5X]0"7 I
- Expectation 1,120 person-ram at None
(647 person-ram)
- Maximum CredibLe 51,700 person-rem at IXI0 "7
(50,600 person-rem)
incremental Cancer Fatalities among
Expo:|ed Population in the Event of
a NilssionAccident (above
de minimis)
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
Retease
Expectation 0.001 at 4X10"4 None
MaximumCredible 0.7 at lX10 "4
VEEGAAccident Causing Release
Expectation 0.1 at 5X10 "7 None
Nex|_ Credible 9 at IXiO "7
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rTABLE2-3. SUHHARYCOHPARISONOF ALTERNATIVES(Continued)
PROPOSEDACTION I
PROGRAMMATIC CONSIDERATIONS NO ACTION I
STS/IUS I
IN 1989 I
Intend Area Requiring Assessment
and Possible Cleanup in Event of
an Accident
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
Release
Expectation 141 km2 None
: Maximum Credible 5 km2
VEEGA Acci,dent Causing Release
Expectation 15 km2 None
Maximum Credible 9 km2
SCIENCE RETURN
Jupiter Arrival Date December 7, 1995 None
Mission Margins:
- Powe¢ Adequate N/A
- #ropettent Adequate N/A
VEEGA Asteroid Opportunities Gaspra & Ida None
COST
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST $1.04 Billion JSunk Cost of $800 Hilt.
LAUNCH OPPORTUNITY
Vehicle Availability Fire Commitment N/A
N/A
Launch Period
- First Possible Launch Date October 8, 1989 N/A
- Length k7 Days N/A
Deity Launch Window 5-50 Minutes N/A :
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Supporting Facility Availability Firm Commitment Not Required
Personnel Availability Project Team in PLace None
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isolid rocket booster engines. The greatest effect will be in the "near
field" (i.e., within about 900 feet of the launch pad). Additional
deposition will occur outside this area in lower concentrations, with most
deposition expected to occur over the ocean.
Short-term impacts on natural vegetation and biota could be acute near
. the launch pad if the launch occurs during precipitation. This damagewould
be confined to vegetation and biota near the launch pad. Acidification of
mosquito impoundmentsnear the launch pad also may occur. These impacts are
similar to those observed during the past I0 years and are on KSCland. At
the time of launch, birds are expected to be startled by the noise, but no
long-term consequencesare expected. No adverse impacts on endangered
species are expected (based on experience with Shuttle launches to date).
Beneficial impacts on the local economywill result from the influx of
tourists who cometo view the launch. Additional benefits will result from
the science returns as discussed in Subsection 2.5.2.
No-Action A!ternativ_
The "No-Action" alternative, while not creating any direct environmental
impacts, could limit the scientific base for future technological advances.
, On the other hand, successful completion of the mission under the "Proposed
Action" would result in new scientific knowledge that could lead to techno-
logical advances that could have significant long-term positive benefits.
2.5.1.2 Possible Environmental Impacts of Mission Accidents
For the proposed action, there is a slight chance of adwrse impacts.
Analysis indicates that the chance of any plutonium-releasing accident
occurring is small (NASA]988a, and Section 4 of this EIS).
The DOEhas conducted an extensive programof safety verification,
testing, and analysis to determine the chances and consequencesof releasing
plutonium-238 from the Galileo spacecraft's RTGsand RHUsin the event of an
accident. The goal of the DOEprogram is to ensure the integrity of RTGs,
predict their response to a broad range of accident conditions, and estimate
the environmental impact, if any, of an accident. The results of these
analysP_ are presented in Section 4 and Appendix B of this document and are
briefly su_wnarizedin Table 2-3.
For the mission as a whole, the most probable accident is an IUS
failure (Phase 4) during deployment which leads to spacecraft break-up,
reentry of the RTGmodules, and impact of the modules on hard rock leading
to a release. The probability of release is 4XlO"_, or 1 tn 2,500. The
collective population dose over a 70-year period would be 4.6 person-rem
(1.3 person-rem above de mtnimts). This has been demonstrated by test and
operational experience that shows RTGshave survived Earth orbital reentry
heating conditions with no release of plutonium.
The maximumconsequencecase is an inadvertent reentry during a VEEGA
flyby (mission Phase 5). In this accident, the RTGmodules, under reentry
heating, release their graphite impact shells (GISs), which also experience
heating, and then three G_Sshit hard rock and release their plutonium fuel.
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The probability of release is 1.1xl0 "7, or about 1 in _ million. The
collective population dose is estimated as 51,700 person-rem over a 70-yea_
period to an affected population of 71,310 persons. As discussed more fully
in Section 4, even in the extremely rare event o6 this accident, the health
and environmental effects are very small. On average, over the exposed
population, the dose is less than one-fifth of the normal background dose.
The expectation case analysts for each mission phase is used, in Section
4, to derive an Individual risk value for fataltty resulting from nosslb_elaunch or mission accidents. The largest Individual risk is abou_ gX10" , or
sltghtly more than 1 in 100 mtllton. Thts figure may be comparedwith Census
Bureau data o_ Individual rts_ of fatality by various causes. _These data
showrisks varying from 7X10"J for death fro,, disease to 7X10"! for death due
to lightning. The risk of the proposed action is two orders of magnitude
lower than any tabulated value.
No-Action Alternative
There are no adverse health or environmental impacts from the no-action
alternative.
2.5.2 Scooe and Timing of Mtsstop _|_nce Return_
In comparing the alternatives it is clear that there are no significant
health or environmental impacts outside the immediate vicinity of the launch
pad associated with a normal mission. There are, however, ,najor adverse
fiscal and programmatic impacts attendant with the no-action a)ternative.
The Proposed Act:on would accomplish most of NASA'sscientific
objectives for the Galtleo mission's study of Jupiter. The Proposed Action
would result in the earliest collection of mission scientific data;
a_AJ+Jnn_llu it _n,,1,1 _F_A MACA th a nnnn_f,mnJfy fnr close observation rf
two asteroids.
The "No-Act!on" alternative by definition would result in not obtaining
any science data and therefore would effectively prevent the Natio_ from +
achieving its solar system exploration program objectives as they relate to
advanced studies of Jupiter and its satellites.
2.5.3 LaunchPreparationand ODeratlonCosts (MissionOnly)
The ProposedAction,with an estimatedcost to completionof
approximately$I billion,representsthe minimumcost alternativeto NASA for
meeting the objectives _ the Galtlec mission,
The No-Action alternative would represent the least cost alternative
for NASAbut would render useless the $800 million current investment.
Implementation of this altern_'i,e would also incur additional costs for
decoPmtsstontng facilities d_', ted for the Galileo mission and for
disassembling and/or storing t,_ _altleo spacecraft.
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2.5.4 LaunchSchedules and LaunchVehicle Availability
(
Consistent with the ProposedAction, the Galileo mission has been
manifested for flight onboard the STS in Cctober/Nove_ber 1989. There are no
planswithinthe existinglaunchmanifestto launchGalileoon board the STS
in 1991;however,if NASAdecidednot to _aunchGalileoin 1989,an STS/IUS
launchcould likelybe made available.
• 2.5.5 Facilityand PersonnelAvailabilit_
To maintainthe ProposedAction,the necessaryscientificand
engineeringpersonnelare in placeto implementthe Galileomissionin 1989.
NASA'sDeep SpaceNetworkis preparedto meet the project'strackingand data
relayrequirements.The FederalRepublicof Germanyhas agreedto provide
spacecrafttrackingsupportfor the 1989mission'sscienceexperimentsthat
are plannedduringthe Venus,Earth,and asteroidflyby phasesof the
;,- mission.
C Selectionof the No-Actionalternativewould resultin releasinga
Shuttlelaunchcommitment(andan IUS upper stagebooster)in October/
November1989 for eithera NASA or Departmentof Defensemission. Existing
L engineerswould be availableto work on other NASA projects. Most signifi-
, cantly,the scientificinvestigationsof scoresof scientistswho have
prepared10 years to conductexperimentsas part of the Galileomission
- wouldbe terminated.
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3. AFFECTEDENVIRONMENT
This sectionaddressesthoseelementsof the human environmentthat could
potentiallybe affectedby the proposedand alternativeactio,,_addressed
_, withinthis document. The sectionis dividedintothree major parts
addressing: (I) the regionin which the KennedySpaceCenter (KSC) and Cape
CanaveralAir ForceStation(CCAFS)launchareas are located,(2) the local
area encompassingthe STS and Titan IV launchsites,and (3) the "global
commons"or the globalenvironment.A briefdiscussionof plutoniumlevelsin
. the environmentis includedin the third subsectionto providethe readerwith
a perspectiveregardingthe types,sources,and levelsof environmental
plutoniumon a broad scale.
3.1 REGIONALOVERVIEW
For the purposeof this document,the regionis definedas the six county
area (Brevard,Volusia,Seminole,Lake, Orange,Osceolacounties)which
i encompassesKSC and CCAFS,as shown in Figure3-i.
3.1.1 LandUse
. About 8 percent(328,000acres)of the total region(4.1millionacres)
:_ is urbanized(ECFRPC1987),with the largestccncentrationsof people
occurringin three metropolitanareas: (I) Orlandoin Orange County,with
expansionsinto the LakeMary and Sanfordareasof SeminoleCountyto the
north;and into the Kissimmeeand St. Cloud areasof OsceolaCountyto the
. south;(2) the coastalarea of VolusiaCounty,includingDaytonaBeach,Port
Orange,OrmondBeach and New SmyrnaBeach;and (3} alongthe IndianLagoonand
coastalarea of BrevardCounty,specificallythe citiesof Titusville,
Melbourneand Palm Bay. Approximately85 percentof the region'spopulation
lives in developedurban areas.
The majorityof the regionis consideredrural,which inc}udes
agriculturallandsand associatedtrade and servicesareas,conaervationand
recreationlands,as well as undevelopedareas. Agriculturalactivities
includecitrusgroves,wintervegetablefarms,pasturelandand livestock,
foliagenurseries,sod farms,and dairy land. Citrusfarminghas been harmed
in recentyears by cankeroutbreaksand freezes,and the majorityof groves in
Lake,Seminole,Volusiaand Orangecountiesremainvacantand unused (ECFRPC
1987). With over 5,000 farms,nurseriesand ranchesin the region,about 35
percent(1.4millionacres)of the regionalarea is devotedto agriculture.
Conservationand recreationlands accountfor almost25 percentof the
total acreagein the region,or slightlyover I millionacres (ECFRPC
Undated). About 866,600acres are land resources,and about 156,000acres are
- water areas. The regionalso containsabout 5,400acres of saltwaterbeaches
and about 48 acres of archaeologicaland historicsites.
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A numberof areas within the region have special status land use !
designations. These include a portion of the Ocala National Forest, the i
Canaveral National Seashore adjacent to KSC, one State preserve, seven State )
wildlife managementareas, and two national wildlife refuges including the
Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge at KSC. The locations of these and
other such areas can be found in Appendix C-5.
3.1.2 Meteoroloqy and Air Quality
The climate of the region is subtropical with two definite seasons:
long, warm, humid summersand short, mild, dry winters. Rainfall amountsvary
both seasonally and from one year to the next. Average rainfall i; 51 inches;
the monthly high occurs in July and the low usually in April. These
fluctuations result in frequent, though usually not severe, episodes of
flooding and drought. Temperature is more constant than precipitation with
prolonged cold spells and heat waves being rare. Tropical storms, tropical
depressions, and hurricanes, all of which can produce large amountsof
rainfall and high winds, occasionally strike the region. The last hurricane
to strikethe regionwas David in September1981,which paralleledthe coast
(ECFRPC1987).
"- There are 14 air monitoring_ites in th_ region: 7 are for total
_ suspendedparticulates,2 each for sulfurdioxide,carbonmonoxideand ozone,
and I for nitrogendioxide. Lead is not monitoredanywherein the region.
Most of the monitoringsitesare locatedin the Orlandourban area;there are
.: no air qualitymo:sitoringsites in Lake or Osceol_Counties.
Air qualityis generallygood. OrangeCountyis the only countyin the
regionthat has been designateda non-attainmentarea (in this case, for
ozone). Data fromthe period1984-1986indicatethat ozone standardswere
being met (Stateof Florida1987). OrangeCountyis expectedto be re-
designatedan ozone "maintenance"area (ECFRPC1987).i
3.1.3 Hydroloqyand WaterQuality
The regionnot only bordersthe AtlanticOcean,but contains
approximately2,300lakes,2 major estuaries,and about 700 miles of streams
and rivers.
Almostall (89 percent)of the freshwater used in the region is drawn
fromgroundwatersupplies,principallythe artesianFloridanAquifer. Some •
smalluserswithdrawwater frnmthe nonartesiansurficialaquifersthat
overliethe FloridanAquifer. The FloridanAquifercovers82,000squaremiles
and is 2,000 feet thick in some areas. In portionsof the region,such as the
coastalzone and an area borderingthe St. Johns River,the FloridanAquifer
is too salinefor potablewater use (ECFRPC1987). Wells tappingthe
.._ surficial,unconfinedaquiferare largelyused for non-potableor individual
domesticuses,althoughthis sourceis also used for somemunicipalpublic
supplysystems(e.g.,the citiesof Mims and Titusville,about 15 miles
- northwestof the KSC/CCAFSlaunchsites;and Palm Bay, about 40 miles southof
the KSC/CCAFSlaunchsites, in BrevardCounty). (SeeAppendixC-2 for
locationsof BrevardCountypotablewater sources.) LakeWashington,in
BrevardCounty,about 32 miles southof the KSC/CCAFSlaunchsites,is the
only surfacewater used as a potablewater supplyin the region,supplyingthe
City of Melbourne(ECFRPC1987).
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' Groundwater reserves are recharged by the percolation of rainwater. !
The region contains someeffective recharge areas for the Floridan Aquifer
(Figure 3-2). These areas are located primarily in the upland portions of
Lake, Orange, Seminole, Osceola, and Volusia Counties and are composedof
very porous, sandy soils. Rainfall quickly percolates through the soils
into the aquifers below. In the most effective recharge areas,
approximately 15 inches of rainfall enter the Floridan Aquifer each year--
almost 30 percent of the tota; rainfall.
The major surfacewater resourcesin the regionare the upper St. Johns
River basin,the IndianRiver Lagoonsystem,the BananaRiver and a portion
of the KissimmeeRiver alongthe westernborderof OsceolaCounty. The St.
Johns River,from its headwatersin the marshesat the southernend of
BrevardCountyto the northernmostpartof Lake Washington,is classifiedby
the State as Class I water (potablewater supply),and as noted earlier,
servesas the sourceof potablewater for the City of Melbourneand much of
the _urroundingpopulationin that area. The remainderof the St. Johns
within the regionis Class Illwater (recreationand fish and wildlife
propagation).
The KissimmeeRiver (and its systemof lakes)is a major contributorof
flow into Lake Okeechobeeto the southof the region,and is the major
drainagefor OsceolaCountyand a portionof easternOrangeCounty. The
river systemis characterizedby a seriesof controlstructuresand
channeledconnectionsbetweenthe lakes for the purposesof floodwater
level controland navigation(FSU 1984).
Waterswith specialstatuswithinthe regionincludethe:
• WeikivaRiver;a federallydesignatedWild and ScenicRiver,which
formsthe borderbetweennorthwesternSeminoleCountyand eastern
LakeCounty
• MosquitoLagoonportionof the IndianRiver Lagoonwhich is a State
of FloridaAquaticPreserve
• Southernportionof the BananaRiver from the southernend of CCAFS
south and the IndianRiver LagoonbetweenMalabarand Sebastian
Inlet,also designatedas AquaticPreserves
• Portionsof the BananaRiver and MosquitoLagoon,as well as the
northernportionof the IndianRiverwithin the confinesof KSC
designatedby the State as OutstandingFloridaWaters,alongwith
the WeiklvaRiver,the Butlerchain of lakes,and the Clermontchain
of _akes.
, In total,the regioncontains4 aquaticpreserves,24 bodiesof surface
water designatedas OutstandingFloridaWaters,and I Area of CriticalState
Concern- the Green Swamp. The locationsof these areas can be f_dnd in
AppendixC-5.
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3.1.4 Geologyand Soils
The region is underlainby a seriesof limestoneformationswith a total
thicknessof severalthousandfeet. The lower formations(theAvon Park and
Ocalagroup) constitutethe FloridanAquifer. Overlyingthese formationsare
beds of sandy clay, shellsand clays of the Hawthornformationwhich form the
principalconfiningbeds for the FloridanAquifer. Overlyingthe Hawthorn
formationare Upper Miocene,Pleiocene,and recentdepositswhich form
secondarysemi-confinedaquifersand the surficialaquifer.
' 3.1.5 BioloqicalResources
As noted in Sections3.1.1 and 3.1.3,the regionhas a large numberof
terrestrialand aquaticconservationand specialdesignationareas (e.g.,
: wildlifemanagementareas and aquaticpreserves),which serve as wildlife
habitat,and compriseabout 25 percent(aboutI millionacres)of the total
land and water acreagewithinthe region(about4.1 millionacres).
Figure3-3 providesan overviewof land cover types found throughoutthe
six countyregion,with a county-by-countybreakdownprovidedin Table 3-I.
Freshwaterand coastalwetlandscompriseabout 23 percentof the total area of
the six countyregion,followedby xeric grassland(21 percent),scrub and
bush (17 percent),water (12 percent)and hardwood/pineforest (11 percent)
beingthe dominantcover types in the region.
A total of 141 speciesof freshwater,esturineand marinefish have been
documentedwithinthe northernportionsof the IndianRiver Lagoonnear KSC
(ECFRPC1988). Of these,65 speciesare consideredcommercialfish and 85 are
sportfish and/orare fishedcommercially.One speciesknown to inhabitthe
river,the rainwaterkillifish(Lucaniaparva),while not on the Federalor
State threatenedand endangeredlists,has been listedby the Florida
Committeeon Rare and EndangeredPlantsand Animalsas "imperiledstatewide"
(S2),and by the FloridaNaturalAreas Inventoryas a "speciesof special
concern."
The St. Johns River supportsboth fresh and saltwaterfishing(DOE
Ig8ga). Sport fish includelargemouthbass, bluegill,black crappie,bowfin,
gar, bullhead,bream and catfish. The St. Johns River basin is heavily
fished,as indicatedby an estimated50,000man-hoursof fishingeffort in
1983 in Lake Washingtonand LakeHarneyalone.
As noted in Section3.1.6.2,commercialfishingis an importanteconomic
assetto the region. BrevardCountyand VolusiaCountyrankedfifth and sixth
respectively,among the 12 eastcoast Floridacountiesin terms of 1987
finfishlandings. Bre_ardrankedfirst in invertebratelandings(crab,clams,
oysters,etc.) and first in shrimplandings,with Volusiafifth in both
categories.
Importantterrestrialspeciesin the regionincludemigratoryand native
waterfowl(ringneck,pintail,and bald pate ducks,for example),as well as
turkey,squirrel,white-taileddeer and wild hogs. Black bear also are known
in the region. The St. Johns River basin is an importantwaterfowlhunting
area. The seven Statewildlifemanagementareas in the region (seeAppendix
C-5) are huntedfor small game, turkey,hogs, or deer.
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|, 3.1.5.1 EndangeredSpecies t
l
The Federal government's list, prepared by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS), currently recognizes 19 endangered or threatened species in
this region. Another 55 species are "under review" for possible listing, of
which 35 are plants. The State of Florida list includes 47 species considered
endangered or threatened. The Florida Committee on Rare and EndangeredPlants
and Animals, a group consisting largely of research biologists, gives
endangered or threatened status to 55 species. The Florida Natural Areas
Inventory, run by the Nature Conservancy under contract to the Florida
Department of Natural Resources, includes 62 species in its top two most
endangered categories. Roughly half of all the endangered and threatened
species identified by these lists occur in wetlands, principally estuarine
environments; the other half depend on upland habitats (ECFRPC1987).
3ol.6 SocioeconomicEnvironment
The socioeconomic environment of the six counties that could be affected
by the launch includes fast growing communities and urban areas that have •
adopted long-range plans reflecting the rapid influx of development in the
regional area.
, 3.1.6.1 Population
The existence of three separate metropolitan areas is reflected in the
designatior_f threeMetropolitanStatisticalArea_ (MSAs)within the region
by the' . Bureauof the Census (ECFRPC1987). These MSAs are the Orlando
MSA _ange, Osceolaand SeminoleCounties),the DaytonaBeach MSA (Volusia
_ County),and the Melbourne-Titusville-PalmBay MSA (BrevardCounty). The
populationin Lake County,thoughgrowingfasterthanthe State average,is
_ split betweenmany small-to-medium-sizedmunicipalitiesand rural areas.
, Growt_Pate
• lhe r_gionalpopulationis growingat a rate fasterthan the State--
during 1960the regioncontained12.8percentof the statepopulation;in
1970 aridin 1980 the growthrate flattenedout and the regioncontained13.6
percentand 13.7 percentof the Statepopulation,respectively. In June of
1980 the disproportionalgrowthof the regionresumed. The 1980 regional
populationwas 1,336,646,a 45 percentincreasefrom the 1970 census. The
estimatedgrowthfrom 1980 to 1986was a 33.6 percentincrease(an addition
448,898persons). Currentestimates(1987)are that the growthrate is
higherin recentyears than at the beginningof the decade,and that between
1986 and 1987the populationincreased4.6 percent(77,711people),placing
14.6percentof Florida'spopulationin the region. This trend is projected
to continuethrough1991. The 1987-1991growthis expectedto be almost20
". percent,or approximately337,000people (ECFRPCUndated).
All countiesare expectedto show increasesin population. In the early
Ig90s,it is anticipatedthat 2,000,000peoplewill be livingin the region.
By the year 2000, officialestimatesshow the regionwill have about 2,300,000
residents,40 percentmore than in 1985 (ECFRPC1987).
OrangeCountyis expectedto remainthe most populatedcounty,growing
to 673,200in 1991, followedby Brevard(428,200),Volusia(373,400),Seminole
(302,100),Lake (153,000),and Osceola(115,200). Osceolais projectedto have
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4the fastest population growth rate over the 1987 to 1991 time frame with an
increase of 39.5 percent. Seminole is projected to have a 25.2 percent
increase, followed by Brevard (]9.9 percent), Lake (]7.6 percen%), Volusia (17.1
percent) and Orange is expected to show the slowest growth rate (16.5 percent).
This projected population growth is summarized in Table 3-2 (ECFRPCUndated).
3.1.6.2 Economics
The region's economic base is tourism and manufacturing. Tourism related
jobs, although difficult to define, include most jobs in amusementparks,
hotels, motels, and campgroundsas well as many jobs in retail trade and various
types of services. Manufacturing jobs, while probably outnumbered by tourism
jobs, may provide more monetary benefits to the region because of higher average
wages and a larger multiplier effect (as jobs are added to the economyin one
sector, needs are created which lead to an expansion of employment in other
sectors) (ECFRPC1987).
EconomicBase
Tourism in the region now attracts more than 20,000,000 visitors annually.
The two Walt Disney World theme parks and Sea World, near Orlando, along with
KSCare four of the five most popular tourist attractions in the state (ECFRPC
198)).
Manufacturing employs approximately 100,000 people re]ionwide. Orange and
Brevard counties account for about 70 percent of this employment. Retail and
wholesale trade provide jobs for more than half (58.9 percent in 1984) of the
: regions'employedpersons. Other economicsectorsthat providesignificant
employmentin the regioninclude: construction(7.5percent),transportation,
communicationand utilities(5.6percent),finance,insurance,and real estate
(5.9percent),and agriculture(2.7percent).
Commercialfisheriesof the two regionalcountiesborderingthe ocean
(Brevardand Volusia)landeda total of 23,608,458poundsof finfish,
invertebrates(clams,crabs,lobsters,octopus,oysters,scallops,squid,
etc.),and shrimpin 1987 (FSU1984). Brevardand Volusiarankedfifth and
sixth,respectively,among the 12 east coast countiesof Floridain total
1987 finfishlandings. Brevardled east coast countiesin invertebrate
landingswith about 16 millionpounds. VolusiaCountyrankedfifthwith
about 0.4 millionpounds. Brevardalso rankedfirst on the east coast with
1.6 millionpoundsof shrimp; Volusiawas fifthwith about 0.3 million
pounds.
The region'sagriculturalactivitiesincludecitrusgroves,wintervegetable
- farms,pastureland,feliagenurseries,sod, livestock,and dairy production
(ECFRPC1987). in the centralregion,30 percentof the land is forestedand
supportssilviculture,includingharvestingof southernyellowpine, cypress,
sweetgum,maple and bay trees. Largecattleranchesoccupyalmostall of the
rural land in Osceolacounty(ECFRPC1987). Agriculturalemploymentdeclinedin
1986to 2.2 percentof the region'semploymentbase (ECFRPCUndated).
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TABLE3-2. PROJECTE_POPULATIONGROWTH,EASTCENTRALFLORIDAREGION
(1986-1991)
Population Change 1986-1991
i
Area 1986" 1991 Number Percent
Brevard 357,000 428,200 71,200 19.9
Lake ]30,100 153,000 22,900 17.6
Orange 577,900 673,200 95,300 16.5
Osceola 82,600 115,200 32,600 39.5
Seminole 241,300 302,100 60,800 25.2
Volusia 319,000 373,400 54,400 17.1
TOTAL 1,707,800 2,045,100 337,300 19.8
(average)
* BEBR,April 1986estimate(roundedto nearest100).
Source: ECFRPCUndated
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4Reqtunal EmoloYment
About 49 percent of the residents tn the region are employed, ranging from
56 percent in Orange County to 33 percent in Lake County with 55 percent in
Seminole, 49 percent in Osceo]a, 45 percent in Brevard, and 41 percent in
Volusia. The region's labor force and employmenthas risen each :'_dr since the
mid-]970s, and employment is expected to continue to increase through ]991 to a
total of 1.08 mtllton civtltan jobs by 1991 from 0.83 million in 1986. The
regton'_ unemp]oymentrate in 1986 was 5.1 percent (ECFRPCUndated).
Reqtonal Income
Income in the regio, has been increasing faster than inflation. The
1985 to 1986 average annual wage rose 3.7 percent (about two times faster
than the Inflation rate of 1.9 percent). The 1986 average wage over all
sectors was $17,604. Per capita income in the region has risen steadily
sinc_ 1979 from $7,799 to $12,273 in 1984. The highest incomewas in Orange
County ($12,901), followed by Brevard ($12,235) and Osceola ($11,026). The
regional per capita income for 1987 to 1991 is projected to increase at a
rate somewhatgreater than inflation, perhaps surpassing the national
average in 1991 (ECFRPCUndated).
3.1.6.3 Transportation
The region's airports, for the most part, still are able to accommodate
increasing numbersof passengers. Orlando International Airport, already the
43rd busiest airport in the world in numberof passengers, is an exception. The
Greater Orlando Airport Authority has recently announcedplans to double its
capacity to 24,000,000 passengers annually. Two other major airports are
Daytona Beach Regtonal and Helbourne Regional (ECFRPC1987).
The region's road network includes five major limited access highways:
Interstate 4, Interstate 95, Florida's Turnpike, the Spessard L. Holland East-
West Expressway, and the Martin L. AndersenBeeline Expressway. In addition,
numerousFederal, State, and county roads are ]ocated in the region (ECFRPC
1987).
The remainder of the region's transportation network is varied. Rail
service for freight is available in al] counties, bat passenger service is
limited. Ports at Cape Canaveral and Sanford provide access for water-borne
shipping and cruises. Hamstransit or paratransit is currently operatiro in all
counties of the region except for Osceola (ECFRPC1987).
3.1.6.4 Public and EmergencyServices
Nearly 90 percent of the peop]e in the region rely upon public supplies of
potable water, while the remainder use private wells. Problems with saltwater
intrusion into ground water is already evident, especially in coastal Brevard
County (ECFRPC]g87).
Health care within the region is available at 28 general hospitals, three
psychiatric hospitals, and two specialized hospitals. Over 6,600 beds are
provided in the general hospitals. Doctors, dentists, and other heath care
professionals, as well as nursing homesare located throughout the region
1990012831-054
(ECFRPC1987). (See Appendix C-3 for locations of Brevard Countyemergency
services.)
3.1.6.5 Historical/Cultural _esources
There are 45 sites within the region that are listed tr tile National
Registry of Historic Places, 2 in the Nattonal Registry of Historic Landmarks,
and one area (_tsslmmeeRiver Prairie) that is a potential addition to th_
) National Registry of Natural Landmarks.
i
• 3.2 LOCALENVIRONMENT
' The local environment is defined as the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
i (CCAFS)and the KennedySpace Center (KSC). The following brief descriptions
use the Air Force En ironmental Assessmentfor the ComplementaryExpendable
LaunchVehicle (later renamedthe Titan IV) at CCAFS(USAF1986), the 1988
: supplement to that documentaddressing an increase in the numberof Titan IV
launches from CCAFS(USAF1988b), and the KSCEnvironmental Resources Document
i (NASA1986)as primarysourcesfor data and figures
The KSC/CCAFSarea is locatedon the east coastof Florida,in Brevard
Countynear the City of Cocoa Beach,approximately15 miles north of PatrickAir
t Force Base (PAFB),about30 miles southof DaytonaBeach and 40 miles due east
of Orlando(see Figure3-4). The localarea is par+ of i:e Gulf-Atlantic
coastalflats and occupiesCape Canaveraland the northend of MerrittIsland,
bothof which are barrierislands.
J
3.2.I LandUse
KSC (Figure3-5) occupiesalmost140,000acres,5 percentof which is
developedland (6,558acres)and the rest (133,444acres)is unJeveloped.
Nearly40 percentof KSC consistsof open water areas,such as portionsof
IndianRiver,the BananaRiver,MosquitoLagoonand a11 of BananaCreek.
The NationalAeronauticsand SpaceAdministration(NASA)mair_tains
operationalcontrolover about 4.7 percentof KSC (6,507acres). This aYea
comprisesthe functionalarea that is dedicatedto NASA operations. About 62
percentof this operationalarea is currentlydevelopedas facilitysites,
roads,lawns,and maintainedright-of-ways.The undevelopedoperationalareas
are dedicatedas safetyzones aroundexistingfacilitiesor held in reservefor
plannedand futureexpansion. For areasnot directlyutilizedfor NASA
operations,land planningand managementresponsibilitieshave been delegatedto
the NationalParkService(CapeCanaveralNationalSeashorewithin KSC) and the
UnitedStatesFish and WildlifeService(CapeCanaveralNationalSeashore
outsideKSC, and the 75,400acre MerrittIslandNationalWildlifeRefuge).
These agenciesexercisemanagementcontrolover agricultural,recreational,and
variousenvironmentalmanagementprogramsat KSC.
CCAFS occupiesapproximately15,800acres (a 25 squaremile area) of the
barrierislandthat containsCape Canaveral(USAF1986). Approximately3,800
acresor 25 percentof the Stationis developedand consistsof launchcomplexes
and supportfacilities(seeFigure3-6). The remaining75 percent(about12,000
acres)consistsof unimprovedland. The Titan IV LaunchComplex41 is lacated
at the northernmostsectionof CCAFS,occupying28.4 acres of land. This
complexwas previouslyused alongwith LaunchComplex40 for test flightsof the
Titan IllA, Ill C, and CentaurVehiclesin the early 1960s.
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3.2.2 MeteoroloqYand Air Quality
Like the region,the climateof KSC and CCAFS is subtropicalwith summers
that are hot and humid,and wintersthat are short and mild. Mean temperatures
range from the low 60s in the wintermonthsto the low 80s in the summermonths.
Precipitationis moderatelyheavywith an averageannualrainfallof 45.2
inches. Hail fallsoccasionallyduringthunderstorms,but hailstonesare
usuallysmall and seldomcausemuch damage. Snow is rare. Historical
climatologicaldata can be found in AppendixC-l.
In general,the winds in SeptemberthroughNovemberoccur predominantly
from the east to northeast(seeFigure3-7). Winds from Decemberthrough
Februaryoccur from the north to northwest,shiftingto the southeastfrom
March throughMay, and then to the southfrom June throughAugust. It
shouldbe noted that the radiologicalimpactassessmentsfound in Section4
and _endix B, use launchwindow-specificwind roses and meteorological
conditions. While those specificwind roses are consistentwith the
seasonalconditionsillustratedhere,they do vary slightlyfor the specific
launchwindow,and can be found in AppendixC-I. Sea breezeand land breeze
phenomenaoccur commonlyduringthe day due to unequalsolar heatingof the
air over land and over ocean. Land breezeoccursat nightwhen air over
land has cooledto a lower temperaturethan that over the sea. Temperature
inversionsoccur infrequently(approximately2 percentof the time).
/
Tornadoesmay occur but are rare. The U.S. Air Force (USAF 1986)cited a
studywhich concludedthat the probabilityof a tornadohittinga pointwithin
the Cape Canaveralarea in any givenyear is 0.00074,with a returnfrequencyof
i approximatelyonce every 1,300years.
! Tropicaldepressionsand hurricanesoccur throughoutthe wet seasonin
Florida. While the possibilityfor winds to reach hurricaneforce (74 miles per
! houror greater)in any given year in BrevardCounty is approximatelyI in 20
! (USAF1986),only 24 hurricaneshave passedwithin 115 miles of KSC and CCAFS
since 1887 (NASA 1986)_ HurricaneDavid (September1981)was the last hurricane
to affectthe area.
Air qualityat KSC/CCAFSis consideredgood, primarilybecauseof the
distanceof the launchsites frummajor sourcesof pollution. There are no
Class I or nonattainmentareas (forozone,NOX, SO2, lead, CO, and particulates)
withinabout 60 miles of KSC/CCAFS,exceptOrangeCountyto the west, which is a
nonattainmentarea for ozone (USAF1986).
The ambientair qualityat KSC is influencedby NASA operations,land
managementpractices,vehicletraffic,and emissionsourcesoutsideof KSC (NASA
1986). Daily air qualityconditionsare most influencedby vehicletraffic,
utilitiesfuel combustion,standardrefurbishmentand maintenanceoperations,
and incineratoroperations. Air qualityat KSC is also influencedby emissions
from two regionalpower plantswhich are locatedwithin a 10 mile radiusof KSC.
Space launches,trainingfires,and fuelload reductionburns influenceair
- qualityas episodicevents.
Ambientair qualityat KSC is monitoredby two PermanentAir Monitoring
System(PAMS)stations(NASA 1986). PAMS A is locatedat the Environmental
HealthFacilitySite, about 5 miles southof LaunchComplex39, and PAMS B is
locatedeast of KennedyParkwayand north of BananaCreek, about4 mileswest of
LaunchComplex39.
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A summaryof air qualityparameterscollectedfrom the PAMSA facilityin
1985 is providedin Table 3-3. The primarystandardfor NOp was exceededin
January. The 109 ug/m_ of NOp was 221 percentgreaterthan-thehighestlevel
recordedin the StateduringIhe year. KSC 24-hourmaximumlevelsfor SOp
during 1984 and 1985were alsoamong the highestalongthe east coast of -
Florida. NO2 and SO2 levelsand prevailingwesterlywinds indicatethat power
plantsto the west o7 KSC are the primarysourceof these emissions(NASA 19869.
Althoughneverexceedingestablishedstandards,ozone is the most
consistently"high"criteriapollutantat KSC (NASA 19869.
3.2.3 Hvdroloqvand Water Quality
3.2.3.1 SurfaceWaters
Major inlandwater bodiesin the CCAFS and KSC area are the IndianRiver,
: BananaRiver,and MosquitoLagoon(Figure3-8). These water bodiesare shallow
lagoons,exceptfor the portionsmaintainedas part of the Intercoastal
Waterway,betweenJacksonvilleto the north and Miami to the south. The Indian
and BananaRiversjoin at PortCanaveraland forma combinedarea of 150,000
it.
acres in BrevardCounty,with an averagedepth of 6 feet. This area receives
drainagefrom 540,000acres of _urroundingarea (USAF19869.
The surfacewater shorelinesat KSC are dominatedby mosquitocontrol
impoundments.The water levelsin these impoundmentsare raisedand lowered
seasonallyas a controltechniqueto reducemosquitopopulations. These
impoundmentsare typicallyfringedby mangroveor saltmarsh communities.The
shallowsubmergedbottomsrange from unvegetatedsand shellbottomsto meadows
of seagrasses.
The BananaRiver and IndianRiver were historicallyconnectedby Banana
Creek. This connectionwas severedin 1964with the constructionof the
LaunchComplex39 crawlerway. NavigationlockswithinPort Canaveral
virtuallyeliminateany significantoceanicinfluenceon the BananaRiver.
. Publicnavigationon the BananaRiver is prohibitednorthof NASA Parkway
East.
3-19
j
,_ _'_ I
1990012831-061
1990012831-062
SOURCE: NASA 1986
FIGURE 3-8. MAJORSURFACEWATERBODIES NEAR KSC
3-_1
,_ ,.)
1990012831-063
43.2.3.2 SurfaceWater Quality
In compliancewith the CleanWater Act, the stateof Floridahas classified !
the surroundingsurfacewaters,accordingto five classificationsbased on their i
potentialuse and value.
All of the MosquitoLagoonarea withinKSC boundariesand the northern-most
segmentof the IndianRiver are designatedas Class II waters (Shellfish
Propagationand Harvesting)(seeFigure3-9). Class II watersestablish
stringentlimitationson bacteriologicaland fluoridepollution. The discharge
of treatedwastewatereffluentis prohibited,and dredgeand fill projectsare
regulatedto protectthe area from significantdamage. The remainderof surface
waters surroundingKSC are designatedas Class Ill (BodyContactRecreationand
Fish and WildlifePropagation)waters (Figure3-g).
BananaCreek water quality(ClassIll) is influencedby non-pointsource
runofffrom the ShuttleLandingFacility,the VerticalAssemblyBuildingarea,
KennedyParkway,and undevelopedareasof the MerrittIslandNationalWildlife
Reserve. BananaCreek has experiencedfish kills in the summerwhen high
temperatureand extensivecloudcover reducethe dissolvedoxygenlevels in the
shallowwatersof the Creek.
There are about 21,422acresof mosquitocontrolimpoundmentsin 75 cells
at KSC. These impoundmentsdominatethe shorelineof KSC. Water levelsare
managedby the USFWS for mosquitocontrolpurposes.
Limitedwater qualitydata and the applicablestandardsfor the Indian
River,BananaCreek,the BananaRiver,and MosquitoLagoonare providedin Table
3-4. These data indicatethatwith the exceptionof the mosquitocontrol
impoundmentsnorthof Pad 39-B, the State of Floridastandardsare not exceeded.
The surfacewaters adjacentto the MerrittIslandNationalWildlifeRefuge
have been designatedas OutstandingFloridaWaters (OFWs)(seeFigure3-10).
The OFW designationsupersedesother surfacewater classifications,and water
qualitystandardsare basedon ambientwater qualitycondltionsor the
designatedsurfacewater standard,whicheveris higher. This level of
protectionprohibitsany activitythat would reducewater qualitybelow the
existinglevels. The entireMosquitoLagoonhas been designatedby the Stateof
Floridaas an AquaticPreserve(seeFigure3-11).
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, TABLE3-4. SURFACE_TERQI.&ALIIYATKSC*
Dissolved Turbidity
WaterBody Salinity(ppt) pH _ NitrogenPhosphorous(JIU)
IndianRiver 30.2 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.06 3.64
(Titusville- north)
(F[IRClassII)
IndianRiver 28.4 8.I 6.9 0.04 0.05 3.75
(Titusville- south
toNASAParkwayWest)
(FDERClassIII)
IndianRiver 27.8 8.1 7.2 0.06 0.05 5.0
(NASAParkwayWest
south_ Bennett
Causev_y)
(FDERClassIll)
!
MosquitoLagoon 31.8 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.05 4.9
(atKSC)
(FDERClassII)
BananaCreek 11.4 8.2 9.8 0.003 0.38 7.5
(FDERClassIll)
MosquitoControl
InIxu_nents 9.4 8.8 11.I <0.02 0.31 14.8
(northof Launch
Col)lex39)
BananaRiver 25.9 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.05 4.3
(NASACauseway,
northto nearTitan
IV LaunchConplex41)
(FDERClassllI)
FDERClassII chlorides 6.5-8.5 5.0 Mean (See 0.0001 29 NlU
St_dards IS above (Iunit 4.0Mln. noteA) (elemental) above
, backgroundvariation) (See background
(marine) noteC) •
FDERClassIII chlorides6.5-8.5 (fresh)5.0 Min. (See 0.0001 29 NTU
Standards IS above 6.5-8.5 (marine)(fresh) noteB) (elemental)above
background(l unit 4°0Min. (marine) badcjro_
(marine)variation) (marine) (SeenoteD)
_-Allne_ts areinm3/lunlessothenwisenoted.
A. NoalterationsoastocauseInbalanceinnaturalpol_latlon.
B. NoalterationsoastocauseInOalar_innaturalpopulation.
C. TotalP -noalterationsoastocauseinbalanceinnaturalIx_ulatlon.
D. TotalP -noalterationsoastocauseInbalanceinnaturalpopulation.
Source:I@6A1906.
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!The FloridaDepartmentof NaturalResources(FDNR)in its capacityto
managemaripe fisherieshas establishedwater classificationsthat regulatethe
harvestingof shellfish. Shellfishmay be harvestedfrom "approved"or
"conditionallyapproved"ai'easonly,with "conditionallyapproved"areasclosed
to harvestingfor 72 hours afterrainfallswhich exceedpreGeterminedamounts.
Prohibitedand unclassifiedareas c_n not be harvested. Shellfishharvesting
classificationof the waters surroundingKSC/CCAFSare illustratedin
Figure3-12.
LaunchComplex41 _t the Cape CanaveralAir Forc_ Station(CCAFS)is
borderedby the BananaRiverAquaticPreserveto the west and the AtlanticOcean
to the east. The BananaRiver is classifiedby the State of Flor:daas a Class
Ill water for bodycontactrecreation,and the propagationand maintenanceof
diversefish and wildlife. Surfacerunofff;'omLaunchComplex4] flows toward
the BananaRiver. Basic water qualitydata for the BananaRiver can be found in
Table 3-4.
3.2.3.3 GroundWaters
- ThreegeohydrologicunitsunderlieKSC and the CCAFS. In descendingorder,
these units are: a SurficialAquifer,SecondarySemi-ConfinedAquifers(found
in the confininglayerunderlyingthe SurficialAquifer),and the Floridan
Aquifer.
SurficialAquifer
The SurficialAqulfer(an unconfinedhydrogeologicu_it) is contiguouswiLh
the land surfaceand is rechargedby rainfallalongthe coastalridgesand
dunes,with littlerechargeoccurringin the low swampyareas. The recharge
area at KSC/CCAFSfor the SurficialAquiferis shown in Figure3-!3.
In general,water in the SurficialAquifernear the groundwaterdivideof
the islandhas potentialgradient_that tend to carry some of the water
verticallydownwardto the deepestpart of the SurficialAquiferand potentially
to the upper unitsof the SecondarySemi-Confinedaquifers(NASA I£86). East
and west of this zone,water in the Surficial,tqJiferhas verticaland
horizontalflow components. Farthertowardthe coastline,circulationbecomes
shalloweruntil,at some point,flow is essentiallyhorizoptalto the water
table (Figure3-14). Major dischargepointsfor the SurficialAquiferare the
estuarylagoons,shallowseepageoccurringto troughsand swales,and
evapotranspiration.Inlandfreshsurface..at_rsare primarilyderivedfrom
surficialgroundwater.
SecondarySemi-ConfinedAquifersand the FloridanAquifer
Groundwatersunder artesianand semi-confinedconditions,the Flbridanand
SecondaryAquifers,have upwardflow potentials. Becauseof the thickness_nd
the relativelyimpermeablenatureof the confiningunits,however,it is thought
that no significantinter-aquiferleakageis occurrl]gfrom the FloridanAquifer
naturally, lhe generalhorizontaldirectionof flow in the FloridanAquifer'is
northerlyand northwesterly.The great elevationdifferehtialbetweenthe
FloridanAquiferrechargeareas (e.g.,Polk and OrangeCounties)and discharge
3-27
¢
1990012831-069
ORIGINALPAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY "_
Am_OVF.D
_Y ARmROVEO
FIGURE3-12. KSCSHELLFISHHARVESTINGAREAS
1990012831-070
¢i ;
ORIGINALPAGE I$
OF POOR QUALITY
INDIAN|IVEI
. .,,. ;
_ -. ,_ i,. _.
,|
i- !
, I
SOURCE:NASA1986
I
FIGURE3-13. POTENTIALRECHARGEFORSURFICIALAQUIFER
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areas along the Atlantic Coast provides the potential for the flowing artesian
pressure experienced at KSC. Recharge to the Secondary Aquifers is dependent on
leakage through the surrounding lower permeability beds.
3.2.3.4 Qualityof Groundwater
Water from the FloridanAquiferat KSC and CCAFS is highlymineralized
(principallychlorides)and is not used as a potablewater source.
Floridagroundwatercriteriahave been establishedas four classes:
ClassG-I throughG-IV,with Class G-I being the most restrictive.The
majorityof the State'sgroundwatersare classifiedas G-II (potablewater
use),and for all practicalpurposes,there are no G-I or G-IV
classificationsin Florida.
Overall,water in the surficialunconfinedaquiferat CCAFS is of good
qualityand meets State of FloridaClass groundwaterqualitystandardsfor
potablewater use with the exceptionof chloride,iron,and total dissolved
solids. The elevatedconcentrationsof these parametersare due to the
influenceof adjacentsalinesurfacewaters. No potablewater wells are located
at LaunchComplex41 or in its vicinity. At KSC, high chlorideconcentrations
_ occuron the north,east, and west fringesdue to intrusionfrom surrounding
; salinewater bodies. Thus,water qualityimprovestowardsthe north-southaxis
of KSC becausethis is where primeareas of freshwaterrechargeoccur and where
potentiometric(watertable)heads have preventedseawaterintrusion.
Preliminarydata for the SecondarySemi-ConfinedAquifershow that someof
theseaquifersmay be marginalwater sources;however,it appearsthat they are
not capableof sustaininglargescaledevelopment.
3.2.3.5 OffshoreEnvironment
The AtlanticOcean offshoreenvironmentat KSC/CCAFScan be described
accordingto its bottomtopographyand characteristicsof ocean circulationin
the area.
Out to depthsof about 60 feet, sandy shoalsdominatethe underwater
topography. The bottomcontinuesseawardat about the same slopeout to about
34 mileswhere the bank slopesdown to depthsof 2,400to 3,000 feet to the i
Blake Plateau. The Blake Plateauextendsout to about 230 miles fromthe shore
at KSC/CCAFS. Figure3-15 showsthe bathymetryof the offshoreareas. Figure
3-]6 illustratesthe generalocean bottomfor a ]O0-degreeazimuthfor 0 to 115
miles fromKSC/CCAFS(USAEC1975).
_. Studiesof water movementsin the area indicatea shorewarddirectionof
the currentfor the entiredepth,surfaceto bottom,in the regionout to depths
of 60 feet (18 nauticalmiles)at speedsof severalmiles per day. Wind-driven
currentsgenerallydeterminethe currentflow at the surface. In the regionout
to the slopingbank, the flow is slightlyto the north tendingto move eastward
when the winds blow to the south. Water over the Blake Plateauflows to the
northmost of the timeand is knownas the Floridacurrentof the Gulf Stream
(USAEC1975).
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3.2.4 Geology and Soils I
KSC/CCAFSis located on a barrier island composedof relict beach ridges.
This island parallels the shoreline separating the Atlantic Ocean from the
Indian River, Indian River Lagoon, and BananaRiver. The area is underlain by
limestoneformationsa few thousandfeet thick. The formations,from oldestto
youngest,respectivelyare: the Avon Park and the Ocala;overlyingthe artesian
FloridanAquiferare the confiningbeds of the HawthornFormation;the confining
beds are overlainby Pleistoceneand RecentAge unconsolidatedeposits.
Soils in the areaof KSC/CCAFShave beenmapped by the U.S. Departmentof
AgricultureSoil ConservationService(SCS). Fivemajor soil associationshave
been identifiedby the SCS. (The locationsof the major soils associationscan
be found in NASA 1986.) The soils in the immediatevicinityof LaunchComplex
39 at KSC consistof poorlydrained,nearlylevelsalineto brackishsoils. The
principalsoilsassociationat LaunchComplex41 are moderatelyto excessively
drained,sandy soilson level or moderatelyslopingtopography.
3.2.5 BiologicalResources
3.2.5.1 TerrestrialBiota
i
Vegetationcommunitiesand relatedwildlifehabitatsare representativeof
barrierislandresourcesof the region (Figure3-17). Major naturalcommunities
includebeach,coastalstrandand dunes,coastalscrub,and wetlands. Coastal
hammocksand pine flatwoodsfound on KSC to the northwestincreasethe
: ecologicaldiversityand richnessof the area. About 90 percentof the total
KSC land area (about73,300acres)is undeveloped,and falls into these
communitytypes. About 77 percent(about12,000acres)of CCAFS is undisturbed
or has revertedback to naturalconditions.
Major PlantCommunitiesand RelatedHabitat
The principalcommunitiesin the vicinityof LaunchComplex39 at KSC and
41 at CCAFS are beach,coastalstrandand dune, coastalscrub,and wetlands.
Beachesof KSC and CCAFS are largelyunvegetated,but providesignificant
wildliferesources. The tidalzone supportsa high numberof marine
invertebrates,as well as smallfish that are food for many shore birds.
Severalspeciesof gulls,terns,sandpipers,and other birds use beachesof the
Cape Canaveralarea. In addition,researchindicatesthat these beachesare
very importantto nestingsea turtles(seeSection3.2.5.3).
Coastalstrandand dune communitiesare markedby extremesin temperature
and prolongedperiodsof drought. Vegetationon the dunes are dominatedby sea
oats. Other grasses,such as slendercordgrassand beach grass, also occur.
Shrubssuch as beach berry and marsh elder,occur in the dune communityalong
with herbs,such as beach sunflowerand camphorweed.The strandoccurs between
the coastalscrubcommunityand the salt spray zoneof the dune system. Growth
characteristicsof strandvegetationproducesa low profilethat is maintained
by nearlyconstantwinds. Plantsthat can tolerat=strandconditionsare saw
palmetto,wax myrtle,toughbuckthorn,cabbagepalm,partridgepea, prickly
pear, and variousgrasses.
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FIGURE 3-17. GENERALLAND COVERTYPES AT KSC/CCAFSAND VICINITY
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4Coastalscrub is the largestnaturalcommunityat CCAFS,covering
approximately9,400 acresat CCAFS and almost20,000acres at KSC. The coastal
2 scrubassociationis characterizedby xerictree species,includingscruboak,
liveoak and sand live oak, and myrtleoak. The scrubcommunityis a harsh
environmentlimitedby low soil moistureconditions. Herbaceousand shrub
vegetationis sparseand includeswire grass, saw palmetto,tar flower,lantana,
wax myrtle,greenbriar,pricklypear, gopherapple,and others.
Wetlandswithin and surroundingthe launcharea are importantwildlife
resources. About 78 percentof KSC, for example,is consideredwetlandhabitat.
Wetlandtypes that are found in the area includefreshwaterponds and canals,
brackishimpoundments,tidal lagoons,bays, rivers,vegetatedmarshes,and
mangroveswamps. Thesewetlandsprovideresourcesfor a vast assemblageof
marineorganisms,waterfowl,and terrestrialwildlife.
"Pineflatwoodsoccur principallyin the northwestand centralportionsof
KSC. Dominanttree speciesare piles,includingslash pine, longleaf,and sand
pine.
Coastalhammocksare characterizedby closedcanopiesprovidedby cabbage
palms,which is the dominanttree species. Additionaltree speciesin hammocks
are red bay, liveoak, and stranglerfig.
• Ruderalvegetationdominatessitesdisturbedby or createdby past human
activity,such as constructionand agriculture.Vegetationcommunitiesinclude
Brazilianpepper,Australianpine, wax myrtleand melaleuca. Citrusgroves,the
only agriculturalcommunitycurrentlyoccurringwithinKSC, occupy about 2,500
acresof land, slightlyover3 percentof the total KSC land area. The groves
occur in the northernportionof KSC alongMosquitoLagoonand on the Merritt
Islandportionof KSC south of BananaCreek.
Wildlife
Nearly60 speciesof reptilesand amphibiansare known to inhabitthe area.
Three of the residentspecies(theAmericanalligator,the easternindigosnake,
and the Atlanticsaltmarsh snake)are federallyprotected.
KSC and the surroundingcoastalareas providehabitatfor nearly300
bird species. Nearlygo speciesare residentbreederswhile over 200
speciesoverwinterat KSC. The breeding,wintering,and migratorybird
speciesand their relativeoccurrencewithin 17 habitattypes at KSC have
beendocumentedand are found in NASA 1986.
The expansiveareas of wetlandsprovideideal feeding,roostingand
nestinghabitatfor nearlytwo dozen speciesof wadingbirds. Many of the
.. wetlandswithinthe MerrittIslandNationalWildlifeRefugeare managedto
providewinteringhabitatfor approximately200,000waterfowl.
. Colonialnestingbirdsoccur within11 rookeriesat and near KSC/CCAFS,
with 4 rookerieslocatedwithin2 miles of LaunchComplexes39 and 41, (see
AppendixC-4). Among the speciesutilizingthese locationsare egrets,ibis,
heron,cormorant,and anhingua.
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More than 20 speciesof mammalsare knownto inhabitthe MerrittIsland
landmass. Mammalsincludemice, voles,raccoons,opossum,rabbit,wild hog,
i and aquaticmammals,such as the manateea_d bottlenosedolphin.
3.2.5.2 AquaticBiota
The coastlinefrom Daytonasouthto Melbourneand extendingseawardto a
depth of 100 fathomsis one of the most productivemarinefisheryareas along
the southernAtlanticCoast. The inshorewaters supportan importantsea trout
,. and redfishsportfishery. The lagoonsand riverssupportcommercialfishery
operationsfor blue crab and blackmullet.
Shellfishingis an importantcomponentof the commercialand recreational
fishingeffort. BrevardCountyleadsthe State in the productionof hard clams
(quahogs)and scallops. The commercialscallopfisherypredominatesoff shore;
it is estimatedthat 30 to 40 millionpoundsof calicoscallopswere harvested
off Cape Canaveralin 1984. A numberof renewableoysterleasesare held in the
watersnear KSC. The southernquahogis the most frequentlytaken specieswith
large numbersbeing gatheredfrom the tidalmud flats by both commercialand
recreationalfishermen. See Figure3-12 for shellfishharvestingareas around
KSC/CCAFS.
i
The lagoonsystemsurroundingKSC providesboth recreationalfin and shrimp
fishing. It is estimatedthat, in 1985,90,300recreationalfishermenutilized
the fisheryresourcessurroundingKSC. The fish fauna of the IndianRiver
lagoonsystemhas receivedconsiderableattention. The fresh and brackish
watersassociatedwith the KSC areaave reportedto support141 species.
Benthicmacroinvertebratesof the northernIndianand BananaRiverscan be
classifiedas estuarine-marineanimals. A total of 122 speciesof benthic
macroinvertebrateshave been reportedfrom brackishlagoonssurroundingLaunch
Complex39A and the northernBananaRiver. Althoughshrimpspeciesof
commercialimportancewere collected,the northernIndianRiver is not
consideredan importantnurseryarea for these species. MosquitoLagoon,
however,is consideredan importantshrimpnurseryarea. Blue crabs were
determinedto spawn in the area also.
3.2.5.3 Endangeredand ThreatenedSpecies
The USFWS and FloridaGame and FreshWater FishCommissionI,rotecta number
of wildlifespecieslistedas endangeredor threatenedunder the Federal
EndangeredSpeciesAct of 1973 (as amended),and under the FloridaEndangered
and ThreatenedSpeciesAct of 1977 (as amended),respectively.A list of the
protectedspeciesat KSC/CCAFSis found in Table 3-5. The Federallist contains
seven speciesas endangeredand three speciesas threatened. The State of
Floridaliststwo additionalspeciesas threatened.
A reviewof CCAFS endangeredor threatenedspeciesshows that only three
species(southeasternKestrel,Floridascrub jay, easternindigosnake)
potentiallyoccur in the immediatevicinityof LaunchComplex4I. An additional
three species(woodstork,bald eagle,peregrinefalcon)may occasionallyoccur
in wetlandslocatedto the east of the complex.
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TABLE 3-5. ENDANGEREDAND THREATENEDSPECIESRESIDINGOR
SEASONALLYOCCURRINGON KSC/CCAFSAND ADJOINING
WATERS
Status
Species USFWS* FGFWFCT**
Mammal@
Caribbeanmanatees(Trichechusmanatus) E E
Birds
Wood stork (Mycteriaamerican) E E
B_ld eagle (Haliaeetus!eucocepha!us) E T
Peregrinfalcon (Falcoperegrinus) T E .
.- Southeasternkestrel(Falcosparverius) - T
Red-cockadedwoodpecker(picoidesboreali_) E T
Floridascrubjay (Ahpe!ocomacoerulesen=s.l - T
Dusky s_side sparrow(Ammospizamaritima} E E (last known
individualdied
in captivityin
1987)
Reptiles
Atlanticgreen turtle (Cheloniam.ydas) E E
Atlanticridleyturtle (Lepidochelvskempi) E E
Atlanticloggerheadturtle (CarettacarettB) T T
Easternindigosnake (Drvmarchoncorals) T T
*U.S. Fish and WildlifeService
**Gameand FreshWater Fish Commission
E - Endangered.
T - Threatened.,
Source: USAF 1986
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Caribbeanmanatees,green turtles,rldleyturtles,and loggerheadturtlesare I
known to occur in the BananaRiver,MosquitoLagoon,and along AtlanticOcean
beaches. Of the remainingtwo species,dusky seasidesparrnwis now thoughtto
be extinct,and the red-cockadedwoodpeckeris not expectedto occur in the
vicinityof LaunchComplex41 due to the absenceof suitablehabitat.
Ten nestinglocationsthat have been used by the bald eagle have been
, locatedat KSC. A 1985surveynoted that 5 locationswere active,witll10
adultsproducing7 eaglets. NestingtypicallyoccursbetweenOctoberand mid-
May. Eaglesare susceptibleto disturbanceduringthe mating and rearingcycle
from courtshipthroughaboutthe first 12 weeks of nesting. (SeeAppendixC-4
for additionaldetailsof nestinglocatiens.)
With respectto the West IndianManatee,the followingareas at KSC/CCAFS
have been designatedas C)'iticalHabitatby the USFWS: the entireinland
sectionof water known as the IndianRiver,from its northernmostpoint
immediatelysouthof the intersectionof U.S. Highway1 and SR-3; the entire
inlandsectionof water knownas the BananaRiver;and all waterwaysbetweenthe
Indianand BananaRivers(exclusiw)of thoseexistingmanmadestructuresor
settlementsthat are not necessaryto the normalneeds of the survivalof the
species). Criticalhabitatand areasof manateeconcentrationare delineatedin
, AppendixC-4.
Osprey,listedby the Conventionon InternationalTrade in Endangered
Speciesof Wild Flora and Faunawere thoughtto be activelyutilizinga total of
25 nestingsites near KSC. The closestsitewas a nestingarea about 2 miles to
the west of KSC LaunchComplex39 (about3 miles approximatelynorthwestof
CCAFS LaunchComplex41). (SeeAppendixC-4 for additionaldetail.)
3.2.6 $Ociqeconomi_s
3.2.6.1 Population
The demographicsof the localarea sites are based upon the workforce
employedat CCAFS and KSC and are influencedby the influxof peopleand their
distributionprior to and duringlaunches. Duringa launch,approximately6,000
employeesmay be onsite. The populationmay increaseduringlaunchesof special
interestby more than 100,000spectators,varyingwith the time of day and year,
and the weather. These individualsoccupynearbybeach areas and line the
publicroads in the area. Onsitepopulationat launchtime is increasedby
about 17,300visitorsand press personnel(Harer1988). These additionalpeople
(seeAppendixC-3 for detail)are distributedamong variousviewingareas as
follows:
e 2,000 peopleat the #I VIP Site (StaticTest Area)
h
e g,o00 peopleat the #2 VIP Site (eastof the Banana
RiverCausewaydrawbridge;total could increaseto
11,000-13,000peopl_if #I VIP Site cannotbe used)
e 2,000press membersat the sitewest of the BananaRiver
drawbridge
3-39
,9'
1990012831-081
Io 4,000 peopleat the IndianRiverCausewaySite (eastof the
drawbridgefor I mile)
o 250 peopleat the O&C Building
• 50 peopleat the LCC Building.
_ 3.2°6.2 Economy
The economyof the surroundingarea is influencedby the presenceof both
CCAFS and KSC, but the area'sdependenceupon them has lessenedin recentyears.
NASA civilianemploymentin BrevardCountyaccountedfor about 11 percentof
countyemploymentin 1987,whereasin 1967 it accountedfor about 25 percentof
countyemployment(BrevardCounty1988a). KSC contracts,however,providea
substantialamountof income,totalingabout $720millionin 1987.
q
3.2.6.3 Transportation
The area is servicedby Federal,State,and local roads. Primaryhighways
includeInterstate95, US-I, State Route (SR)-AIA,and SR-520. Urban areas on
the beachesand MerrittIslandare linkedby causewaysand bridges. Road access
to KSC is from SR-3 and the Cape Road from the south,NASA Causeway(SR-405)and
the Beach Road (3R-406)from the west, and KennedyParkwayfrom the north.
There are about 211 miles of roadwayat KSC; 163 mi]es paved and 48 miles
unpaved. CCAFS is linkedto the highwaysystemby the SouthGate via SR-AIA,
NASA Causeway,and Cape Road.
Rail transportationin the area is providedby FloridaEastCoast Railway.
A mainlinetraversesthe citiesof Titusville,Cocoa,and Melbourne. Launch
Complex41 is servicedby a branchline fromTitusvillethroughKSC. At KSC,
approximately_0 milesof rail track provideheavy freighttransportto KSC.
MelbourneRegionalAirportis the closestair transportationf_cilityand
is located30 miles southof CCAFS. CCAFS containsa skid strip used for
Governmentaircraftand deliveryof launchvehicles, Any air freightassociated
with operationof LaunchComplex41 uses the CCAFS skid strip. Ferryingand
supportaircraftservingKSC utilizethe ShuttleLandingFacility.
PortCanaveralis the nearestnavigableseaportand has a total of 1,578
feetof dockageavailableat existingwharf facilities.
3.2.6.4 Publicand EmergencyServices
A mutualagreementexistsbetweenthe City of Cape Canaveral,KSC, and the
RangeContrdctorat CCAFS for reciprocalsupportin the event of an emergencyor
disaster. Two Firestationslocatedin the VerticalAssemblyBuilding(VAB)
Area and the IndustrialArea providefor effectivecoverageof KSC.
Securityoperationsincludea_:esscontrol,personnelidentification,
trafficcontrol,law enforcement,investigations,classifiedmaterialcontrol,
and nationalresourcepro_ection. TiseBrevardand VolusiaCountySheriff's
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Fdepartoents, the USFWSan_ ha National Park Service supple,;ent KSCsecurity _ l
forces in patrolling non-secure areas of KSC(e.g., Cape Canaveral National
Seashore,MerrittIslandNationalWildlifeRefuge)(NASA 1986).
Medicalservicesare providedat the facilitiesand by hospitalsat Patrick
Air Force Base and in Cocoa,Tltusvlll_,and Melbourne. CCAFS is equippedwith
: a dispensaryunder contractto NASA. Medicalservicesare providedto KSC by an
OccupationalHealthFacilityand an EmergencyAid Clinic.
No publicschoolfacilitiesare wesent on CCAFS or KSC. All school-age
childrenof the KSC a,d CCAFSworkforceattend;choo_in he vicinityin wh:h
they llve.
No recreationalfacilitiesare presenton CCAFS,exceptfor _hose
associatedwith the TridentSubmarineWharf, a serviceclub, and a naval '
recreationfacility. Culturalfacilit;eson stationincludethe Air ForceSpace
Museum,tow facilities,and MissionControl,all locatedat the southernportion
of the base. Offbasemilitaryand civilianpersonnelutilizerecreationaland
culturalfacilitiesavailablewithinthe communities.
KSC has a 238 acre recreationalarea (Complexgg) locatedon the Ba,ana
River near the southernlimitof KSC property(NASA1979). The Visito;"s
_,i InformationCente_at KSC, locatedabout6 miles east of U.S. HighwayI,
providesexhibits,lectur_s_nd _udio-visualdisplays,and bus tours on the I
facilityfor visitors.
KSC and CCAFS obtaintheirpotablewater from the City of Cocoa water
systemunder a contractthatprovidesfor someg milliongallonsper day.
Approximatelyhalfthat amountis normallyused by the two facilities. The on-
sitedistributionsystemsare sized to accommodatethe constanthigh volumeflow
requiredby tilelaunchdelugesystem. The city'swell field in OrangeCounty
has a capacityof 32 milliongallonsper day (USAF 1986).
Additionaldetailsof facilitiesin the local area can be found in Appendix
C-2 and C-3.
KSC also enforcesprocedures,plans and personneltrainingwith respectto
the use and handlingof radioactivesources. Comprehensiveradiol_gical
contingencyplans are being developedto addressall launch/landingphase
accidentsthat couldpotentiallyinvolvethe RadioisotopeThermoelectric
Generators(RTGs)and R_JioisotopeHeaterUnits (RHUs)aboardthe Galileo _,
spacecraft. These plansconformto the reauirementsof the Fede;'alRadiological
EmergencyResponsePlan that is underdevel,)pmentand involvesthe
effortsof numerousgovernmentagenciesincluCingNASA, DOE, the Departmentof
Defense,the U.S. EnvironmentalProtection_gencyand the State of Florida. An
. overviewof radiologicalcontrolsand emergancyplanningat KSC can be found in
AppendixC-6.
3.2.6.5 Historic/ArchaeologicResources
A map _howingthe relativelocationsof State listedarch_eologicsites is
providedin Figure3-I8.
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A systematicsurveyof areas in the MerrittIslandNationalWildlifeRefuge
was conductedin 1978 (NASA 1986). No significantculturalresourceswere found
other than four historicsites: SugarMill Ruins,Fort Ann, the Old Haulover
Canal,and the Dummetthomestead.
Two locationswere assessedin 1981 (NASA1986j. 0'._area c'Jered6 acres
where PeacockPocketRoadmarks the east boundary"and "R-402borderson the
north;the other areawas locatedon the south edg_ of .(-402approximately
2,300 feetwest of PeacockPocketRoad. No significantarchaeologicalsites
were found on eitherof the two locations. No significantculturalresources
•i were found as the resultof other surveys,which includeda 1982 surveyof the
UnitedSpaceBoosterFacilitytracton MerrittIslandand of the Space Shuttle
Solid RocketBoosterFacilitysite.
An archaeological/historicalsurveyof CCAFS was conductedin 1982 (USAF
1986). It was determinedthatCape Canaveralhad been inhabitedfor 4,000 to
5,000years. The surveylocated32 prehistoricand historicsitesand several
uninvestigatedhistoriclocalities. The initialresultsof the field survey
indicatedthatmany of the archaeclogicalresourceshad been severelydamagedby
constructionof roads,launchcomplexes,powerlines,drainageditches,and other
excavation. None of these sitesare locatedin the vicinityof LaunchComplex
41.
Most recently,NASA proposedto developa site along BananaCreek to
allow VIPs to view Shuttlelaunches. It was determinedthat this site contained
state listedarchaeologicsite BR170. NASA fundedan extensivearchaeologicdig
of this site. The initialwork for this study _as completedin August 1988.
3.3 GLOBALCOMMONS
This sectionprovidesa generaloverviewof the globalcommonsin termsof
overallpopulationdistributionand density,generalclimatological
characteristics,and surfacetype (i.e.,ocean,rock, soil),and also providesa
brief discussionof the globalatmosphericinventoryof plutonium. The
informationprovidedwas extractedprimarilyfromthe "OverallSafetyManual"
preparedfor the U.S.Atomic EnergyCommissionin 1975 (USAEC1975). The
"OverallSafetyManual"utilizedworldwidepopulationstatisticsand other
informationcompiledinto720 cellsof equal size. The cells were derivedby
dividingthe entireEarth from poleto pole into 20 latitudebandsof equal
area. Each latitudeband was then segmentedinto36 equal size cells for a
totalof 720 cells. Given that eachof the cellscoveredan area of the Earth
equal to 273,528squaremiles, it has been assumedfor the purposesof this
discussionthatwhile worldwidepopulation,for example,has certainlychanged
sincethe referencewas prepared,the changeis not significantrelativeto a
given 273,528squ_remile cell.
3.3.1 PopulationDistributionand Dens]:_
Figure3-i9 illustratesthe distributio_c, the Earth'spopulationacross
each of the 20 equalareG latitudebands. It shouldbe noted that the
populationscale is logarithmic.Figure3-_G illustratesthe land-adjusted
populationdensitieswithinthe latitudebaRos.
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FIGURE3-19. TOTALAND URBANWORLD POPULATIONBY EQUAL AREA LATITUDEBANDS
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FFrom these exhibits it can be seen that, with the exceptlo, of the four
more southern latitude bands, the total population amongthe bands varies by
about one order of magnitude. In addition, Figure 3-19 indicates that the
bulk of the population within most of the bands can be found in rural areas.
The greatest population densities (Figure 3-20) occur in a relatively narrow
grouping of the four northe I bands between latitudes 17 and 44 degrees
north (bands 4 through 7).
3.3.2 Climatoloqy
Worldwide climatic types, which range from the perpetual frost of the polar
climates to the dry d_sert climates, are illustrated in Figure 3-21.
3.3.3 Surface Types
The distribution of surface types, worldwide, is an important
characteristic in considering the potential consequencesof accident
scenarios analyzed for the Galileo mission. Table 3-6 provides a breakdown,
by each of the 20 equalarea latitudebands noted previously,of the total
land fractionand the totalocean fractionbrokendown by two ocean depth
categories- surfacedepth,i.e.,75 meters (246feet) averagedepth;and
intermediatedepth, i.e.,500 meters (1,640feet)averagedepth. The land
fractionwas furthersubdividedby the fractionconsistingof soil cover and
rock cover. For the mostdenselypopulatedbands (bands4 through7), it
can be seen that the land fractionvariesfrom about34 percent(band7) to
about 46 percent(band4), and withinthose four bands the soil fractionis
dominant(75 percentin b_nd 4 to 92 percentin band 7). It can also be
seen (by subtractingthe total land fractionfrom 1.0)that the bulk of the
Earth'ssurfaceis coveredby water.
3.3.4 WorldwidePlutoniumLevels
Plutonium-238,the primaryfuel of the GalileospacecraftRTGs, already
existsin the environmentas a resultof atmospherictestingof nuclearweapons
and a 1964 launchaccident. The followingparagraphsdescribethe worldwide,
national,and regionallevelsof plutoniumin the environment. This informati_.,
is relevantto analyzingthe scopeof postulatedincrementalreleasesof
plutoniumintothe environmentthat could resultfrom a Galileomission
accident.
c
Over the period1945through1974,above-groundnuclearweaponstests
producedabout 440,000curiesof plutonium(EPA1977,USAEC 1974). About 97
percent(about430,000curies)of this plutoniumwas Pu-239and Pu-240which
are essentiallyident4calboth chemicallyand with respectto their _
radiologica]emissionenergies. The remainder(about10,000curies)
'" consistedprimarilyof Pu-238(about9,000 curies),a_ well as Pu-241and
Pu-242. Consequently,above-groundnucleartestingrepresentsthe major
sourceof the worldwidedistributionof plutoniumin the environment, i
Of the approximately430,000curiesof Pu-239produced,about 105,000 J
curieswere depositedat and nearthe test sites (EPA1977). The remaining
325,000curieswere injectedintothe stratosphere(about6 to 15 miles above
the Earth'ssurface). The stratosphericinventoryreturnedto Earth as
"fallout." About 25,000curieswere depositedin the northernhemisphere,
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TABLE 3-6. SURFACETYPE DISTRIBUTIONSFOR EACH LATITUDEBAND
Latitude Total Land Ocean Surface Ocean Intermediate Land Soil Land Roch
Band Fraction Depth F[actiQn Depth Fract!on_ Fraction Fraction
1 0.4739 0.1648 O.1444 0.0" 1.00"
2 0.5845 0.1247 0.0704 0.0" I.00"
3 0.5665 0.0441 0.0452 0.749* 0.251"
4 0.4580 O.0349 0.0429 0.749 0.251
e
5 0.4353 0.0357 0.0290 0.847 0.153
6 0.3980 0.0312 0.0365 0.912 0.088
7 0.3391 0.0358 O. 0334 0.924 0.076 *
8 0.2545 0.0214 0.0300 0.942 0.058
9 0.2444 0.0400 0.0368 0.923 0.077
10 0.2211 0.0400 0.0197 0.916 0.084
11 0.2500 0.0326 0.0263 0.956 0.044
12 0.2199 0.0387 0.0299 0.945 0.055
13 0.2169 0.0329 0.0200 0.915 0.085
14 0.2480 0.0128 0.0319 0.911 0.089
15 0.2231 0.0088 0.0155 0.908 0.092
16 0.1372 0.0185 0.0172 0.888 0.112
17 0.0465 0.0191 0.0256 0.704 0.296
18 0.0223 0.0172 0.0427 0.704* 0.296*
19 0.0034 0.0036 0.0115 0.0" 1.00"
20 0.5438 0.0077 0.0850 0.0" 1.00"
ul i
• Assumed Values Source: USAEC 1975
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p_imarilyin the mid-latitudes,with about 70,000curiesdepositedover the L
southernlatitudes(EPA ]g77). About 5,000curiesremainedaloft as of 1974.
Approximately]6,000curiesof falloutsettledon the continentalUnitedStates
(USAEC1974). Figure3-22 illustratesthe accumulationof Pu-23gfalloutin
millicurfesper squarekilometermeasuredat variouslocationsin the United
States. In general,drier areasof the UnitedStateshad lower accumulations
thanwet areas,indicatingscavengingof Pu-239from the atmosphereby rainfall.
Some dry westernareas are apparentexceptionsto this indicatingthe
possibilitythat thereare regionswhere stratosphericdebrismay preferentially
enter the troposphereto be depositedon the Earth'ssurface.
Table3-7 indicatesthat the Pu-238inventoryfromweaponstests (about
9,000 curies)was increasedby a spacenuclearsource,specificallyfrom the
]964 re-entryand burn-upof a SNAP-gARadioisotopicThermoelectricGenerator.
This releaseof plutoniumintothe atmospherewas consistentwith the RTG design
philosophyof the time. SubsequentRTGs, includingthoseon the Galileo
spacecraft,have beendesignedto containthe Pu-238fuelto the maximumextent
possiblerecognizingthat there are mass and configurationrequirementsrelative
to the spacecraftand its missionwhichmust be weighedagainstthe design and
configurationof the power sourceand its relatedsafetyrequirements(see
Section2.2.2.2).
TABLE3-7. MAJOR SOURCESAND APPROXIMATEAMOUNTSOF PLUTONIUM
DISTRIBUTEDWORLDWIDE
Amount % Activityby Isotope
Sources (Curies) Pu-238Pu-23gPu-240
AtmosphericTesting1945-74
o Depositednear testingsites 110,000 3 58 38
o Depositedworld wide 330,000 3 58 39
Space Nuclear(Snap-gA,1964) 17,000 100 -
Total 457,000
Total globalexcludingamounts 347,000
near to test sites
Source: USAEC 1975
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The addition of 17,000 curies of Pu-238 from the SNAP-gAbrought the total
global inventory of plutonium to about 457,000 curies. Since 1964, essentially
all of SNAP-gArelease has been deposited on the Earth's surface (USAEC1974).
About 25 percent (approximately 4,000 curies) of that release was deposited in
the northern latitudes, with the remaining 75 percent settling in the southern
hemisphere.
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' 4. ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCES
The principalpurposeof this Final (Tier2) EnvironmentalImpact
Statement(FEIS)is to presentinformationto enablea choice amongthe
alternativeactionspresentedin Section2. This sectiondiscussesthe
potentialenvironmentalconsequencesthat could resultfrom the
implementationof each of the alternativesavailableto the National
Aeronauticsand Space Administration(NASA)as presentedin Section2.
4.1 ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCESOF THE PROPOSEDACTION
4.1.1 Implicationsof Completionof Pre&arationof the Spacecraft
The activitiesassociatedwith completingthe preparationsto the
spa_ocraftprimarilyinvolvethe completionof post-testspacecraft
mechanicalassembly,integrationtestswith the launchvehicle,and final
launchpreparation. The impactsassociatedwith final launchpreparations
are addressedin the followingsubsection. There are no environmental
: consequencesassociatedwith the b_ianceof the activitiesidentifiedabove
(NASAIg88a).
4.1.2 EnvironmentalConsequencesof NormalLaunchof the STS
The environmentalconsequencesof normaloperationsand normallaunches
are summarizedin this subsectionand were discussedin detail in previously
publishedNASA documents,includingEISs on the Space ShuttleProgram(KASA
1978)and the KennedySpace Center (KSC)EIS (NASA1979),the KSC
EnvironmentalResourceDocument(NASA1986),and the Tier I EIS for the
Galileoand Ulyssesmissions(NASA1988a),and were found to be insufficient
to precludeshuttleoperations.
Impactson Land Use
Launchof the Galileomissionaboardthe SpaceTransportation
System/InertialUpper Stage (STS/IUS)would occur at LaunchComplex39 at
the KSC. The launchcomplexand the area surroundingit are dedicatedspace
launchland uses. The only specialland uses nearbyare Cape Canaveral
NationalSeashoreand MosquitoLagoonabout2 miles to the north. Mosquito
Lagoonis a designatedStateof Floridaaquaticpreserveand also an
OutstandingFloridaWater. Designatedlanduses in these areas would not be
affectedby a launchof the Galileomission.
. Air Qqa!ityImpacts
A groundcloudwill be formedby combustionin the Space Shuttlerocket
enginesduringlaunch(NASA 1979,NASA 1986,NASA Ig88a). This cloud
consistsof the exhaustproductsfrom the solidrocketmotors and liquid
engines,the productsof afterburningin the exhaustplume,the air that is
mixedwith the exhaustgases,and much of the heatenergy that is generated.
Thesegases have the potentialfor forminghigh concentrationsof acids
(hydrogenchloridemist - HCl) thatcan rain on and affectvegetation. This
acid rain can affectthe densityof vegetationas describedin the following
subsectionon biologicalsystems.
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4The exhaust products contained in the ground cloud (scavenged HCI ga;
and aluminumoxide particulates) are typically dispersed within m 9-mtle
zone around the launch site (NASA]986). Up to 6,615 poundsof chlorides
ana 15,435 pounds of particulates are deposited within about 0.3 miles from
the launch pad (the near-field environment), and can sometimes extend out to
about 0.6 miles depending upon variables such as wind conditions (NASA
1985c, NASA1986b). The near-field typically is about 54 acres in size
outside the perimeter of_the launch complex. Deposition of up to 100 g/m_
of chlorides and 200 g/mL of particulates have be_n collected from the near-
field (NASA1986). In the far-field (beyond a_out 0.3 mile_), deposition ofchloride has been measured_at 25 to 5,300 mcj/mL and alumina,,, oxide parti-
culates at 0.3 to ]08 _/m 2. Launchof the Galileo mission can be expected
to result in similar emissions. While particulate emissions within the
• groundcloud will temporarilyexceedstandards(seeTable 3-3), the signifi-
cant air emissionsproducedby STS launcheshave not resultedin significant
deteriorationin ambientair qualityat eitherof the twc PermanentAir
MonitoringSystems(PAMS)stationssiteslocatednear the launchpad (see
Subsection3.2.2). Detaileddiscussionsof ai_-qualityimpactscan be found
in prior NEPA documents(NASA1978,NASA 1979,NASA ]986,NASA ]g88a).
Upner-AtmosphereEffect_
The Space Shuttleexhaustreleaseswater, hydrogenchloride,chlorine,
.. and aluminumoxide particlesintothe stratosphereand producesnitricoxide
in the hot plume. The quantityof water releasedby the Space Shuttleis
small comparedto naturalsources,and its effecton the ozone densitywill
be insignificant(Cofer1987).
DuringShuttlemaneuversabove an altitudeof 180 kilometers(in the
ionosphere),the exhaustproductsfrom Che OrbitalManeuveringSystemwill
result in short-termdecreasesin the concentrationon ions and electronsin
the upper portionson the ionosphere(NASA1978). This effect is localized
and temporary. Effectson radiowave propagationwill be insignificant.
DuringShuttlereentry,whichwill occur betweena 70- and gO-kilometer
altitude,some of the heatedatmospherewill be convertedto nitricoxide,
which ionizesin ultravioletsunlight. The lengthof the trail could extend
to one-fourththe circumferenceof the Earth,but the width will be narrow.
The requiredtime for the trail to disappearhas been calculatedto be less
than I day, and if wind shearsare present,the trail could disappearin
hours. The effectsof the ionizedtrail on radiowave propagationare
expectedto be insignificant.The long-termeffectsof nitricoxide on
the stratospherealso have been studiedand have been determinedto be
negligible(NASA1978}.
SQnic Boom
Launchof the STS resultsin three sonicbooms with focal zones over
uninhabitedocean waters. The Shuttlealsowill producea sonic boomduring
reentry. Becauseof the largerange of entry trajectories,the boommay
occur partiallyover land. Overpressureshave been calculatedfor these
conditions,and trajectorieshave been tailoredto minimizethe effecton
the ground (NASA 1986). These owrpressures are not enough to cause damage
or injurybut are in the nuisanceor annoyancerange, accordingto the
report issuedby +he SonicBoom Panel of the InternationalCivil Aviation
Organizationir October1970.
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Hydrologyand Water Ouality I
l
Each SFS launc _eneratesabout863,000gallonsof deluge and washdown
wastewater(NASA]986). Much of the delugewater is vaporizedand contained
in the groundcloud. Sha'lowimpoundedwatersnear the launchcomplex
typicallyexperiencea sharp but short-term(aboutZ hours)depressionin pH
immediatelyfollowinglaunchduc to the HCf scavengingfrom the ground
cloud. About 326,000gallonsof washdownwater, alongwith an unknown
quantityof delugewater,are collectedIn two concretetanks connectedto
the launchpad flame trench. This water is neutralizedto a pH of about8.5
after the launchand is landspreadover the adjacentpad area. Groundwater
studieshave been unableto establisha cause/effectrelationshipbetween
launchesand periodicallydetectablequantitiese• aluminum,cadmium,
chromium,iron,lead, and volatileorganiccompoundsin the groundwater
(NASA ]986).
BioloqiqalSystems
Informationon the impactsof launcheventsto the local environment
has beendocumentedfrom a 54-acrearea outsideof the perimeterof Launch
, Complex39A (LC-39A). Describedas withinthe near-fieldenvironment,this
tract has experiencedsignificantchangesin vegetativecommunitystructure
- (NASA1986). Overall,total vegetativecover in the near-fieldhas been
reducedand unvegetatedareas have expanded. As with all STS launches,the
Galileomissionwill contributeto the overallreductionin speciesrichness
thatwill ensue owr the longerterm with resumptionof STS launchesat
LaunchComplex39.
Impactanalysesindicatethat thin-leafedherbaceousspecies,and
shrubswith succulentleaves,are more sensitiveto launchcloud deposits
than are typicaldune grasses(NASA 1986). Dune communityspecies
exhibitingsensitivityto launchcloud effectsincludecamphorweed
(Hetero_h_qas__u_ubaxillaris),inkberry(ScaevolaDlumleri),bedch sunflower
(Heli_n_husdebit,s),and marsh elder (]v_imbric_ta}. Dune species
exhibitingresistanceto launchcloud effectsincludesea oats (_LDJ_Q!._
panic_IBta),beachgrass (panicumamarqm),and slendercordgrass(_n._
ate).
Shallowimpoundedwatersin the vicinityof LaunchComplex39A have
experiencedfish kills followingthe launchof the Space Shuttle(NASA
1986). Thesewaters can experiencesharpdepressionsin pH dropping
temporarilyto belowwater qualitystandards(seeTable 3-4) as a resultof
launchcloud rainout. Reductionsin pH of four unitswithin 30 minutesof a
launchevent are possible. The suddenacidificationof surfacewaters is
thoughtto be responsiblefor the fish killsaccompanyinglaunchevents.
Speciesof fish collectedfrom the near-fieldimpactarea exhibitsymptoms
of severeionic imbalanceand anoxia,resultingfrom extensivegill damage
(NASA 1986). Fish killshave ranged from small (lessthan ]00 individuals)
to major (greaterthan ],000 individuals)(NASA 1986). Fish kills have
involved]7 specieswith individualspecimenstypicallyless than Z inches
in length.
While the impacton the near-fieldflora and fauna is measurable
followingeach launchevent,these impactsare localizedand are not likely
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to extendsignificantlyfromthe near-fieldenvironment(NASA1986). Far-
field effects(outto aboutg miles)typicallytakethe form Gf spottingon
structuresand vegetationfrom HCI deposition, No mortalityof vegetation
or changesin vegetativecommunitystructurehave _een recorde_in the far-
field (NASA1985c).
_ndanaered_nd ThreatenedSpecies
, Some protectedspecies,principallycolonialnestingbirds such as snow
egret,white ibis and yellow-crownednight heron,are knownto inhabitat
leastthe PicnicIslandnestingarea about I mile to the west of Launch
Complex39. Of these three species,the snowy egre{ is listedby the State
of FloridaGame and FreshwaterFishCommissionas a "speciesof special
concern". The ibis and heronare listedby the FloridaCommitteeon Rare
and EndangeredPlantsand Animalsas "speciesof specialconcern". An
ospreynestingsite is also locatedin the PicnicIslandarea. The osprey
is listedby the Conventionon InternationalTrade in EndangeredSpeciesof
Wild Floraand F_una,whichwas implementedby the EndangeredSpeciesAct of
1973. The nearestbald eagle (Federallyendangered)nestingsite is over 5
miles From the launchcomplex. BananaCreek,about I mile west of the
launchcomplex,is listedas criticalhabitatfor the Federallyendangered
Floridamanatee. (SeeAppendixC-4 for more detailand figuresshowing
locationsinhabitedby these species.) No endangermentof these species
will resultfrom a normallaunch.
n additionto the previousconcerns,the potentialevictsfor other
listedspeciess_ch as the roseatespoonblil(Statespeciesof special
concern),as well as some listedplants,t_ occur in the vicinityof the
launchcomplex.
Birdswould be _ubjectto a startle/flightreactionwith ignitionof
the STS enginesand would probablyavoidthe area _nd the exhaustcloud,and
thus shouldnot experienceany significantadverseimpact. Protectedp_ant
speciesthatmay exist in the area couldbe exposedto the groundcloud a)_d
its high levelsof acid mist and particulates.Given that th_ r=ear-fieIJ
area aroundthe launchcomplex(outto about 930 feet) has been impactedby
prpviousand futurelaunchactivities, t is unlikelythat thL Galileo
missionwould result in any additionalimpacton listedplants.
SocioeconomicFactro_zs
Launchof the Galileomissionaboardthe STS/;USfromKSC shouldhave
' no significantadverseeffectson the socioeconomicenvironmentsurrounding
_r eK_. In fact,given the Nation_ interestin the Space Programand general
. publicviewingof plannedlaunchesfrom KSC, the launci,of the Galileo
missionshouldhave _ short-termbeneficialeffecton _h_economyof the
nearbyarea from the influxof touristswho come to view _ launch. Such
tourist._can numberover I00,000peoplewho add temporarilyto trafficand
congestionin the area at launchtimes.
Radiation[xpoRure
Exposuresof occupationalpersonnelto minor externalradiatieacould
occurduringthe normalmovementand handlingof the Radioisotope
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iThermoelectricGenerators(RTGs)beforelaunchat KSC. Radiationfrom the
RTG and RadioisotopeHeaterUnit (RHU)componentshas a very short range,
and all such operationsoccur under strictconditionsand supervision.
Therefore,there is no healtheffecton occupationalpersonnelor the public
from theseactivities.
4.1.3 Implicationsof Balanceof Mission
The balanceof a normalmissionwill haveno significantadverse
impactson the environment.Recoveryof the jettisonedreusablesolid
rocketboosterswould introducesome solubleproductsfrom the small amount
of residualfuels left in the boosters. The impactwould be temporaryand
localizedto an area immediatelyadjacentto the boosters.
With completionof its portionof the Galileomission,the STS would
returnto Earth for a landingat EdwardsAir Force Base in California.A
normalreturnwould resultin a sonicboom duringreentryfrom orbit and
duringlanding. These sonicbooms are not expectedto adverselyimpactthe
environment.
The Galiseospacecraft,once injectedinto its Venus-Earth-Earth--
Gravity-Assist(VEEGA)trajectory,would have no impacton the human
environmentgiven a normaltrajectory. The Jupiterencounterof the Galileo
spacecraftwould also have no impacton the human environment.
4.1.4 Consequencesof ShuttleLaunchAccidents
_, 4.1.4.1 Overviewof ShuttleAccidents
AccidentScenarioDefinitionApproach
The NASA approachto definingpotentialaccidentscenariosand proba-
bilitiesinvolvedseveralsteps. First,potentialfailureswere identified
i that could (I) occur in each of the sevenmajor elementsof the Shuttle
i (STS)system,and (2) presenta potentialthreatto the RTGs. The seven
major STS elementswere:
e LaunchSupportEquipment
o Payload
• Orbiter
i • ExternalTank (ET)
• Solid RocketBoosters(SRBs)
e Space ShuttleMain Engines(SSMEs)
m Range SafetyDestructSystem.
The next step involveddividingthe missioninto six phases,with each
uf the phasessubdividedfurther,as necessary. Fault treeswere developed
i for each of thesemissionphases. Each fault tree encompassed,as
. appropriate,all relevantfailuresthat could occur in the seven major
Shuttlesystems. Finally,and becausemany of the accidentscenarios
representedby the faulttrees lookedsimilar,representativeaccident
scenarioswere developedfor each of the missionphases.
)
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Given the mappingof systemfailuresinto scenarios,NASA then provided
estimatesof failureprobabilitiesfor each of the systemsas a functionof
time (NASA1988c). These estimateswere generatedbased on reviewsof system
characteristics,historicalfailureratedata from similarsystems,and
previoussafetyanalyses. Becauseof the wide uncertaintyin applying
historicaldata, NASA providedestimateswith an order of magnituderange
for each system. The U,S. Departmentof Energy(DOE),with NASA
concurrence,then used the geometricmeans of each range in performingits
safetyanalysis.
A detailedGalileoEarthAvoidanceStudy (JPL 1988)of possible
spacecraftand missionfailureshas determinedonly three failuretypes that
° representeven a remotethreatof Earth impactduring Earth-gravity-assist
flybys. They are retro-propulsionmodulepenetrationby a micrometeoroid,a
small combinationof lesserprobabilityspacecraftfailures,and multiple
serialfaiIJresin the groundcommand§ystem. The total probabilityof
spacecraftreentryand impactis 5XI0".
AccidentScenariosand EnvironmentOverview
,T
_, Accidentscenariosand environments(fromNASA Ig88a)are treatedin
J AppendixB and summarizedin Table 4-I. For purposesof analysis,the
missionwas dividedintomissionphasesgenerallyrelatedto vehicle
_ configurationand/oractivity.
The applicableintactabortmodes,primaryaccidentcauses,and
" applicableenvironmentsare indicatedin Table 4-I.
The intactabortmodes -- Returnto LaunchSite (RTLS),Transoceanic
Abort Landing(TAL),Abort-Once-Around(AOA),Abort-To-Orbit(ATO),and
Abort-From-Orbit(AFO) -- are explainedin detail in AppendixB-2. The
first four are generallycausedby prematdreshutdownof one or more Space
ShuttleMain EnginesSSMEs. AFO would be a resultof ATO or a problemwith
the IUS or spacecraftwhich preventeddeploymenton orbit. If two or more
SSMEs shutdown duringparts of the ascentto orbit,a contingencyabort
mode leadingto crew bailoutand ocean ditch of the Shuttlewould occur.
Finally,there is a very small probabilityof mult_'_eShuttlesystem
failuresleadingto a crashduringthe landingpha_c_
The primaryaccidentcausesfor each phase are generallythe most
activeportionof the systemduringthat phase. For the PropulsivePhases,
it is generallythat systemprovidingthe propulsivethrust,the structure
supportingthe thrustand being actedon by externalloads,and/orthe
guidancesystem. Multipleredundanciesin the Shuttleguidancetend to
decreasethe likelihoodof guidancefailuresfor the Shuttle.
Environmentscreatedby the accidentsgenerallydependon the sourceof
the accidentand the time that it occurs. Time is importantbecauseit may
affectthe characterof the sourceor the resultingsecondaryenvironments.
For example,the ShuttleSolid RocketBooster(SRB) fragmentswill achieve
highervelocityif a case failureoccursnear the end of the burn when less
propellantis availableto be acceleratedalong with the casewall. Liquid
propellantexplosionsare more severenear the groundwhere the ground
promotesmixing. Early failurescan resultin ground impacts,while
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failuresabove the upper atmospherecan resultin reentryheatingand
subsequentgroundor water impact.
The explosionenvironmentscan have multipleelementsas seen by the
RTGs or RHUs. The suddenreleaseof energyin air will drive a shock wave
that can distortor breakup the RTG,dependingon its strength. The same
explosiveenergycan push fragmentsof structureinto the RTG. Finally,the
resulting fire associatedwith accidentson or near the groundcan provide
thermalstresseson the RTG elements.
STS/IUSConfiquration
In the wake of the Challengeraccident,NASA canceleddevelopmentof
the CentaurG-Primefor flightcrew safetyreasonsunrelatedto nuclear
launchsafety. That rocketwas an energeticliquidhydrogen/liquidoxygen
upper stage launchvehicle. In its place,NASAwill use the solid fueled
IUS in the Shuttlefor launchingdeep spacemissions,such as Galileo. An
IUS successfullydeployeda TrackingData Relay Satelliteinto Earth orbit
duringthe successfulSeptember1988and March 1989STS Discoveryflights.
, The STS/IUSconfigurationposesmuch less potentialenvironmentalrisk
i than the STS/Centaur,whichwas addressedin the draft EIS of September1985
(NASA1985a)o The earlierSTS/Centaursafetyanalysisindicatedthat most
accidentenvironmentswere dominatedby Centaurinvolvementirrespectiveof
the initiatingcause (e.g.,a SRB rupturewould generatehigh-velocity
fragmentsthat would cause a Centaurruptureand explosion). The IUS,a
solidfueledupper stagewhose fuel is more inert,is much less likelythan
the Centaurto explodeand contributeto accidentenvironments.
It is noteworthythat an IUS upper stagewas on board duringthe
Challengeraccidentin order to propela data relay satelliteto geosyn-
chronousorbit. Detailedexaminationof photographicrecords,telemetry
data, and fragmentsrecoveredfromthe Challengeraccidenthave shownthat:
I) no major explosionoccurred,rathera ruptureof the externalpropellant
tank, initiatedby the effectsof the Shuttleboosterjoint failure,was
followedby releaseand rapid burnof some of the liquidpropellants;2) the
ShuttleOrbitersubsequentlybroke up under flightdynamicand aerodynamic
forces;and 3) the IUS boostercame out of the cargo bay relativelyintact,
brokeup under aerodynamicforces,and fell 50,000feet to the ocean surface
withoutviolentsolid propellantignition. Uncertainphotographicevidence
and an incompleterecoveryof the Trackingand Data Relay Satellitedid not
permitan assessmentof its responsesequence.
The interagencystudy group formedto evaluateboth the Challengerand
Titan 34 D-g explosions(NASAet al. 1989) concludedthat, had an RTG been
on board,both it and its claddedheat sourceswould have survivedthe
Challengeraccidentwith no releaseof plutoniumfuel. This is aside from
solidrocketmotor fragmentswhich, in the case of the Challengeraccident,
were not a factor.
Safetyand EnvironmentalAnalysisProce@se@
The safetyand environmentalanalysisprocessesare depictedin Figure
4-I. The analysesconsistof definingpotentialaccidentscenariosand
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resulting environments to which the RTGs/RHUsmay be exposed and the proba-
bility distributions of these accidents and environments, and then assessing
the consequencesof subjectin_ the RTGs/RHUsto those environments. The risk
is then a combination of the probabilities of the accidents and their con-
sequences. At this time, there is a Shuttle Data Book (NASA1988b) that
contains scenarios and environments for the STS/IUS configuration, and a
Safety Analysis Report (DOE1988a, DOE1988b, DOE1989a).
A numberof similar documentswere developed for the planned 1986
launch of Galileo and Ulysses using the STS/Centaur. During the interval
between the completion (late 1985) of the Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR) for the subsequently postponed 1986 launch and the present, work has
been redirected to develop and to improve and refine the accident models and
techniques for analyses applicable to the STS/IUS case as follows.
A new FSARis required for the STS/IUS because the analysis in the
previous documentswas directed at the STS/Centaur. The replacement of the
Centaur with the IUS, and the assessment of the STS 51L and 34D-9 accident
data, led NASA to developa revisedData Book of the STS/IUSaccident
scenariosand possibleenvironments.Therefore,the resultsof the earlier
_ STS/CentaurFSAR are not relevantto the STS/IUSconfiguration.
4.1.4.2 Non-RadiologicalAccidentConsequences
Unplannedeventsthatmight occurduringSpace Shuttlelaunchopera-
tions includeexplosions,fire, the releaseof toxic gases,crash,or
missionabort. The followingdiscussionsare taken from the ShuttleProgram
EIS (NASA1978).
On-PadFire or Explosion
The most seriousconsequenceof an on-pad fire involvingthe entire
Space Shuttlevehiclewill be the releaseof toxiccombustionproductsfrom
the SRBs. The large heat releaseassociatedwith the burningof the main
engine'spropellantswill assistthe cloud of combustionproductsin rising
to a high altitude. Althoughthe quantityof SRB combustionproducts
releasedat ground levelwill exceedthat relea;edat or near groundlevel
in a normallaunch,the additionalheat and cloud rise contributedby the
main engine'spropellantswill compensatein termsof ground-level
concentrationsof hydrogenchlorideand chlorine.
Explosionson the launchpad might achievesignificantblast effects
under specialcircumstances.Suchcircumstanceswould be those that leadto
suddenruptureof the Extern31Tank. Immediatelyprior to launch,all
unprotectedpersonnelare evacuatedfrom the launchpad. Consequently,no
injuriesother than to the flightcrew are anticipated,even for this worst-
case event.
AscentAccident
Publicsafetyfrom hazardsassociatedwith the launchand early ascent
of the Shuttleis the responsibilityof the Range SafetyOfficer. For early
flight,this is exercisedthroughthe capabilityfor ground-commandedflight
termination(vehicledestruct)to preventimpacton land shouldthe vehicle
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departradicallyfrom its nominalflightpath. This protectionof the
publicis provideduntil the vehicleachievesorbit.
ExternalTank Jettison
r
In a normalmission,the ExternalTank will be jettisonedto impactin
a preplannedocean arearemotefrom shippingzones. Additionally,the
impactareawill be announcedto air transportersand shippersbeforethe
flight. This practiceis identicalto that used in currentspaceflight
activityto protectaircraftand ships fromreentryof suborbitalrocket
stages. In case of an earlymissionabort,the ExternalTank may be
jettisonedintothe ocean near the launchsite. A portionof the possible
impactarea coincideswith the launchcorridorwhere warningsare issuedto
aircraftand shipsbeforethe launchand which is under surveillanceduring
launchoperations. Becausethe ExternalTank will not containtoxic
materials,the hazardto the environmentfrom impacteitherin the
preplannedarea or elsewherewill be confinedto physicaleffectsat the
impactpoint.
Jettisonof the Solid RocketBooster
Damageto the environmentwould be limitedto the physicaleffectsof
the impact,as the SRBs are inertafter burnout. In a normalflightor in
an abort,the SRBs will descendto the preplannedocean area recoveryzone
by parachute. The locationof the recoveryarea is announcedto aircraft
and shipsbeforelaunch,and the area is maintainedunder surveillance.
If the SRB parachutewere to fail, the 3RB would still impactwithin
the preplannedzone. The SRB might be damagedbeyondfurtherusefulnessor
sinkand be lost, but no long-termenvironmentalhazardswould result.
OrbiterLanding
Upon successfulcompletionof its mission,tileShuttleorbiterwill
returnto Earthand land at EdwardsAir Force Base (EAFB).
Shouldthe Shuttlecrash,the consequenceswould be similarto those of
any large aircraftcrash,excepttherewould be a probabilityof fires and
accompanyingtoxic environmentdownwindbecauseof hypergolicpropellants
(monomethylhydrazineand nitrogentetroxide).
In conventionalaircraftoperations,which shouldcloselyresemble
Shuttleatmosphericflightoperations,the most probablelocationof a crash
on landingis near or on the runway. The Shuttlewill land at the remote
, EAFB.
Effect of Unplanned Events on the Marine Environment and Water Quality
The potential impact of unplanned Space Shuttle operational events on
the marine environment and water quality are limited to the following: in-
flightfailuresthat may resultin vehiclehardwareand propellantlanding
in the ocean,and on-padaccidentsand propellantspillsthat may result in
run-offof propellantsto localdrainagesystems.
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The potential sources of pollutants during unplanned events and the
major pol]utants are as follows.
Potential Source Major Pollqtant
Solid propellants Ammoniumperchlorate (NH4Cl04)
Liquid propellants Hono-Methyl Hydrazine (MMH)
Hydrazine (N?H4)
Nitrogen tetFoxide (N204)
Lubricants, hydraulic
fluid Hydrocarbons
In-FliqhtFailures
Possibilitiesof pollutionare primarilyassociatedwith toxic
materialsthatmay be releasedto and are solublein the marineenvironment.
Rocketpropellantsare the dominantsourceof suchmaterials. A secondary
considerationrelatesto oils and other hydrocarbonmaterialsthat may be
essentiallyimmisciblewith water but, if released,may float on the surface
of the water. The quantitiesof hydrocarbonsused are small. In case of an
in-flightfailurein the early stagesof flight,the Shuttlewould be
I expectedto separateintactand returnto the launchsite.
The SRB propellantwould continueto burnwith the same productsof
combustionfrom a normallaunch (primarilyhydrogenchloride,aluminumoxide
and carbonmonoxide)beingdispersedinto the air or absorbedinto the ocean
water. Any unburnedsolid propellantwould slowlydisperse.
The impactof the Shuttle'sExternalTank would releaseliquidhydrogen
and liquidoxygen,which would burn or evaporaterapidlyintothe
atmosphere. The MMH is containedin the Shuttleonly and would be returned
to the launchsite. However,if the Shuttlewere forcedto abort to a water
landing,this materialwould enter intothe water. These materialsare
expectedto diluteto nontoxiclevelsof concentrationwithinthe area
affectedby the emergencylanding(NASA 1978). Small schoolsof fish could
be affected,but no large-scaleor permanenteffectson marinelife are
expected. The compoundsare all chemicallyactiveand are not expectedto
persistin the marineenvironment(NASA1978).
On-padAccidentsand PropellantSpills
Provisions,suchas dikes and catch basins,are in place for containing
on-padspillsand disposingof the spil]edpropellantwithoutcontaminating
the water environment.On-padvehiclefailureswould normallybe expected
to resultin a fire thatconsumedalmostall of the propellants.Any
unconsumedpropellantwould be treatedin the sameway as a spill.
4.1.4.3 RadiologicalAccidentAnalysis
The use of plutonium-238dioxide(Pu02)fuel,a radioactivematerialin the Gene,al PurposeHeat Sources(GPHSs)-- used in the two Radioisetope
ThermoelectricGenerators(RTGs)and the 13] light weightRadioisotope
HeaterUnits (RHUs)on the Galileospacecraft-- necessitatesevaluationof
the radiologicalrisks to personsin the launchsite vicinityand the
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general population worldwide resulting from postulated accidents occurring
duringthe mission The inventoryof PuO_ fuel is about 132,825Ci in each
RTG (265,650Ci total)and 33.6 Ci in eacn RHU (about4,800 Ci total). The
RTGs and RHUs are describedin Subsection2.2.2.1.
Only accidentsthatcould resultin damageto a RTG and possiblefuel
releaseare addressedin this section. These accidentsare presentedin
Table 4-2 for each of the six missionphases.
The RHUs aboardthe Galileospacecraftcould be subjectedto a wide
varietyof hostileenvironments.A thorough,systematicassessmentof the
responseoF RHUs to theseenvironmentsshowsthat fuel releasewould occur
only in certaininstances.
Some RTG accidents,listedin Table 4-2, could result in the releaseof
fuel. Each of these (whichcould resultin the releaseof fuel)has a
probabilityof occurre,ceand a predictedamountof releasedfuel (calleda
sourceterm). The predictedreleaseis basedon the subsequent(i.e.,
conditional)probabilitythat the accidentwill lead to a releaseof
radioactivematerial.
The distributionof accidentsand consequencesfor each missionphase
are characterizedby three parametricrepresentations:the most probable
case,the maximumcrediblecase, and the expectationcase. These cases are
definedfor each missionphase as follows:
m Most ProbableCase: The singlereleasehavingthe highest
probability.
e MaximumCase: The maximumfuel releasethat, when coupledwith
meteorologicalassumptions,resultsin the highestpopulationdose
throughthe ingestion,inhalation,and externalpathways. A
probabilitylimit of ]X]O'"was determinedfor the mil,ximum
credibleaccident. Lowerprobabilityeventswere analyzedby the
DOE in the developmentof its safetyanalysisreportfor the
Galileomission(DOE 1988a,DOE Ig88b,DOE I98ga). However,no
substantialincreasein the overallris_ was found. Further,it
is recognizedthat probabilitiesof 10TM and IO"v have been used
as safetygoals in evaluationsfor nuclearpower plants. NASA
has, however,adoptedI0"" as an addedmeasureof conservatism
becausespacelaunchesto date presenta smallersamplepopulation
than in other nuclearpowerprograms. Lower probabilityaccidents
eval ted by DOE yield no §ubstantialincreasein the risk, thus
justifyingadoptionof I0".
a
e Expe{tationCase: The probabilitylistedfor the expectationcase
is the total probabilityof all accidentsfor a plutoniumrelease
for that phase of the mission. The expectationcase uses all of
the predictedreleaseand theirprobabilities(withoutregardto
the IxIO'"limitingvalue)for all of the accidentscenariosin a
missionphase to definea probabilityweightedsourceterm--the
statisticallyexpectedrelease.
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lTABLE4-2. ACCIDENTSBY MISSIONPHASE,STS I
Phase Description Accident
0 Prelaunch to Launch Inadvertent RangeSafety System destruct
Fire/explosion
1 Ascent Solid Rocket Booster failure
RangeSafetySystemdestruct
Aft compartmentexplosion
Vehiclebreakup
Crash landing
Ocean ditching
2 SecondStage Orbiterfailure
ExternalTank failure
Space Shuttlemain enginefailure
Payloadfailure
Range SafetySystemdestruct
Crash Landing
Ocean ditching
3 On-Orbit Orbiterfailureand reentry
4 PayloadDeploy IUS Solid RocketMotor Case burst
IUS Solid RocketMotor no ignition,
low impulse
IUS Tumblingfrom separationor
recontact
IUSmisalignedburns due to guidance
failure
IUS erraticburns
5 Venus-Earth-Earth- High-speedreentryof the spacecraft
GravityAssist
Maneuver
p
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The radiologtcal consequencestnclude: 11
I. The short-termradiationdose thatresultsfrom the initial
exposureby inhalationof the radioactivecloud. The doses are 70
year dose commitmentsresultingfrom the long-termretentionof
the materialin the body.
2. The long-termradiationdose whichwould resultfrom continuous
exposureto materialsdepositedin the environmentove- "-
extendedperiodfollowingrelease. Most of the lone c. _e
commitmentwould occurover the firsttwo years aft _ _ !_nt
(DOE 1989a). This is becausethe availabilityof 9 _.,I-.;J ited
radioactiveparticlesto the inhalationpathwaythr, '
resuspensionfrom the soil decreasesdramaticallyafte ' _ _rst
two years. (Inhalationof resuspendedparticlesis the u.,f=inant
long-termexposurepathway.) Long-termdoses includethose
outsideKennedySpaceCenterboundariesand worldwidepopulations
due to inhalationof resuspendedmaterialand ingestionof
contaminatedfoodproductsand water over a 70-yearperiod. In
addition,long-termdoses to onsiteKennedySpace Centerworkers
due to inhalationof resuspendedmaterialis calculatedfor onsite
workersfor a periodof 35 years based on 40 hours per week.
3. Estimatesof land and surfacewater areas contamination.This
contaminationresultsfromdepositionof PuO2 from a plume or
cloud createdby an explosionor fire,or from surfaceimpactof
unvaporizedreenteringPuO2 particles It shouldbe noted that
the estimatespresentedhere in the EiS are for illustrative
purposesand are not intendedto reflecta definitivestatement
with respectto specificareas at KSC or its environsthat would
be contaminated.Shouldan accidentoccur,a site-specific
screeninglevelwould be establishedbased upon cleanupto levels
as low as reasonablyachievable(ALARA).
This informationis presentedin the followingterms for each case.
I. Numbersof personsestimatedto be subjectto greaterthan
specifiedlevelsof both short-termdoses and long-termdoses,
based on the launcharea populationdata and worldwidepopulation
densitydata.
Doses appear in termsof person-rems.A person-remis a unit of
collectivedose froma given sourceof radiationexposure. As
usedhere,'thenumberof person-remsis the sum of all individual
• lifetime(70-year)doses in a given populationfromexposureto a
releaseof plutonium-238froma missionphase accident. For
example,as the releasedmaterialis carriedaway fromthe point
of release,it is dispersedand its concentrationdecreases,but
the area and populationexposedgenerallyincreases,as illus-
tratedin Subsection4.1.4.4. Health impactsare assessed
probabilisticallybased on populationdose.
2. Total short-termand long-termpopulationdoses. In presenting
populationdoses,the conceptof "de minimis"has been used,
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meaning a dose level below regulatory concern and from which no )
health effects are expected. De minimts, as a concept in
determining the risk from exposure to ionizing radiation, remains
a controversial topic within the regulatory as well as in the
scientific community. The Council on E,wironmental Quality has
been following the issue for sometime; however, it presently
offers no guidance on either the approach to de minimis or the
levels of "de mintmts risk." The White HouseOffice of Science
and Technology Policy established a Committee on Interagency
RadiationPolicyCoordinationin 1982which consideredthe
establishmentof a level of risk or radiationdose belowwhich
agencieswould not have to regulateor otherwisecontrolFor the
purposeof radiationprotection(i.e.,a "de minimis"). The
Committeehas not formallyaddressedthis topic as yet. While the
U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency (EPA)appearsto be moving
towardproposinga "belowregulatoryconcern"(de minimis)level
for individualdose, it ha: not yet supportedthe conceptfor
collectivedoses. The Nat. hal Councilon RadiationProtection
and SpaceMeasurementin 1987establisheda "NegligibleIndividual
Risk Level"of I in 10 millionannualrisk,which correspondsto a
dose rate of I mrem/yr(NCRPSM1987). For the purposeof this
document,the de minimisdose was taken to be I mrem/yrand 50
mrem totaldose commitment. Total populationdoses are reported
bothwith and withoutde minimis.
3. The maximumshort-termand long-termdoses to individuals.
Tables4-3 and 4-4 presentthe resultsof the accidentmodelingfor the
most probableaccidentin each missionPhase and the most severe"credible"
accidentfor each missionPhase. For the:e presentations,accidentswith
probabilitiesless than about I in I0 millionwere consideredbeyondthe
rangenormallyconsideredcredibleand not listed. In the detailedaccident
analysespresentedin AppendixB and the FSAR, all accidentsgquencesand
scenarioswith probabilit,esas low as I in 10 million(IXIO") were
considered. Analysesof lowerprobabilityeventspreparedby DOE for the
GalileomissionFSAR (DOE1988a,DOE Ig88b,DOE I98ga)did not yield any
substantialincreasein overallrisk. All accidents,irrespectiveof
probability,were used to developthe expectationcase from which overall
riskwas derived.
The releasesfor both the most probableand maximumcases illustrate
thatthe RTGs and RHUs survivemissionaccidentsverywell and contain
essentiallyall of the radioactivematerialsas designed. The releasesare
only a very small fractionof the availableplutonium. The only accidents
, identifiedin which more than 0.01percentof the plutoniumcould be
releasedwere the near launchpad accidents,where both largequantitiesof
fueland propellantwere availablein conjunctionwith hard surfacesfor the
GraphiteImpactShells (GISs)to impact,and the extremelylow probability
inadvertentreentryin the VEEGA maneuver,in which essentiallyall of the
plutoniumin a GIS is assumedto be releasedif the impactshell hits hard
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rock. The reentrycharacteristicsof this accidentare such that flight
paths of the GISs are essentiallyindependent,implyingthat the probability
of more than a few hittingrock and releasingplutoniumis extraordinarily
low.
A summaryof the resultsof the radiologicalconsequenceanalysisare
presentedin Tables4-5 and 4-6. More detailedresultsare presentedin
AppendixB-4. Consequencesare expressedin terms of collectivedose to the
affectedpopulationand amountof land contaminatedabove the screening
levelproposedby the EPA. The populationdose estimatesare 70-yeardoses.
The most probable, maximum,and expectation cases present a
representativerange of accidentsand consequences.The most probablecase
has the highestprobability,but the consequencescould vary from those
indicatedin Table 4-5 becauseit is representativeof only one set of the
variables--quantityof release,locationof release,particlesize
distribution,probabilityof occurrence,and meteorologicalconditions. A
changeof any one of these variables,exceptthe probabilityof occurrence,
could resultin a differentset of consequences.The maximum,presenting
_ the most severehuman healthimpact,i_ utilizedto give an upper limit and
is developedprimarilyfor emergencyplanningassistance. The expectation
_ case representsa probabilisticombinationof all accidentscenarios
resultingin a releasein a phase utilizing42 sequencesoF meteorological
conditionsfor the launchperiod. These two cases togetherfor each Phase
presenta range of the type and magnitudeof occurrencesthat could take
place for each missionPhase. The impactsof the variousuncertaintiesin
the accidentmodelingand analysisare presentedin Subsection4.1.4.7.
The consequencespresentedin Tables4-5 and 4-6 indicatethat the
collectivepopulationdoses to those affectedby the accidentsis quite
small,rangingfrom0 (forwind blowingoffshore)to 391 (fornominal
meteorologicalconditions)person-remfor the Most ProbableCase or to 4,890
person-remfor the MaximumCase in Phase I. In missionPhase 5, the maximum
case has a populationdose of 51,700person-rem. The analysisfor mission
Phase 5 uses an exposedpopulationof 71,310,assuminga uniformarea
populationdistribution.Over a 70-yearperiod,the MaximumCase dose on
the averageover the exposedpopulationin missionPhase 5 equatesto less
than 20 percentof the averagebackgroundlevelof 150 mrem/yr. Note that
the maximumcase usesmeteorologicalconditionsthatwould maximizethe dose
to persons. The consequencecalculationsincludethe onsite,launchday
populationof workersand visitorsto KSC.
Tables4-5 and 4_6_alsoincludeestimatesof the area of material
depositionat 0.2 uCi/mz or greater. At that level,EPA recemmends
monitoring;belowthat level,monitoringis not recommended.NASA'sactual
monitoringplanswill be basedon real-timeestimatesof the amountand
locatiorof the releaseand updatedatmosphericanalysesof the advectionof
the releasedmaterial. As discussedin AppendixB, cleanupwill be based
upon a numberof factors,includingthe amount,particlesizes,and
concentrationof the depositionand the normaluse of the area in question.
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TABLE 4-5. SUMMARYOF RADIOLOGICALCONSEQUENCESMOST PROBABLECASES,STS
Area (_re Kilometers)with
Population Dose, Deposition Alcove
Person- ram 0.2 uCi/m
Mission Release Above ;;_alth Dry Inland
Phase Probability Tote[ De M|n|mis Effects Land Swamp Water Ocean
0 5x10"7 35.4 0 0 12.5 1.63 4.6 0
1 3x10"4 391 0.003 0 43.3 15.9 25.7 0
! 2 2x10"6 0.2 0.03 0 0 0 0 0
3 6x10"6 4.6 1.3 0 .059 0 .001 0
- 4 4x10"4 4.6 1.3 0 .059 0 .001 0
5 lx10 "7 1,010 581 0.1 13.2 0 .296 0
Source: DOE1989a
TABLE 4-6. SUMMARYOF RADIOLOGICALCONSEQUENCES,MAXIMUMCASES,STS
;
Area (SquareKilometers)with
' Popul at i on Dose, Oeposi t i on AlcovePerson-ram 0.2 uCi/m
Mission Release Above Health Dry Inland
Phase Probability Total De Ninimis Effects Land Swan_o Water Ocean
0 5x10"7 133 0 0 4.13 .128 2.6/+ .044
1 lx10 "4 4,890 3,710 0.7 2.03 .688 2.53 .18
2 2X10"6 7.3 0.9 0 0 0 0 0
3 lx10 "7 200 51 0 .12 0 .003 0
4 7x10"6 200 51 0 .12 0 .003 0
5 lx10 "7 51,700 50,600 9.4 8.91 0 .20 0
Source: DOE1989a
The tables of radiotogical consequencesshould be read as fotlo_: first column lists mission
phase, see page 4-15 for descriptions; second column lists the total probability for the release in
that phase; third column lists the collective lifetime (i.e., 70-year) exposure of the people
resident where the atmosphere carries the material; fourth column lists the lifetime exposure de
minimis; fifth columngives the statistical incremental health effect of that exposure; last four
columns list areas over which the material deposits. Thus, in Phase 5 for the maximumcase: the
probability of the release is one in ten million; if a release occurs, then there could be a maximum
70-year exposure of 51,700 person-ram to a population of 71,310 people (50,600 above de minimis);
and there would be an increment of 9.4 cancer fatalities co_pared to a normally expected amount of
about 14,000 in a population of 71,310 people.
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4.1.4.4 Impactsof RadiologicalAccidentsto Individuals
Individualmembersof the KSC workforce,launch-dayvisitors,and
membersof the generalpopulationof Floridaand of the world could,under
some accidentconditions,receivesmall radiologicalimpacts. The degreeof
the impactwould be highlydependenton the natureand point in the flight
path of the accident,the characteristicsof the materialreleased,and the
specificmeteorologicalconditionsprevailing. The individualdoses
presentedthroughoutthisdocumentare expressedin 70-year(i.e.,lifetime)
" dose and are the sum of two components: the initialdose due to inhalation
of very small (generallylessthan 10 microns)particlesduring initial
cloud passage,and the long-termdose resultingfrom continuousexposureto
materialdepositedin the environmentover an extendedperiodfollowingthe
release.
" Figures4-2 through4-4 presentplots of the individualdose (abscissa)
versusthe numberof peoplereceivingdosesgreaterthan the indicated
levels(ordinate). In general,the modelscalculateexposureversusarea
and then estimatethe populationwithinthe area.
Figures4-2 through4-4 indicatethat dose levelsfrom possiblelaunch
accidentswill be very low. For instance,for missionPhases0 and ], in
the most probablereleasecase, which uses an averagemeteorology,no
individualwould receivemore than the de minimisdose. In Phases2 through
5, the numberof personsreceivinggreaterthan de minimisdoses would be
approximatelyI, 10, 10, and 1,500,respectively.Note thatmissionPhases
J 3 and 4 are groupedas one value in the figures.
The inadvertentreentryaccidentduringthe VEEGA operation,although
extremelyunlikely,has the potentialfor higherreleasesand hence higher
theoreticalconsequencesthan any of the accidentsidentifiedfor Phases0
to 4. As discussedin the Tier I EIS (NASA ]g88a)and in the Earth
AvoidanceAnalysis(JP_1988),the overallprobabilityof an inadvertent
VEEGAreentryis 5XIO-'. This low probabilityresultsfromthe
trajectory'sbias away from Earth,and fromthe fact that there are few
accidentsthat could occur in just the rightway to put the spacecrafton an
Earth-impactingpathwithoutthe abilityto do subsequentmaneuversaway
fromthe Earth. Consequenceswere calculatedassumingworldwideaverage
populationdensityon land and averagemeteorologicalconditionsfor the
most probablecase, and the maximumlatitudeband populationdensity(90.1
persons/km_) and meteorologicalconditionsthat maximizedradiological
consequencesfor the maximumcase. Under the most probableassumptions,
lessthan 1,500personswould receivemore than a de minimislifetimedose,
with as many as ]00 receivingI rem and about 4 receivingless than a 40 rem
, lifetimedose. Under the maximumcase conditions,as many as 70,000 (71,310
by modelingcalculations)couldreceivemore than a de minimisdose, about
20 couldreceiveup to 100 rem lifetimedose, and about 3 could receiveup
to 270 rem. The few receivingthe higherdoses would have to be very close
to the impactarea and immediatelydownwind. In practice,mitigation
measures,suchas those discussedin the next subsection,would likely
reducethe long-termimpactsto those residingin the contaminatedareas.
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The radiologicalconsequencesummaryfor the expectationcase presented
in Table 4-7 indicatesthatwhen probabilityis factoredintothe
calculationof the consequencesand expectednumberof peopleexposed,the
resultsare very similarto the most probablecase. (It shouldbe noted
that the populationdose estimatesassumea 70-yearexposureperiod.) This
is because,for Phases2 to 5, the higherconsequencesare the resultof
more GPHSmodulesor GISs hittingrock. While the total consequencesare
additivewith each additionalhit, the reentrycharacteristicsand flight
paths of the GISs are essentiallyindependent,implyingthe probabilitythat
more than a few hittingrock and releasingplutoniumis extraordinarilylow.
Therefore,the probabilityweightedconsequences(andrisk)for accidentsin
Phases2 through5 are dominatedby the most probableaccidents. For Phase
1, the expectationcase is higherthanthe most probablecase because
severalPhase I accidentswere identifiedthat could leadto about the same
amountof materialbeingreleased.
Table 4-8 presentsa summaryof the risk from each MissionPhase. The
excesshealtheffects(or excesscancerfatalities),assumingthe accidents
for each Phaseoccur,are quite small and indistinguishablefrom health
effectsdue to naturalbackgroundradiation. In the Phase5 or VEEGA
accident,about0.1 incrementalfatalitieswould be expectedamong the 1,460
peoplethat statisticallymight be expectedto receivemore than a de
minimislifetimedose. Among all the peopleexposedto any radiation,
includingbelowde minimislevels,the totalexpectationdose (from
Table 4-7) is I,]30person-rem,equivalentto about 0.2 healtheffects
(incrementalfatalities)among the exposedpopulation.
When the probabilityof the accidentsis factoredintothe analysis,
the risk to the exposedindividualscan be calculated. The average
individualrisk in the Table equalsthe probabilitytimes healtheffects
consequences,dividedby the populationaffected. This risk is quite low.
The risk to membersof the generalpopulationis actuallyquite a bit lower
than the risk presentedin the Table becausedifferentsets of peoplecould
be affected,dependingon impactareas and meteorologicalconditions. These
risks can be comparedto the approximateindividualrisksof early
fatalitiesby othercausesfaced by the publicpresentedin Table 4-9.
Table 4-8 impliesthat the most severerisk is due to Phase I accidents,
with a maximumindividualrisk of excessfatalityof about4 in I billion,
much lessthan the ordinaryrisks faced (Table4-g). A Phase I accidentis
expectedto have greatestimpacton-siteat KSC and Cape CanaveralAir Force
Station(CCAFS.)
4.1.4.5 Impactsand Mitigationof LandDeposition
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof an accidentin
which plutoniumdioxide(Pu02)is exposedto the environment. The impact
analysisis dividedintotwo-majorcategories:I) the potentialimpactsof
the most probableand maximumcase accidentsduringPhases0 and 1; and 2)
the potentialimpactsof the most probableand maximumcase accidentsduring
Phases2, 3, 4, and 5. The firstcategoryare those accidentswhich could
affectKSC and vicinityand can be representedby a specificmathematical
model. The secondcategoryof accidentsare thosewhich could affect
unspecifiedareas of the world and cannotbe preciselymodeled.
4-25
._" '", ;_,_t_ • ., -_Iw-_ _ _''Wlillt
1990012831-118
44-26
1990012831-119
4-27
1990012831-120
TABLE4-9. INDIVIDUALRISK OF FATALITYBY VARIOUSCAUSESa
Numberof Approximate
AccidentType Accidents IndividualRiskc
for 1983
Motor Vehicle 44,452 2 x 10.4
Falls 12,024 5 x 10"5
Drowning 5,254 2 x 10-5
Fires and Flames 5,028 2 x 10-5
Poison 4,633 2 x 10-5
Water Transport 1,316 5 x 10-6
Air Travel 1,312 5 x 10-6
Manufacturing 1,200 5 x I0-6
Railway 1,073 4 x 10-6
Electrocution 872 4 x 10.6
Lightning 160 7 x 10.7
Tornadoes 114b 5 x 10-7
Hurricanes 46b 2 x 10.7
All Other Accidents 9,311 4 x 10.5
All Accidents 77,484 3 x 10.4
Diseases 1,631,741 7 x IO3
Source: USBC 1986
Notes:
a. Based on 1983 U.S. population.
b. 1946 to 1984 average.
c. Fatalities/TotalPopulation.
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Results are presented for immediate impacts and long-term impacts.
Immediate impacts are those that result from the deposition of PuO2 on
various environmental media. Long-term impacts are those that result from
leavtng PuO2 in the environment. They include impacts to natural
environments,agriculturalresources,man-usedresources,and water bodies,
alongwith possiblemitigationmeasuresand the impactsof mitigation. The
economiccost estimatesassociatedwith the impactanalysesare also
presented.
It shouldbe emphasizedthat the followingdiscussionis for
illustrativepurposesand is not intendedto reflecta definitivestatement
regardingareasthat would be contaminatedin the event of an accident
involvinga releaseof plutonium. In the unlikelyevent such an accident
occurred,the amountof contaminationand the specificaffectedareaswould
be determinedand appropriateactionstaken in accordancewith the
ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,Compensation,and LiabilityAct.
Actionswould includeevaluationof alternativesin accordancewith the
NationalContingencyPlan and developmentof appropriatecleanuplevelsin a
publiclyavailabledecisiondocument.
Assessmentof Impactsto KennedySpace CenterBnd ViGinity
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof Phase O,
Prelaunch/Launchand Phase I, FirstStage Ascentmost probableand maximum
' case accidents. The areas affectedby the accidentsare primarilyon KSC
property. The land areas of initialsurfacedepositionfrom the most
probable,maximum,and expectationaccidentsin Phases0 and I are presented
in Table B-20 of AppendixB. Most of the radioactivematerial(about94.5
percent)will remainwithin 10 km of the accidentlocationand hence,
primarilyimpactKSC property.
Surfacecontaminationresultingfromthe Phase0 most probablecase
producesa total area of 18.7km_ whichwill receivedepositionabove0.2
uCi/m_. The phase ] most probableaccidentproducesa total depositionarea
of 84.9 km_ above the 0.2 uCi/mL screeninglevel. The potentialrange of
decontaminationmeasuresfor the six landcover types (i.e.,natural
vegetation,urban,agricultural,wetlands,inlandwater, and ocean) is shown
in Table B-I9. Ocean impactsdo not occur for eitherthe Phase 0 or Phase I
most probableaccidentscenarios.
The _hase0 maximumcaseproducesa total surfacearea depositionabove
0.2 uC_/m_ of 6.9 km_. The Phase ! maximumcase producesan areaof5.4 km . In PhaseO, dry land receivesthe greatestamountof contami-
nation,while in Phase I, inlandwater receivesthe greatestcontamination.
- Again,as notedearlier,the arealextentof landcontaminationfor the
maximumcase is smallerbecausethe model utilizesconditionswhich maximize
populationdose. Hence,the smallercontaminatedarea is in the maximum
case, but with higherdose.
155 k_9e Phases0 and I expectationcases producetotal areas of 57.4 an_, resp ctively,abov the depositionscre ninglevelof 0.2 uCi/m .
In both cases,naturalvegetationis the land cover receivingthe greatest
contamination.
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4In all cases, 94.5 percent of released radioactive matertal is
contained tn particles greater than 44 mtcrons and wtll be deposited wtthtn
10 km of the accident/impact site. Atmospheric dispersion may scatter
smaller particles beyond 10 km. Particles ]0 microns and smaller could
travel 50 km or more; concentrations would be expected to be extremely low,
as shown by the small number of health effects.
Immediate Conseauences
The deposition of plutonium dioxide from the representative accidents
does not physically alter land covers unless a particle produces enough heat
to start a fire. However, the PuO2 can affect the human use of these land
covers and could result in a change tn land cover.
Contaminated areas were analyzed to determine current land cover use
and how PuO2 would react to various environmental conditions. This analysts
was used to-draw the following conclusions on immediate consequences.
There is no initial impact on soil chemistry. Host PuO2 deposited on
water bodies is not expected to react chemically with the water column;
therefore, no immediate consequences are expected in these waters. No
significant consequences to flora and fauna are expected from surface
deposition and skin contact with PuO2 (Section B.6.], Appendix B).
Lonq-Term Consequences
Plutonium dioxide deposited on the soil will interact with inorganic
and organic ltgands forming soluble or insoluble products. It is expected
that over 95 percent of the PuO2 will remain in the top 5 cm (2 tn) of
surface soil for at least 10 to-20 years. Mitigation required for other
reasons may result in significant soil impacts (Section B.6.], Appendix B).
Natural areas receiving deposition above the 0.2 uCi/m 2 screening level
within 32 km_(20 mi) of L_unch £o_plex 39 (Phases O, ]) could range from 1.5
km_ (0.58 mi _) to 73.7 kmL (28 m|L) (see Appendix B, _able B-Z0). oWetland
areas receiving deposition range from .]3 km_ (.05 mi L) to 28.5 km_ (11
mi_). No significant consequences to flora are expected. Minor
consequences are possible through ingestion by terrestrial and aquatic fauna
and inhalation by terrestrial fauna (Section B.6.1, Appendix B).
Only small amounts of PuO2 will be available in the water columns. The
amounts available are not considered to have significant impacts to the
aquatic fauna that may ingest dissolved or suspended PuO2. Bioaccumulatton
of PuO? by benthic organisms and aquatic vegetation may occur. There is a
potential for the PuO2 to travel up the food chain; however, btoaccumulatton
of plutonium decrease[ with higher trophtc levels (Subsection B.6.Z.3,
Appendix B).
Mitigation of the impacts to flora and fauna in natural areas could be
accomplished through a combination of monitoring and remedial action based
on monitoring. The amount of PuO? resuspended in the air in natural areas
determines if PuO_ concentrations-would pose in:,alatton health hazards to
man. If levels a_e determined to pose inhalation health hazards, then
access to the area could be restricted until monitoring indicates that PuOz
concentrations will no longer pose a potential inhalation health hazard.
4-30
1990012831-123
-!
)
Agricultural areas constitute about 5 percent of the land cover types
within 32 km (20 mi) of Launch Complex39 and include citrus groves and
pastures. Agrtcultwral areasocont_minated by accidents during Pha_es 0 and
1 range from 0.2 kmL (0.08 miL) in the maximumcase to 5 km_ (2 mi_) in the
expectation case. Hittgatton at pasture areas could include destruction of
affected crops, scraping or plowing under the contaminated upper soil layer,
or restrictions on use of the pasture. Appropriate mitigation will be
determine( by the levels of contamination, type of cover, and other factors
as appropriate to each specific case.
If citrus exposed to deposition is consumed, it poses a potential
health effect to man. Contaminated citrus fruit surfaces are not readily
washable with water. In contrast with the fruit, plutonium was readily
washed away from leaf surfaces (Subsection B.6.2.3, Appendix B).
Mitigation of contaminated citrus fruit could include collection and
disposal of the contaminated fruit according to Federal and State
regulations. To prevent future contamination of citrus crops and protect
the safety of workers, the trees could be washed down to remove PuO? from
the leaves and soil added around the trees. Future citrus crops co0ld be
monitored for PuO2 contamination before sold on the market (Subsection
B.6.2.3, Appendix-B).
Surface contamination levels may impact the recharge areas of the
surficial aquifer. The surftcial aquifer serves as the potable water source
for the cities of Titusville, Hams, and Palm Bay. In addition, manywells
on private land use the surfi_ial aquifer as a source of water. PuO?could
contaminate this aquifer, but analysis of 9roundwate¢ flow and sediment
leaching indicate it is unlikely, especially for any contamination to reach
the wellheads of municipal water supplies. It is highly unlikely that any
contamination on the KSCwill reach offsite wells. Transport through the
underlying aquatard to the lower Flortdan aquifer is considered very
unlikely (Subsection B.6.2.3, Appendix B).
Mitigation could include m_nitoring of contamination profiles of the
soil in aquifer recharge areas to determine if the PuO_ is migratory to the
water table. If the monitoring showsa high probabtli[y of migration, areas
may be scraped to below the contamination depth and the spoil disposed of
properly. Private wells in the area of deposition could be monitored and
alternative water supplies could be developed if water supplies are
impacted.
The areas of land cover used by man (e.g., buildings, roads, ornamental
, vegetation, and gras_ areas) that are contaminated could be monitored to
determine the decontamination or mitigation action necessary. Mitigation
actions could prevent the immediate return of the population to their homes
and workplaces. Cleanup actions could last from several days to several
months. Historical and archaeological resources, both knownand unknown,
could receive deposition. KSCfacilities that have historical signiftcam:_e,
and are not damagedin the blast, could also receive deposition. Presently
unknownarchaeological sites could be affected by the cleanup actions under-
taken in those areas. Plutonium dioxide also has a long-term affect on
future investigation at any archaeological site (Subsection B.6.2.3,
Appendix B).
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Plutonium dioxide is generally considered highly insoluble, therefore, I
it is not expected to react chemically with the water column. As a result, I
the 15 pCi/lwater qualitystandardapplicableto all Floridawaters (NASA
1986)is not expectedto be exceededfor the waterssurroundingMerritt
j Island. Some of the waterssurroundingMerrittIslandare considered
OutstandingFloridaWaters. Waterswith thisclassificationare subjectto
waterqualitystandardsbased uponeitherexistingwater qualityor the
designatedsurfacewater standard,whicheveris higher. This level of
protectionis intendedto prohibitland and/orwater use activitiesthat
woulddegradethe water qualityof the resourceso designated.
Mitigationof PuO2 impactscould includemonitoringsmall and shallow
w_terbodiesclose to Eumanactivity,and drainingand removingsedimentif
a threatto man is identified.Largerbodiesof pondedwater could be moni-
toredand skimmedto removesurficialfilm, if necessary. Additional
monitoringto determinethe need for water and/orsedimentremovalcould be
required. Recreationalwater activitiescould be restrictedin largerwater
bodiesuntilmonitoringresultsindicateit is safe for them to be resumed.
i
The boundingeconomiccostof each representativecase accidentfor
; Phases0 and I are presentedin AppendixB (SubsectionB.6.2.3). In all
cases,the minimumcost wouldbe the monitoringprogram. This programis
estimatedto cost $1 millionin the firstyear, $500,000in the secondyear, .
$250,000in the thirdyear, and $_00,000per year afterthe third (Appendix
B, TableB-18). Thesenumbersmay be somewhatless for Phase 0 and somewhat
more for Phase I sincethe areascontaminatedin the Phase I accidentsare
greater(SubsectionB.6.2.3,AppendixB).
The majorityof contaminationresultingfrom Phase0 most probable,
maximum,and expectationcaseaccidentsis confinedto the KSC site. lhe
economicimpactsfrom theseaccidentswill thereforebe confinedto KSC
,_ facilitiesand operations.Cleanup,as a mitigationmeasure,appliesto
areascontaminatedat 25 mrem/yror above. For the purposesof estimating
cleanupcostsfor Phase0 and Phase1, the areas exceedinga dose rateof 25
mrem/yrat "Year2" as developedby FSARmodeling(DOEIg89a)were utilized
(seeAppendixB, SectionsB.5.3and B.6.2.3). This is consistentwith draft
EPA guidancefor nuclearincidents(EPA 1988)for the periodI to 50 years
post-incidentwhen cleanupactivitieswould commence. The firstyear
followingthe incidentwould be devotedlargelyto monitoring,remedial
actionplanningand,as needed,populationrelocation. Phase 0 modeling
yieldedno areascontaminatedat this levelat "Year2" (DOE198ga),thus
cleanupcostsare notedas zero. These estimatesand the 25 mrem/yrdose
levelsare merely indicative.Actualmonitoringat the time, as well as
cleanupstandardsagreedupon amongthe concernedauthorities,will
establishthe actualareasof cleanup.
The Phase1 maximumcasehas the highestlevelof impactson the KSC
and vicinity. TableB-21 in AppendixB providesa breakdownof the economic
cost associatedwith the Phase I cases. The costs for the most probableand
expectationcases are zerobecausethe model showedno areascontaminatedat
the cleanuplevelat "Year2" (DOE IgSga). The maximumcase has total
estimatedcosts rangingbetween$0.2millionto $36 million.
The maximumcost of $36 millionis primarilyfor the cleanupof urban
lands($22million). Sincethe majorityof the depositionis estimatedto
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occur on KSCproperty, the actual costs probably would be toward the low end T
of the cost range. Secondarycosts for urban uses on the KSCprobably will t
not be five times the cleanup costs. All agriculture on the KSC is citrus
production on leased land and the urban areas are industrial areas. Impacts
to wetlands and natural areas on the KSCcould be isolated by controlling
access rather than removal and restoration. Oceancleanup costs would be
limited to search and removal of large particles. This is also estimated to
, be at the lower end of the cost range. ,
It should be noted that the cleanup costs estimated for the purposes of
this EIS are based upon cleanupto a levelof 25 mrem/yr. The 25 mrem/yr
levelwas selectedas a reasonablelevelfor illustrativepurposesin the
EIS on the basis of adoptionof this level by Federalagenciesfor the
protectionof radiationworkers,and the public,from releasesassociated
with the landdisposalof radioactivewastes(10 CFR 61.41)from
radionuclideemissionsfromDOE facilities(40 CFR 61.92)and as associated
with the managementand disposalof spentnuclearfuel, high-levelwaste,and
transuranicwaste (40 CFR 191.15). In addition,the 25 mrem/yrlevel is
one-fourthof the 100 mrem/yrcontinuousexposurelevel recommendedby the
NationalCouncilon RadiationProtectionand Space Measurement(NCRPSM1987,
p. 44) as an "acceptablerisk" for latentcancermortalityrisk to
individualmembersof the publicover their lifetime. Actual cleanuplevels
will dependupon a numberof factors,suchas the locationand use of the '
specificarea contaminated,potentialthreatto the public,evaluationof
the specificexposurepathways,and the specificparticlesizedistribution
of the contamination.As statedearlier,cleanupactionswould be taken in
accordancewith the ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,Compensation,and
LiabilityAct throughwhich cleanuplevelsand actionswill be developedin
a publiclyavailabledecisiondocument.
Assessmentof GlobalImpacts
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof Phases2, 3, 4
and 5. Sincethe exact locationof areas of depositioncannotbe
determined,location-specificimpactsare not described. A general
discussionof the impactsand possiblemitigationmeasuresare presented.
Globalimpactsvary from one module impactingland for the most
probableaccidentsin Phases2, 3, and 4, and one, two, and two modules
impactingland in the maximumcase for Phases2, 3 and 4, respectively. For
Phase 5, threeGISs could impactfor the most probableand maximumcases
(SectionB.4.2,AppendixB). ::
A reentryaccidentduringPhases3, 4 and 5 would involvespacecraft
failureand breakup. Atmosphericreentryspeedand spacecraftbreakuprate
will likelyresultin PuO2 modulesor GISs being releasedat different
'_ locationsduringreentry.-These independentreleasepointswill result in
impactareasthat may be separatedby many thousandsof kilometers. Except i
for Phase5, the areas involvedare less th_n I km_ (0.36m_C). For Phase
5, each impactareawould average4 to 5 km (1.4to 1.8 ml ). Cleanup
costswere not estimatedfor Phase2 throughPhase 5 accidentsdue to the
uncertaintiesinvolvedin definingthe specifictypes of land cover
involved. It shouldbe noted thatthe Federalgovernmentwould, however,
respondto such accidentswith the technicalassistanceand supportneeded
to cleanupand remediatethe affectedareasand populations.
{
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Deposition from the Phase 2, 3 and 4 cases does not exceed the cleanup
level at "Year 2". For Phases 2, 3 and 4, the vast bulk of deposition that
exceeds the screening levels occurs on dry land.
The deposition that exceeds the screening level for Phase 5 accidents
occurs on dry land and inland water_ The land areas impacted vary from 8.9
km= for the maximumcase to 14.7 kmL for the expectation case. The areas
which could exceed the cleanup level at "Year 2" (DOE]989a) consist of 0.64
km= in the most probable and expectation cases, and zero in the maximt,m
case.
4.1.4.6 Additional Mitigation Measures for Accidents
EmergencyResponsePlanning
For missions involving soace nuclear power, comprehensive radiological
contingency plans must and will be developed to address all launch/landing
phase accidents involving the RTGsand RHUs. These plans are developed
through the combined efforts of various government agencies, including NASA,
DOE, the Department of Defense, the EPA, and the State of Florida, and
are formulated to conform to the Federal Radiological EmergencyResponse
Plan (FRERP) (NASA1985b). These plans are being updated for the Galileo
missions based on the results of the new FSAR. Development and
implementation of these plans will ensure the availability of appropriate
response personnel, equipment, facilities, and procedures in the event of a
launch accident. Before the plans are finalized, they will be extensively
reviewed by Federal, state and local authorities. NASAhas scheduled
completion of the planning for late Spring 1989. It would be premature at
this time to quote detailed or quantitative materials from the draft plans.
The primary objectives during the early phases of an accident are to
determine whether a release of radioactive materials has occurred, to assess
and characterize the extent of the release, to predict the propagation of
the released material, and to formulate/recommend mitigating actions to
safeguard humansand the environment from the consequencesof the release.
Another objective is to locate and recover the RTGs. These objectives will
be achievedthroughthe evaluationand analysisof real-timedata provided
by mobilefieldmonitoringteams and groundair-samplingstations,airborne
monitoringand surveillanceaircraft,groundand airbornemeteorological
stations,and computerizeddispersionmodeling.
Follow-onobjectiveswould be to isolatecontaminatedareas,recover
the fuelmaterials,and decontaminateand/orrecoveraffectedareas,
facilities,equipment,and properties.
Other Methodsof LimitiD_qthe PotentialConsequencesof Accidents
In additionto post-launchactivities,there are other options
availableto NASA to mitigatethe consequencesof prelaunchand launch-
ascent(Phase0 and I, respectively)accidents. For instance,further
restrictionson spectatorlocationand meteorological aunchcriteriacould
furtherreducethe alreadylow consequences.NASA has studiedboth types of
restrictionand has found them to be unnecessaryat this time. Most
spectatorlocationsare off of KSC propertyar_ are in publicareas,making
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Ifurtheraccessrestrictionsdifficultwithoutlegislation. Spectatorsat l
KSC properare no closerthan 4 miles from the launchpad. In fact, except
for essentiallaunchpersonnel,no one is allowedwithin about4 miles of
the launchpad duringPhase O. With initiationof STS fuel loadingat the
startof PhaseO, a Blast DangerArea is establishedwhich extendsabout
4,500feet from the launchpad. Only criticallaunchcrews (i.e.,the
flightcrew, close-outcrew, ice inspectionteam; about 20 peopletotal)are
allowedwithinthis area just priorto the launch (NASA1988). At about 30
minutesbeforelaunch,the LaunchImpactLimitLine is established,
extendingto about 15,000feet from the launchpad. A total of about go
peopleare allowedwithin that line to supportthe launch. All personnel
withinthis area are providedwith protectiveequipmentincluding
communicationsand breathingapparatus. At the time of launch,only the
flightcrew, the rescuecrew, and launch-supportpersonnelare withinthe
LaunchImpactLimit Line. The rescuecrew is stationedabout 5,000 feet
from the launchpad in an armoredvehicle. Thus, the number of people in
close proximityto the launchpad is kept to the absoluteminimumduring
PhaseO. In addition,the extensiveanalysesand accidentmodeling
conductedfor the Galileomissionby DOE (DOE Ig88a,DOE 1988b,DOE IgSga,
DOE 1988d,DOE 1988e),indicatethat the collectivedose from a pre-launch
Phase0 accident(seeTables4-5, 4-6 and 4-7)would not exceedthe "de
minimis"or "belowregulatoryconcern"levelof I mrem/yrcurrentlyunder
considerationby both DOE and the NuclearRegulatoryCommission(DOE Ig88d).
Giventhe extremelylow total probabilityof a relgaseof RTG fuel in a pre-
launchPhase0 accident(totalprobability= 5XI0-',or 5 in 10 million)and
the extremelylow dose that would ensue,it is difficultto justify
additionalaccessrestrictionson KSC,much less in offsiteareas. Certain
Phase I accidentsalsomay affectKSC and the vicinity. In general,
mitigationmeasureswill be developedand documentedin NASA Federal
radiologicalemergencyresponseplansfor the Galileomission.
NASA remainsopen to furtherconsiderationof meteorological
constraintson the Galileolaunchin orderto mitigateor minimizethe
effectsof a prelaunch,launch,or ascentphase accident. However,in view
of the very low doses calculatedfor the maximumcase (seeTable 4-6), NASA
does not, at this time,envisionfurtherrestrictionsto alreadyshort (as
littleas 5 minutes)daily launchperiods.
In general,in view of the low probabilityof adverseconsequences,
furtherlaunchconstraintshave not been imposed.
v
4.1.4.7 Limitationsand Uncertaintiesof the AccidentAnalyses
The safetyanalysesperformedin supportof the launchof the Galileo
spacecraftwith RTGs and RHUson board are unquestionablysome of the most
detailedand elaborateever performedin supportof a spacecraftlaunch.
Significanteffortwent intothe analysesto ensurethat they were both
reasonableand conservative.Even so, there are stilluncertaintiesin the
estimationof the probabilitiesof releases,the amountof material
released,and the consequencesto man and the environmentfrom those
releases. As a part of the safetyanalysisprocess,an attemptwas made to
identifythe degreeof confidencewith each of the major assumptions,the
limitationsof the analyses,and the impactsof theseuncertaintiesand
limitationson the overallprobabilitiesand consequenceestimates. This
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uncertainty analysis is included as Appendix H of Vol. III of the FSAR
(DOE1989a) and is summarized in Section B.4.2 of Appendix B.
The factors affecting estimates of radiological consequencesand
mission risks that were evaluated include the following:
e Accident scenario
- Accident environment
- Accident probability
• Releasecharacterization
- Conditionalsourceterm probability
- Sourceterm
- Modificationsto the sourceterm and particlesize
distributionbecauseof mechanical,chemicaland physical
interactionpriorto deposition
- Particlesizedistribution
- Initialcloud dimensions
- Verticalsourcetermdistribution
• - Releaselocation
t
• Meteorologicalconditions
- Atmosphericstability
- Wind speedand direction
- Mixingheight
" - Sea-breezereclrculation
- Fumigation
- Space and time variation
• Exposurepathwayparameters
- Populationdistribution
- Resuspensionfactor
- Depositionvelocity
Vegetableingestion
- Protectiveaction
• Radiationdose and healtheffects
- Internaldose factors
- Healtheffectsestimator.
Estimateswere made of the uncertaintyof each of these factorsand
then combinedto determinethe overalluncertaintyassociatedwith the
varioustypes of radiologicalconsequencesand missionphase risks.
Table 4-10 presentsthe overallmean uncertaintyfactorsand the associated
rangesfor both the consequencesand missionrisks. The uncertainty
analysisimplies,for example,that the best estimatefor the mean total
populationdose for the expectationcase is actuallyabout23 percentof the
value quotedearlierin Table 4-7. Referringto Table 4-7, the population
dose for Phase ! was 821 person-rem. The best estimatesmean total
populationdose utilizingthe uncertaintyfactorfrom Table 4-10 then
becomes0.23 X 821 - 188.8person-rem,or 23 percentof 821 person-rem. The
5 percentto 95 percentuncertaintyrange for thatmean total population
dose best estimatevariesfrom 0.67 percentto 790 percent(i.e.,the 0.0067
to /.gorange noted in Table 4-10),of the value quotedearlier(82]person-
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TABLE4-10. OVERALLUNCERTAINTYANALYSISRESULTS
OverallUncertaintyFactor
ResultType Mean Rangeb
• Radiologicalconsequencesa
- Short-termpopulationdose 0.25 0.013 - 4.6
- Long-termpopulationdos_ 0.22 0.0042 - 1.4
- Total populationdose 0.23 0.0067- 7.9
- Healtheffects 0.23 0.0063 - 8.5
- Surfacecontaminationarea 0.75 0.051 - 5.2
• Missionphase riskb
Phase I
- Short-termpopulationdose 0.42 0.061 - 2.9
- Long-termpopulationdose 0.37 0.024 - 5.7
- Total populaLiondose 0.39 0.035 - 4.3
- Healtheffects 0.39 0.032 - 4.8
- Surfacecontaminationarea 1.3 0.22 - 7.8
PhasesO, 2-5
- Short-termpopulationdose 0.25 0.055 - 1.1
- Long-termpopulationdose 0.22 0.019 - 2.5
- Total populationdose 0.23 0.029 - 1.8
- Healtheffec,s 0.23 0.026 2.0
- Surfacecontaminationareamean !.75 0.20 - 2.9
Source:DOE 1989a
a. The mean uncertaintyfactorfor radiologicalconsequencesmultipliesthe
expectationcase results(Table4-7) to yield a best estimatemean of
the expectationcase results. The originalexpectationcase result
shouldalso be multipliedby the uncertaintyfactorrange to yield a
best estimateof the 5- and 95-percentilevaluesof the range of
radiologicalconsequencesthat feed intothe best estimatefor the
,_ expectationcase results.
b. The mean uncertaintyfactorfor missionphase risk multipliesthe
missionphaserisk results(Table4-8) to yield a best estimatemean of
missionphaserisk (definedas total probabilitytimesexpectationcase
results). The originalmissionphase risk resultsshouldalso be
multlplledby the uncertaintyfactorrange to yield a best estimateof
the 5- and 95-percentilevaluesof the bestestimatefor the mission
phase risk.
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rem). For Phase I missionrisk,the uncertaintyrange is largerwith the
mean total populationdose fromTable 4-10 being 39 percentof the
estimationcase estimate,and the range varyingfrom3.5 percentto 430
percentof that estimate. In termsof missionrisk for Phase 0 and Phases2
through5, the mean total populationdose is 23 percentof the estimation
case estimate,and the rangevaryingfrom 2.9 percentto 180 percentof that
estimate.
These uncertaintyestimatesimplythat the overallmissionrisk is
still low even when the 95 percentileuncertaintyestimatesare included.
Table 4-10 impliesthat at the 95 percentconfidencelevel,the overall
consequenceand risk estimatespresentedin these sectionsare unlikelyto
be low by much more than a factorof 10.
In additionto the uncertaintyanalysisconductedin the FSAR, there
are ongoinganalysesbeing conductedby the NASA/DOEprojectand NASA/
DOE internalreviewgroupsthatcould broaden(or narrow)the uncertainty
range of accidentconsequences.The currentlyknown _reas of further
analysesinclude: (1) probabilityof variousaccidentscenarios,(2) SRB
fragmentvelocities,(3) fragment/structuralinteractions,(4) RTG impact
responsemodels,(5) RTG responseto VEEGA reentry,and (6) radiological
transportmodels. It is impossibleto quantifythe resultsof these further
assessments,a priori,but it is likelythat there will be some changeto
the uncertaintyresultsin the Final EIS.
4.2 NO-ACTIONALTERNATIVE
There are no environmentalimpactsassociatedwith the No-Action
alternative;however,there are major economic,programmatic,and geo-
politicalconsequencesof sucha cancellation.ThroughFY 1988 (i.e.,
throughSeptember30, 1987),NASAwill haveexpendedapproximately$800
millionon the Galileoprogram. Cancellationwould mean the abandonmentof
that investmentand a lossof the anticipatedscientificgains.
Currently,the UnitedStateshas a clear lead in the explorationof the
outer planets. Programmatically,thereare currentlyno back-upmissions
that could achieveGalileo'sscientificgoals withinthis centu)_,as there
are no other approvedU.S. missionsto the outer planets. Thus, the United
Stateswould foregodetailedscientificknowledgeof the uniqueenvironments
of Jupiter.
Galileowas startedin 1977and many scientists,engineers,and
technicianshavedevoteda largeshare of their professionallivesworking
on this project. From a humanperspective,it would be unfortunateto cancel
the programwhen there is no clear evidenceof adverseenvironmentalimpacts
thatwould justifysucha cancellation.
4.3 SUMMARYOF ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCES
The proposedactionis the completionof preparationsand operationof
the Galileomission,includingits launchon the STS/IUSin October1989.
The alternativeto the proposedactionis no-action;that is, to terminate
furthercommitmentof resourcesto ti,emission. The only expected
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environmental consequencesare associated with a normal launch. These T
: impactshave been treated elsewhere in NASANEPAdocumentation and have been i
deemedto be insufficient to preclude Shuttle operations.
, In the event of an accident during launch and deployment, or
inadvertentreentryduringEarth flyby,there are potentialadversehealth
and environmentaleffectsassociatedwith the possiblereleaseof plutonium
from RTGs and RHUs. An intensiveanalysisof the proposedaction indicated
• that healthand environmentalrisks stemmingfrom such accidentsare small
comparedto the risks from naturalevents. The individualrisk of cancer
fatalityis estimatedas no greaterthan about I in 108,000,000.
4.4 ADVERSEENVIRONMENTALEFFECTSTHAT CANNOTBE AVOIDED
Duringthe normallaunch,hydrogenchloridewill be producedby the
solid rocketboosters. This will likelyproduceshort-termacidificationof
the mosquitocontrolponds near the launchpad and depositionon nearby
vegetation. The airborneconcentrationsof aluminumoxide particulates
withinthe launchcloudwill exceed air qualitystandards(seeTable 3-3)
for a short period,but will be below levelsof exposureconsidered
hazardousby the NationalAcademyof Sciences. No significantdeterioration
in ambientair qualityhas been recordedat the two PAMS monitoringstations
, located3 and 5 miles from LaunchComplex39, however. The depositioncould ,
resultin some vegetationdamagenear the launchpad, and possiblefish
kills in onsiteponds near the launchpad. Launchof the Galileomission
will contributeto long-termchangesin speciesrichnessin the near-field
environmentthatwill be experiencedwith the resumptionof STS launchesat
LaunchComplex39.
In the event of an accident,it is possiblethat some areas could be
contaminatedby plutonium. The probabilityof this occurringis predicted
to be less than I in I0 million. If such an accidentdid occur,
decontaminationof land, vegetation,and buildingscould be required,and
costswould be incurred.
4.5 RELATIONSHIPBETWEENSHORT-TERMUSES OF MAN'S ENVIRONMENTAND THE
MAINTENANCEAND ENHANCEMENTOF LONG-TERMPRODUCTIVITY
4.5.1 _hort-TermUses
The affectedenvironment,for the short term, includesthe KSC and
surroundingareas. The short-termuses of the area includeNASA operations,
a fish and wildliferefuge,citrusgroves,residentialcommunities,and
recreationalareas, lhe proposedactionwill be conductedin accordance
with past and ongoingNASA proceduresfor operationsat the launchsite.
4.5.2 Lonq-TermProductivity
The KSC regionwill continueto supportcitrusgrovesand wildlife
habitat, as well as humanactivities. The proposed action should have no
long-term effect on such uses. Successful completion of the project,
however, may have an impact on the future of the space program and the
continued economic stability of Merrttt Island and the surrounding areas.
Both the humanand biotic ecosystems are expected to maintain their
harmonious productivity.
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A potentially large benefit to be gaineO from successful completion of
this project is a better understanding of Earth through exploration and
study of the environments of other planets.
4.6 IRREVERSIBLEANDIRRETRIEVABLECOMMITMENTOF RESOURCES
4.6.1 Iridium
A totalof 270 troy ounces of iridiumare containedin the two Galileo
RTGs. This amountrepresentsapproximately0.0001percentof the discovered
reservesof this metal in the world. Based on a cost of $600 per troy
ounce,the 1982marketprice of iridium(DOI 1982),approximately$162,000
worth of iridiumwould be irreversiblycommittedto the Galileoand Ulysses
missions.
Essentiallyall platinum-groupmetals,includingiridium,are recycled
in domesticuse, resultingin a smallpercentageloss. Consequently,the
total supplyavailabledoes not appreciablydecreasewith time, as is the
case with less preciousmaterialsthat are not aggressivelyrecycled. The
UnitedStatesmaintainsa strategicstockpileof iridiumand, at the end of
1973,had an inventoryof 17,000troyounces (NASA 1985b). Althoughthe
_ amountof iridiumlost in the successfulimplementationof the missions
would representabout 1.6 percentof the currentU.S. stockpile,+his amount
could easilybe replacedfrom the world supplythroughcurrentsources.
4.6.2 plutonium-238
EachRTG containsapproximately17.8poundsof plutonium-238in the
formof plutoniumdioxide. Successfulimplementationof the Galileomission
thereforewould result in the lossof approximately35.6 poundsof
plutonium-238.
The elementplutoniumis producedin nuclearreactorson an as needed
basis by DOE. Therefore,althoughthe launchingof the RTGs representsa
commitmentof plutonium-238resourcesthat will never be recovered,addi-
tionalplutonium-238can be manufacturedin nuclearreactors.
4.6.3 Other Materials
The totalquantitiesof othermaterialsin the payloadsthat would be
irreversiblyand irretrievablycommittedto the Galileomissionsare
relativelyminor. Thesematerialsconsistprimarilyof steel,aluminum,
titanium,iron,molybdenum,plastic,glass,nickel,chromium,lead, zinc,
and copper,as well as small quantitiesof silver,mercury,gold, and
platinum.
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5. CONTRIBUTORSTO THE EIS t
1
This Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared by Code EL of
the Office of Space Science and Applications of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). The organizations and individuals listed below
contributed inputs for use by NASACodeEL in the preparation of this
document. Table S-1 summarizes, for each contributor, the sections of the
EIS for which inputs were prepared.
PREPARER
National Aeronautics and Space Administratipn
Dudley McConne11,Ph.D. Deputy Director for AdvancedProgram
Studies, Code EL
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lewis Andrews NASANEPACoordinator, CodeNXG
Jet PropulsionLaboratory
M. JosephCork Manager,LaunchApprovalEngineering
ReedWilcox Supervisor,LaunchApprovalPlanning
Group
RobertMitchell Manager,MissionDesignSection
MaxwellClayton Member,TechnicalStaff
LawrenceReinhart,Ph.D. Member,TechnicalStaff
KennedySpace Center
Mario Busacca EcologicalAnalyst
U.S. Departmentof [nerq.y
JamesTuri Director,Officeof SpecialApplications ,
AlfredMowery,Ph.D. SafetyProgramManager
ScienceApplicationsInternationalCorporation
MauriceHale SAIC ProjectManager
DouglasOutlaw,Ph.D. SeniorEnvironmentalScientist
Barry Nichols SAIC DivisionManager,Environmental
Scientist .
DennisFord, Ph.D. SeniorEnvironmentalAnalyst
JeffreyWeiler SeniorEnvironmentalAnalyst
NU$ Corporation
EricSchweitzer NUS ProjectManager
RichardEngelhart,Ph.D. SeniorExecutiveConsultant
Bart Bartram SeniorExecutiveConsultant
Kurt Eckerstrom EnvironmentalScientist
JamesSteckel EnvironmentalScientist
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TABLE 5-1. CONTRIBUTORSTO THE EIS
T
t
ResponsibLe Chapter Appendix
Person Summery 1 2 ] 4 5 6 7 8 A g C O
_SA
DUDLEYNCCONNELL X X X X X X X
Ph.D. Aerospace
Science
• LEWIS ANDREWS X X
N.S. Systems Nanegement
NAUT,ICE HALE X X X X X X
M.S. Engineering
Mar_ern_t
N.S. Engineering
Physics
DOUGLASOUTLAW X X X
Ph.D, Nuclear
Phys| cs
BARRYNICHOLS X X X X
B.S. Naturat
Science
DENNIS FORD X X X X X
Ph.D. Zootogy
JEFFREYWEILER X X X X X X X X X
N.S. Resource
Economics/
Env| ror_mental
Nanagement
NU.__S
ERIC SCHWE] TZER X X
N.A. Urban and
Regional Planning
R[CHAkDENGELHART X X
Ph.D. Nuclear
Engineering
BARTBARTRAH X X
N.S. Nechanicat Engineering
N.S. Physics
KURT ECKERSTRON X X '
B.A. Env| ronmenta |
Conservat ion
JAHES STECKEL X X
B.S. Biotogy
JP..__L
N. JOSEPHCORK X X X
N.S. Aeronaut icat
Engineering
REED W[LCC_( X X X X
14.S. City and
Regional Planning
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TABLE5-1. CONTRIBUTORSTO THEEIS (Continued)
I
ResponsibLe Chapter Appendix
Person Summary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 A B C D
J_%
ROBERTMITCHELL X X X
M.S. Mathematics
14.S. ELectricaL Fngineering
MAXWELLCLAYTON X X X
6.S. Aeronautical Engineering
LAWRENCERE]NHART X X
Ph.D. Mechanical. Engineering
Ksc
MARIO BUSACCA X X
N.S. Nar'ine BioLogy
JAMESTUR] X X X
M.S. NucLear Engineering
ALFREDNOI_ERY X X X
Ph.D. Physics
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I6. AGENCIESAND INDIVIDUALSCONSULTED
This final EnvironmentalImpactStatement(EIS)was made available
for reviewand commentby Federal,state,and local agenciesand th_ public,
as applicable. The 45-daycommentperiodclosedon February21, 1989. All
informationreceivedwas consideredduringthe preparationof this Final
EIS. Responsesto commentsreceivedare presentedin AppendixD. Comments
were solicitedor receivedfrom the following:
FederalAgencies:
Councilon EnvironmentalQuality
FederalEmergencyManagementAgency
NationalAcademyof Sciences
NuclearRegulatoryCommission
Officeof Managementand Budget
U.S. Departmentof the Air Force
U.S. Departmentof Commerce
U.S. Departmentof Defense
U.S. Departmentof Energy
U.S. Departmentof Healthand Human Services-Centersfor DiseaseControl
U.S. Departmentof the Interior
U.S. Departmentof State
U.S. Departmentof Transportation
U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgsncy
StateAgencies:
FloridaDepartmentof EnvironmentalRegulation
East CentralFloridaRegionalPlanningCouncil
IntergovernmentalCoordination--Officeof the Governorof
California
State of Florida,Officeof the Governor
State of New Mexico
LocalAgencies:
BrevardCounty: Boardof Commissioners
EconomicDevelopmentCouncil
Planningand ZoningDepartment
CanaveralPortAuthority
Cape Canaveral,City of
Cocoa,City of
Tltusvi)le,City of
Organizations:
Air PollutionControlAssociation
Brevardiansfor Peaceand Justice
Center for Law and SociaI Policy
ChristicInstitute
Citizensfor Peace in Sp_ce
Citizensto Stop Plutoniumin Space
CommonCause
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Concern,Inc.
EnvironmentalPolicyInstitute
FederationofAmericanScientists
FloridaCoalitionforPeaceandJustice
FloridaDefendersof the Environment
Friendsof theEarth
NationalklldllfeFederation
NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil
PhysiciansforSocialResponsibility
ProjectCensored
RadioactiveWasteCampaign
SANE
SandiaNatl_nalLaboratory
SierraClub
Slerr'aClub,FloridaChapter
TheCommitteeto BridgetheGap
The Planetary Society
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APPENDIXA
GLOSSARYOF ABBREVIATIONSAND ACRONYMS
AFO Abort-From-Orbit
AOA Abort-Once-Around
ATO Ahnrt-To-Orbit
CCAFS Cape CanaveralAir ForceStation
CELV ComplementaryExpendableLaunchVehicle,or Titan IV
Ci- Curie
cm centimeter
DEIS Draft EnvironmentalImpactStatement
DOD Departmentof Defense
DOE Departmentof Energy
Eh Theoretricequilibriumelectricalpotential
EIS EnvironmentalImpactStatement
EPA U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
ESMC EasternSpaceand MissileCenter
ET ExternalTank
FAST Failure/AbortSequenceTree
FC Fueledclad
FEIS Final EnvironmentalImpactStatement
FDER FloridaDepartmentof EnvironmentalRegulations
FRERP FederalRadiologicalEmergencyResponsePlan
f/s feet per second
FSAR FinalSafetyAnalysisReport
FTS FlightTerminationSystem
FWPF fineweave,piercedfabric
g gram
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GIS Graphite impact shell
GPHS General Purpose Heat Source
INSRP Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel
IUS Ine,.ialUpper Stage
JPL Jet PropulsionLaboratory
JSC JohnsonSpace Center
KSC KennedySpace Center
km/s kilometersper second
LES 8/9 LincolnLaboratoryExperimentalSatellite8 and g
LWRHU LightWeightRadioisotopeHeaterUnit
" MECO main enginecutoff
MET Missionelapsedtime
MMH Monomethylhydrazine
m/s metersper second
MSA MetropolitanStatisticalArea
NAS NationalAcademyof Sciences
NASA NationalAeronauticsand Space Administration
NEPA NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct
NOAA NationalOceanicand AtmosphericAdministration
NOI Noticeof Intent
NRC NuclearRegulatoryCommission
NSTS NationalSpace TransportationSystem
b
OMS OrbiLalManeuveringSystem
OSTP Officeof Scienceand TechnologyPolicy
PAM Payload Assist Module
PAMS PermanentAir MonitoringStation
ppm parts per million
A-Z
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PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
psi pounds per square inch
Pu Plutonium
PuO2 Plutonium dioxide
J
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1978)
RHU Radioisotope Heat¢- Unit
ROD Record of Decision
RPM Retropulston module
RSO RangeSafety Officer
RTG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
RTLS Return to Launch Site (abort)
SAR Safety Analysis Report
SER Safety Evaluation Report
SNAP Space Nuclear Auxiliary Power
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SRM Solid Rocket Motor
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
STS Space Transportation System
TAt Transoceanic Abort Landing
USFWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
VAFB VandenbergAir Force Base
VEEGA Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist
VEGA Venus-Earth-Gravity-Assist
W Watt
WIND WeatherInformationNetworkDisplay
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APPENDIXB
; LAUNCHVEHICLEACCIDENTANALYSISAND RTG ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS/CONSEQUENCESA SESSMENTFOR THE STS
B.I LAUNCHVEHICLEAND PAD DESCRIPTION
B.I.1 GeneralDescription
The Galileospacecraftis plannedfor launchby the Space
TransportationSystem/two-stageInertialUpper Stage (STS/IUS)combination.
The STS configurationconsistsof the Shuttleorbiter,its main External
_.• Tank (ET)and two solidpropellantrocketboosters(SRBs)(seeFiguresB-I
and B-2). The main ExternalTank (ET)containsliquidoxygenand hydrogen
_ propellants.The STS configurationproducesapproximately6,925,000pounds
Qf thrustat sea level.
C
- The Shuttleorbiteris launchedfrom pad 3gB, which is locatedin a
_: wetlandsenvironmentat the KennedySpace Center (KSC)in Florida. (See
_i Section3 for a detaileddescriptionof the launchareaenvironment.)As
shown in FiguresB-3 and B-4, the launchpad is borderedby a paved, roughly
circularroadwayapproximately1,200feet from the centerof the pad. The
surfaceof the launchpad is constructedof concreteand stands
approximately48 feet abovethe ground. An approximately14,000squarefoot
steellaunchplatform,calledthe servicestructure,supportsthe Shuttle.
• This structureconsistsof a fixed portion(calledthe launchtower) and a
-- movableportionwhich rotatesclearof the Shuttleduringpre-launch
! operations. Two steel structures,the liquidhydrogenand oxygen
facilities,are locatednortheastand northwestof the pad, respectively.
_. Insidethe 1,200-footradiusroadwaysurroundingthe pad are a seriesof
concreteroads and supportbuildingsthat extendradiallyfrom the pad. The
remainderand majorityof the launchcomplexareaconsistsof sand.
A flame trenchand exhaustchannelare locatedunder the launch
platformand terminateat an exhaustdeflectorstructure(see FigureB-4).
To the northeast,approximately300 feet fromthe pad, lies an elevated
water tank. This tank supplieswater to protectthe pad fromthe high
temperaturesgeneratedduringmain engineand SRB ignitions.
B.1.2 Launch/FlightSequence
The Shuttleorbiter,alongwith its ExternalTank and two SRBs, are
launchedin the followingsequence. At 6 secondsbeforelaunch-- denoted
"T-6"or "T-6MET" (MissionElapsedTime) -- the main engineswill be
ignited. At T-40 milliseconds,the two SRBswill be ignited. At T+7
secondsthe Shuttlewill clear the launchtower. The SRBs will burn out and
j separatefromthe ExternalTank at T+128 seconds.
The main engineswill continueto providethrustuntil T+500 seconds
at which time theywill shutdown. After the ET is released(at
approximatelyT+528 seconds),the Shuttle'sOrbitalManeuveringSystem (OMS)
engineswill be fired to establishand circularizethe Shuttlein orbit.
Approximately9 hours afte_ launchand in approximatelythe sixth orbit of
Earth,the Galileespacecraftand its IUS will be deployedfrom the orbiter.
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Once the orbiterhas moved a safedistanceaway, the IUS will be ignited.
The sequentialignitionand burn of the two stagesof the IUS will take the
Galileospacecraftout of Earthorbit and place it on a trajectoryfor
Venus. Once the RadioisotopeThermoelectricGenerator(RTG)booms have been
deployedand the spacecraftstabilized,the Galileospacecraftwill separater
fromthe IUS and continueon its trajectory.
Table B-I lists the normalsequenceof eventsthat lead to placementof
the Galileospacecrafton its plannedinterplanetarytrajectory,with
referenceto the missionphasesused for accidentanalyses.
TABLE B-I. NOMINALMISSIONSEQUENCE(CONDENSED)
Phase Sequence Time
Start PropellantLoading T-8.5 hours
Auto LaunchSequenceBegins T-3I seconds
0 OrbiterMain EnginesIgnition T-6.6 seconds
! SRBs Ignition T-40 milliseconds
-- Launch T-O seconds
OrbiterClearsTower T+7 seconds
" I OrbiterOver Water T+34 seconds
SRBs Burnout T+IIg seconds
SRBs Separation T+I2S seconds
2 OrbiterMain EngineCutoff T+514 seconds
FirstOMS Burn (To Orbit) T+634 seconds
3 BeginAscentCoast T+802 seconds
SecondOMS Burn (OrbitCircularization) T+2,770seconds
Spacecraft/IUSDeployment T+6 hours,40 minutes
4 InterplanetaryInjection T+7 hours,28 minutes
5 2nd Earth Flyby T+38 months
B.I.2.1 Trajectory/FlightCharacteristicsto Orbit
The Shuttleorbiter,containingthe Galileospacecraftand its IUS,
will be launchedwith an approximate70-degreeazimuth. This means that the
Shuttle'sinitialground-track(i.e.,the path it flies over the surfaceof
the Earth)will be 70 degreesfrom true north. A 70-degreelaunchazimuth
will give the Shuttlean orbitalinclinationof approximately34 degreesas
measuredfrom the equator;in otherwords,the 70-degreelaunchazimuthwill
J allow the Shuttleto fly as far north as pointsalong the 34-degreenorth
parallel(i.e.,Cape Canaveral'slatitude)and as far south as pointsalong
they 34-degreesouth parallel.
B.I.3 Ranqe Safety
The primaryrange safetyobjectiveis to precludethe ground impactof
intactlaunchvehiclesor theircomponentparts which could endangerhuman
B-6
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life or causedamageto property. All Shuttlelaunchescarry a flight "
terminationsystemwhich allowsthe Range SafetyOfficer,throughmonitoring
systems,groundtransmitters,and trackingsystems,to determinewhetherthe i
launchvehicleposes an imminentthreatto peopleor property. In the event
that the launchvehicleviolatesestablishedflightsafetycriteria,the Range
SafetyOfficercan controlthe launchvehicle'sflightpath by destroyingthe
vehicle.
B.I.3.1 FlightVehicleRange SafetySystem
The Space ShuttleFlightTerminationSystemallowsthe intentional
destructionof the SRBs and ET if the flightdeviatestoo far outsidethe
nominalor establishedflightlimits. On radio commandfrom the Range
SafetyOfficer,linearshapedchargesrupturethe two tanks in the ET as
well as the cases of the SRBs. The onboardsystemsfor the three elements
(one ET and two SRBs) are all interconnectedso that, if eitherSRB receives
a destruct,all three receiveit.
: Basedon past experienceand the combinedfunctioningof the groundand
flightportionsof the SafetySystem,a delay of at least 4 and I/2 seconds
will occur betweenthe time a Shuttlevehicleis determinedto require
: destructactionand when the destructevent actuallyoccurs.
B.2 MISSIONACCIDENTS
B.2.1 AccidentScenarioDefinitionApproach
A systematicapproachwas utilizedto identifythosecredibleaccident
; scenariosthatmight occur. The Shuttlesystemwas dividedinto its major
elements: LaunchSupportEquipment,Payload,Orbiter,ET, SRBs, Space
ShuttleMain Engine (SSME)/LiquidPropellantSystem,and Range Safety
DestructSystem. Eachof theseelementswas furtherdividedinto its major
failurecomponents. Crediblefailuremodes refer to those which generally
cause lossof the vehicleand may producean environmentwhich is a
potentialthreatto the RTG(s). These are generallysinglepoint failures
in systemsor subsystemswhich cannotbe mitigatedby astronautintervention
or other pre-plannedsystemoverrides. These failuremodes represent
exceptionsto the programrequirementof single-failuretolerance. They
have been acceptedby the NationalAeronauticsand SpaceAdministration
(NASA)technicaland programmanagementand by the contractor,after
extensivereviewindicatingthat they were impracticalor impossibleto
eliminate. Representativeaccidentscenarioswere definedby grouping
similarvehicleresponseswhich resultedfrom each of the crediblefailure
modes for the six major phasesof the STS/Galileomission. The potential
accidentscenariosare listedin Table B-2 and describedbelow as summarized
from NASA 1988.
B.2.2 Phase0 A_cidentScenarios(Pre-Launch)
Phase0 accidentscan occur betweenpropellantloadingand launch,
typicallyfrom T-8 hours to T-O secondsor launch. A pad fire or a pad
explosionare the primaryaccidentsof concern. The causesfor either
accidentare the same, beinglinkedto failuresin launchsupportequipment,
vehiclestructuralfailures,propellantcontamination,and inadvertent
destructactivation. The latteraccidentcould occuronly afterdestruct
armingin the last 20 secondsbeforelaunch.
B-7
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TABLE B-2. VEHICLECATASTROPHICACCIDENTSEVALUATEDIN SAFETYANALYSIS
Phase Description Accident
0 Prelaunchto Launch InadvertentRangeSafetySystemdestruct
Fire/explosion
I Ascent Solid RocketBoosterfailure
Range SafetySystemdestruct
Aft compartmentexplosion
Vehiclebreakup
Crash landing
Ocean ditching
_. 2 SecondStage Orbiterfailure
ExternalTank failure
SpaceShuttlemain enginefailure
Payloadfailure
RangeSafetySystemdestruct
Crash Landing
Ocean ditching
3 On-orbit Orbiterfailureand reentry
4 PayloadDeploy IUS Solid RocketMotor Case burst
IUS Solid RocketMotor no ignition,
low impulse
IUS Tumblingfrom separationor
recontact
IUS misalignedburnsdue to guidance
failure
IUS erraticburns
5 Venus-Earth-Earth- High-speedreentryof the spacecraft
GravityAssist
Maneuver
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iB.2.3 Phase ] A;ctdent,Sqenarios (SRBBurn)
Phase ] accident scenarios represent the period in which the SRBsare a
primary failure threat, and the external environments which may be seen by
the RTGcan be affected by ground surface interactions. A failure of the
left SRBin the first 2 secondscan cause vehicle impact with the launch
tower. Between0 and 10 seconds, a release of ET propellants can cause a
ground surface pool explosion, which is explained in the following
paragraphs. After about 20 seconds, the trajectory of the launch vehicle,
if thrust were stopped, would lead to water impact rather than land impact.
In addition to vehicle breakup by instantaneous failures of the SRBs
or SSME's aft compartmentexplosions, RangeSafety Systemdestruct is an
intentional abort action by the RangeSafety Officer in the event the
Shuttle vehicle trajectory could result in endangering populated land areas.
Automatic shutdownof one of the Space Shuttle Main Engines during
Phase ] can lead to a Returnto LaunchSite (RTLS)intactabortmode. After
SRB separation,the vehiclereversesthe directionof flighttill such a
timewhen main enginecutoff (MECO}point is reachedwhich allowsacceptable
Orbiter/ETseparationconditions,acceptableET impactlocation,and an
acceptablerange for the Shuttleto glide back to the KennedySpace Center.
If a combinationof failuresoccurswhich does not allow the Shuttleto
safelyreturnto KSC, the contingencyabort planof crew bailoutwill occur,
leadingto ocean ditch. A Shuttlefailureon touchdowncan result in a
crash landing.
B.2.4 Phase 2 AccidentScenarios($SMEBurn to MECO)
This phase of the flightstartswhen the SRBs separatefrom the vehicle
and extendsuntil SSME cutoff (MECO).The primaryvehiclecatastrophic
accidentsduringthis periodresultin vehiclebreakunor in failureto
achieveorbit,leadingto uncontrolledreentry.
At altitudesexceeding150,000feet,explosionsand fragment
enviro..o,entsare no longera threatto the RTGs. The SRBs are no longer
attachedand formationof explosivemixturesof liquidoxygenand liquid
hydrogencannotresultin explosionoverpressures,consideringthe rarefied
atmosphere. Ballisticreentryof the spacecraftwill result in breakupof
the vehicleand releaseof the RTGs.
Non-catastrophicshutdownof one or more SSMEsduringthis phase can
leadto a varietyof intactor contingencyabortmodes. The Transoceanic
' Abort Landing(TAL)abortmode is used if a SSME shutdownplacesthe
vehiclebeyondthe trajectorylimitsof a RTLS abortyet prior to attaining
an Abort-Once-Around(AOA)or Abort-to-Orbit(ATO)capability. After
selectionof this abortmode, the vehiclewll] continueto accelerate
downrangeto the TAL MECO target. After ET separation,the onboard
computersare loadedwith the entry flightsoftwareand the Orbiterglides
to the designatedlandingsite. TAL sites for NSTS-34(Galileo)are:
• Primary - Ben Guerir,Morocco
• Alternate - Moron,Spain.
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If a SSKEshutdown occurs after the vehicle exceeds the parameters for
a TAL, the Shuttle wtll attempt to _each the nominal MECOtarget. A
combination of OMSengine burns and propellant dumpscan be porformed to
increase powered flight performance. After MECO,the OMSfuel, _ehicle
velocity, and velocity required for orbit are evaluated. If performance
margins do not exist for orbit Insertion and a subsequent deorbtt, an AOA
maneuver wtll be performed with the OMSengines. The following AOAlanding
sites have been identified for NSTS-34:
e Primary - EdwardsAir Force Base, California
e Alternate - White Sands SpaceHarbor,New Mexico
; • Alternate - KennedySpaceCenter,Florida.
An ATO generallyinvolvesloss of propulsionlate in the ascentwhere
the vehiclevelocityis adequateto achievea safe,yet lower than planned
orbit. Since the Shuttlemust achievea specifiedorbit to performthe
initialconditionsfor IUS injection,it is likelythat an ATO will result
in transitionto an Abort-from-Orbit.
Contingencyabort conditionsare definedwhen two Space ShuttleMain
Enginesfail prior to singleengineTAL capability,or when three engines
fail prior to achievingan AOA capability. These resultsin a crew bailout
and subsequentoceanditch of the Orbiter. There is a possibilityof
performingan RTLS abort if two or threemain enginesfailwithin 20 seconds
' after launch,or a TAL, if three enginesfailduringthe last 30 secondsof '
poweredflight. However,duringthe remainderof the ascentphase,two or
. threemain engine failuresresult in a contingencyabort scenario.
B.2.S Phase3 AccidentScenariqs(M_COto IUS deployment)
Accidentsin this phasewould occur aftervehicleorbit has been
achievedbut prior to deploymentof the Galileo/IUS.The accidentsof
primaryconcernare those associatedwith the Shuttlefailuresthat would
resultin orbitaldecay and eventualuncontrolledreentry. The entrywould
be very shallowat a velocityof 26,000feet per second.
If problemsare foundwith eitherorbitalparameters,the Galileo
spacecraft,or the IUS,that clearlyindicatedeploymentfrom the Shuttle
would not resultin a successfulEarth escapetrajectoryinsertion,then two
optionsexist. If safereturnof the Shuttleis threatened,thecargowill
be jettisonedin low Earthorbit. However,if it is determinedno threat
existsto a safe landing,the Shuttlewill returnwith tl.ecargo. The
primaryand alternatelandingsitesgiven in the AOA sectionabove may be
employedin this abortmode.
' Althoughabort landingaccidentsare theoreticallypossiblefrom Abort )
FromOrbit (AFO),the probabilitywas consideredto be very smallcompared
to RTLS, TAL, or AOA relatedaccidentsbecausethe SSME does not affectAFO,
and time pressuresare much reduced. Becauseof these considerations,and
since the consequenceswould be no different,a separatetreatmentwas not
included.
As pointedout in Section2.2.5,if a healthyspacecraftis left in
Earth orbit,the spacecraftpropulsionsystemcan be used to boost the
spacecraftto a long-lifeorbit in excessof 2,000years.
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Accidents in this phase would occur between Galileo/IUS separation from
the Shuttle and Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist (VEEGA)trajectory
insertion. The accidents of primary concern are IUS propulsion or guidance
failures which could result in vehicle breakup and/or in reentry from
orbit.
Re-entry conditions can range from speeds of 14,000 to 36,000 ft/sec at
angles of -0.5 to -36.0 degrees.
B.2.7 Pha_e 5 A¢c!dent Scenarios (VEEGA)
A detailed Galileo Earth Avoidance Study (JPL 1988) of possible
spacecraft and mission failures has determined only three fatlure types
which represent even a remote threat of Earth impact: retro-propulsion
module penetration by a micrometeoroid, a small numberof lesser probability
spacecraftfailures,and multipleserialfailuresin the groundcommand
system.
r
IThQo-_ total probabilit.yof spacecraftreentryand impactis less than5 . In the remoteevent that any of these ccidentsre ultedin theX
' spacecraftbeing placedon an Earth-impactingtrajectoryand recovery
attemptsfailed,the spacecraftwould break up as it re-enteredthe
atmosphereat a velocityof 45,600to 49,300ft/secat anglesof 0 to go
degrees. The resultingthermaland dynamic_nvironmentwould be very severe
with peak heatingrates around11,000Btu/ft-secand peak dynamicloads of
17,700lb./ft._ at decelerationsof approximately600 g's.
B.3 ACCIDENTENVIRONMENTS
The followingparagraphssummarizethe key accidentenvironmentswhich
were addressedin the Departmentof Energy (DOE)safetyanalysisof Shuttle
accidentsand the possiblethreatto the RTGs and RadioisotopeHeaterUnits
(RHUs).
B.3.1 SRB FraQmentEnvironment
Duringoperationof a SRB, fragmentswill be producedupon ruptureof
the steel pressure-contalnmentmotor case eitherby randomfailureor by
rangedestructaction. These substantialfragmentsmay damage an RTG or
propelit into anotherstructure. The size, velocity,and directional
distributionsof SRB fragmentsare based in part upon analysisof films and
recovereddebris of the destructedsolid rocketboostersfrom the Challenger
- (STS 51-L) and the Titan 34D-g accidents. To supplement these empirical
data and to fill gaps not represented by the two accidents, analytical
modeling was performed and calculations were madeusing a computer code i
capable of predicting the very fast structural breakup of the rocket motor
case and the ensuing fragment motion away from the centerline of the motor.
The characteristic mechanismfor fragment formation is a rapid release
of the operating motor pressure through a fracture in the case causing
further extensive breakup of the case and rapid acceleration of the pieces
to velocities of hundreds of feet per second. The peak velocity of case
Boll
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Jwall fragments dependson motor pressure and volume. The massof propellant
remaining attached to a case wall fragment is also a major determinant of
the final fragment velocity. In addition to velocity, the fragment also
rotates or spins as it travels. Since all these parameters vary with
mission elapsed time, the spectrum of SRBfragment characteristics is highly
dependent upon mission elapsed time (NET) at the time of tntttal case
fracture.
Typicalestimatedneak SRB fragmentcharacteristicsfor SRB random
failureare shownas a functionof MET in Table B-3. This table also shows
estimatesof the probabilityof a largefragmenthittinga RTG and the
effectsof interveningOrbiterstructureon fragmentsflyingtowardthe
Shuttlecargo bay. The peak fragmentvelocitiesfor rangedestructare
comparableto the randomvalues,but the high velocityrange destruct
fragmentsrepresenta lesserthreatto the RTGs becauseof their locat)on
nearthe motor destructcharge.
TABLE B-3. PEAKSRB FRAGMENTENVIRONMENTS:
SRB RANDOMFAILURE
Intervening
Haximum Fragment Structure
Fragment Spin Hit Velocity
HET (s) Velocity (fps) Rate (HZ) Probability Reduction (%)
0-20 135-370 12 -.17 10-19
20-70 135-340 11 -.17 10-19
70-105 180-365 13 -.17 10-19
105-120 265-765 21 -.17 6-18
i
B.3.2 El Propellant [xplo_io, Environments i
B,3.2.1 Blast Environments
The hazards imposedby explosions can be characterized for purposes of
safety analysis by specifying, in probabilistic terms, values for the blast
wave parameters, peak overpressure, overpressure impulse, peak dynamic
pressure, dynamic pressure impulse, and peak reflected pressure. The
definition of these blast-loading parameters are provided below.
• Static Ov_rpr_$_ur_: The peak crushing pressure, exceeding the
anbtent pressure, which occurs tn the blast pulse from an
explosion. The variation of the overpressure with time at a fixed
distance from the explosion depends largely on the amount and rate
of the energy release of the explosion. The peak overpressure at
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a fixed distance is the maximumvalue sensed at that location and T
is experienced at the instant the front of the blast pulse just
passes the location.
e Static OverDressure Impulse: The area under the curve of
overpressure versus time over the interval between the time of
arrival of the blast front at the fixed location to the time at
which the overpressure returns to zero at the same location.
e Peak Reflected Pressure: The magnitude of the refl-tted blasL
wave front that would result upon striking a rigid body placed in
the path of a blast front. Since the peak reflected pressure can
be quite high, it can deform the body and accelerate it.
• DynamicPressure: Measure of the strength of the "wind" following
the front of the blast pulse. Peak dynamic pressure occurs jL t
behind the front and decays rapidly with distance behind the front.
• DynamicPressure Impulse: Defined analogously to static over-
pressure tmpulse. Peak dynamic pressure and dynamic pressure
impulse control the drag of the blast wind and along with body
shape and weight determine the final velocity of a body if it is
free to move.
Pre- and Early-Fl!qh_ GroundPOOlExolo$ton_
A significant explosion source for the Shuttle is possible should a
massive spill of the liquid oxygen and hydrogen ET propellants. 5pills of
these propellants, as a result of ET structural breakup, Shuttle impact with
the launch tower, early range destruct, SRBcase rupture or Orbiter aft-
compartment explosions could lead to collection, mixing, and ignition of
significant portions of the propellants on launch-pad surfaces while the
Shuttleis stillessentiallyat the pad. The resultingblastwave
subseqdentlysweepspastthe Orbiter,actingon the exteriorsurfacesin a
mannerto implodeor crush the structureinto the RTGs withinthe Orbiter.
It is also possiblethat,as the blastwave fails the ct ucture,the RTGs
will be directlyexposedto the blastenvironment.Thus, not onlyOrbiter
fragmentationbut also blast loading(acceleration)hazardsare presentedto
the RTGs.
There have beerno pad accidentsinvolvingth_ spillageof ET _'
propellantsfromwhich to base estimatesof potentialexplosion
environments,therefore,environmentsare basedon resultsfrom a
hydrodynamiccomputercode capableof predictingthe blast loading
parametersof a fastmovingplanarblast pulseas it travelsthroughthe
, air above the pad. The behaviorof the explosion energyreleaseitself
(sourcecharacteristic)is variedover a wide range to includethe range
of uncertaintyin the initialcollection,mixingand ignitionof the
propellants,Since the explosionsourcecharacteristicontrolsthe blast
pulse loadingparameters,a probabilistlcomputationaltre:_tmentof the
sourcecharacteristicyieldsa probabi_istlcestimateof blast loading
parametersat specifiedheightsabove the pad. Applicationof these
loadingparametcrsto an apalyticalfragmentaccelerationmodel for the
Orbitercargo bay door yields_ probabilisticestimateof fragmentvelocity
for this closestcomponentto the RTGs.
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, Typicalblastand Orbiterfragmentationenvironmentsestimatedto i
resultfromtheseground-poolexplosionsat severaldistancesabove the pad
surfaceare shown _n TablesB-4 and B-S, respect,vely.
TABLE B-4. BLASTENVIRONMENTS*DUE TO DESTRUCT
OR GROUND-POOLEXPLOSIONSSTS/IUS
Pressure(psi) Impulse(psi-s)
Over-
Height (ft) Pressure Dynamic Reflected Static Dynamic
In-pool 2,075 810 5,300 0.58 0.058
Just Above
Pool 659 1,720 5,169 2.01 0.33
20 106 123 552 0.71 o.Ig
- 100 21 18 78 0.41 0.20
J
*UpperI0 percentileestimatesfor on-padexplosionsof respectiveliquid
bipropellants(exceptfor in-pooland just above pool).
TABLE B-5. FRAGMENTVELOCITIES*FROM DESTRUCT
OR GROUND-POOLEXPLOSIONS: STS/IUS
Height (ft) FlyerPlateVelocity(fps) ShrapnelVelocity(fps)
In-ponl 679-2,186 1-92
JustAbove Pool 1,07g-2,661 2-122
20 429-1,096 0-70
I00 184-356 0-58
*UpperIO percentileestimatesfor on-padexplosionsof respectiveliquid
bipropellants(exceptfor in-pooland just ebove pool).
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Jn-Fliqht [xplosions
A second explosion source involving the ET propellants is possible for
a short time after the Shuttle has cleared the tower. Aerodynamic
conditions through the pext 20 seconds (up to an METof 30 seconds) are such
that failures of the ET structure can lead quickly to its breakup and the
consequent airborne dumpof liquid hydrogen and oxygen propellants. The
hydrogen quickly vaporizes and mixes with air to form an explosive mixture.
The burning SRBsprovide an ignition source to ignite the mixture. A
hydrodynamic computer code is used to compute the blast load!ng parameters
of a fast-moving, spherically-expanding, blast pulse.
The estimated blast environment from this explosion is shownin
Table B-6 for the breakupstartingat two differenttimes as the Shuttle
acceleratesduringits early launchtrajectory. As the ET breakup,
propellantdump, and mixingrequirean elapsedtime on the order of a
_ second,tileincreasedspeedof the Shuttlebetweenthe two initiatingtimes
shown in Table B-6 has allowedan increaseddistance(Shuttleinertia)to
developbetweenthe Orbiterand the centerof explosionfor the later
occurringbreakup. Hence,the potentialblast environmentfor airborne
explosionsrapidlydiminishes. BeyondMET 30 seconds_changingatmospheric
and aerodynamicconditionswill precludesignificantairborneexplosions.
The potentialOrbiterfragmentvelocitiesassociatedwith the airborne
blastenvironmentsin Table B-6 are shown in Table B-7.
TABLE B-6. BLAST ENVIRONMENTSDUE TO IN-FLIGHTEXPLOSIONSFROM DESTRUCT
_ OR MASSIVESTRUCTURALFAILURES: STS/IUS
\
MET (s) Pressure(psi) Impulse(psi-s)
Over-pressure Dynamic Reflected Static Dynamic
10 298 122 1,99] 3.23 1.60
30* 14 5 53 1.13 0.48
*Over-waterthreshold.
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i TABLE B-7. FRAGMENTVELOCITIESFROM IN-FLIGHTEXPLOSIONSDUE TO
DESTRUCTOR MASSIVESTRUCTURALFAILURES:
I
MET (s) FlyerPlate Velocity(fps) ShrapnelVelocity(fps)
I0 958 - 1,949 6 - 354
30* _00 - 285 2 - 83
*Over-waterthreshold.
B.3.3 FireballEnvironmentFrom ET Propellants
The updraftsand hightemperatureswithinthe fireballproducedby a
;- large liquidpropellantgroundfire are hazardsif the exposedRTG fuel
clads have been breachedearlierby severemechanicalimpactloads. The
releasedfuel fines in this case can be vaporizedand dispersedinto the
atmosphereby the fireballenvironment.
The fireballcharacteristicsand thermalenvironmentthat would result
from a massivespill of ET propellantsat the launchpad can be specified
by: (I) maximumfireballdiameter,(2) fireballlift-offtime,
(3) durationof the fireball,(4) temperatureinsidethe fireball,and (5)
: total heat flux producedwithinthe fireball.
Using availableexperimentaland analyticalinformation,and assuminga
full ET loadof propellantis involved(1,595,000pounds),a maximum
fireballdiameterof 1,000feet is predicted. The fireballis also predicted
to have a total durationof 30 secondsand to liftcompletelyoff the ground
after about 10 seconds.
: The temperaturesto which an RTG could be exposedrange from ,
approximately4,000 degreesFahrenheitat fireballinceptiondown to 3,500
degreesFahrenheitat fireballl_ft off. The total heat flux rangesfrom
about 300 to 100 Btu/second/feet_ over the sametime span.
!
B.3.4 Abort Crash Environments
Duringthe latteraerodynamicflightportionof a returnfrom a mission
abort,the Orbiterflieswithoutenginethrustand exhibitsthe same general
flightcharacteristicsas a conventionalheavy aircraftduringa final
landingapproach. Assumingthat the orbiterhas enteredthis final phase
of the abort returnundernormalcontrol,a crash could ensue due to
controlerror,or mechanicalfailuresof the flightcontrolsystemor
landinggear.
t
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Examinationof the Orbiterflightprofileand flyingcharacteristics
leads to a set of fourabort crash accidentsthat are deemedcredible: two
landingscenariosand two ocean ditch scenarios. In each case, crasheswith
and withoutthe final landingflare are consideredin estimatingthe
_ resultingrelative-impactvelocityof the RTG with the surroundingOrbiter
structure. The estimatedupper and lower boundsof these impactvelocities
are shown in Table B-8.
B.3.5 EnvironmentsFor Re-entryFrom Orbit
Aerodynamicand heattransferanalysisof the uncontrolled,accidental
reentryof the Shuttleprior to the deploymentof the upper stage and
payloadshowsthat the RTG conditionjust prior to earth surfaceimpact
varieswith the time of launchfailure. For the time intervalof interest
betweenSRB separation(MET= 128 seconds)and the achievementof the
parkingorbit (MET= 510 seconds),the predictionsare:
1) The Orbiterand IUSwill alwaysbreakup duringreentryand will not
reach the surfaceintact.
2) For MET less than495 seconds,the RTGs or GeneralPurposeHeat Source
(GPHS)modulesreach the surfaceover the AtlanticOcean.
3) For MET between128 and 155 seconds,the RTGs reach the surfaceintact
and withoutcasemelting.
4) For MET between155 and 210 seconds,the RTGsmay reach the surface
withoutcasemelting,or the GPHS modulesmay be releasedprior to
reachingthe surface.
5) For MET greaterthan 210 seconds,the GPHS modulesare releasedprior
to surfaceimpact.
B.3.6 InertialUpper Staqe and PayloadEnvironments
The IUS vehicleitselfdoes not significantlyadd to any of the
accidentenvironmentsproducedby the main launchvehicle. Yhe solid
propellantis not detonableundercredibleaccidentconditionsfor the i
Galileomission. AlthoughIUS propellantimpactingthe groundas ejecta
from other eventsmay react vigorouslyas an explosion,these events
produceonly localizedblast effects. In addition,the propellantdoes not
contributesignificantlyto fireballenvironments,since the burn is
relativelyslow and occursat ambientpressure.
Some IUS failuresafter the deploymentof Galileo/IUSfrom the Orbiter
resultin errantreentrywithinthe designcapabilityof the RTGs. Earth
impactconditionsare similarto those for reentryfromorbit.
f
," B-17
1990012831-170
TABLE B-8. RTG iHPACTVELOCITIESDUE TO ABORT CRASH: STS/IUS
Crash Scenario RTG ImpactVelocity(fps)
Ditch No Flare 65-125
Ditch With Flare 50-IIO
LandingPre-F]are 60-120
LandingPost-Flare 50-65
,j
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The only IUS failurethat can cause a direct threatto the RTGs is a I
motor case ruptureduringthe secondfiringof the IUS. The dominantthreat
from this failureis the productionof fragmentsof solidpropellant
estimatedto be travelingat velocitiesin the range of 92 to 728 feet per
secondand weighingfrom 2 to 8 poundsper fragment.
The Galileospacecraftalso does not significantlyadd to any of the
accidentenvironmentsproducedby the launchvehicleaccidentszenarios. ,
B.4 RADIOLOGICALASSESSMENT
The use of plutonium-238dioxide(Pu02)fuel, a radioactivematerial,
in the two GeneralPurposeHeat Source- R_dioisotopeThermoelectric
Generators(RTGs)and the 131 LightWeightRadioisotopeHeaterUnits
(LWRHUs)on the Galileospacecraftnecessitatesevaluationof the
radiologicalrisks te personsin the launch sitevicinityand the general
populationworldwideresultingfrom postulatedaccidentsoccurringduring
the mission. The inventoryof plutoniumdioxidefuel is 132,200Ci in each
RTG (264,400Ci total)and 33.6 Ci in each LWRHU (4334Ci total). The RTGs
and LWRHUsare describedin Section2.2 of this EnvironmentalImpact
Statement(EIS).
l
Final SafetyAnalysisReportshave been preparedby the U.S. Department
of Energy(DOE)addressingthe safetyaspectsof the RTGs (DOE 1988a,
DOE 1988b,DOE Ig89a)and the LWRHUs(DOEIg88d,DOE 1988e,DOE 1988f)on the
Galileomissionusing the Space Shuttleas a launchvehicle. The Final
SafetyAnalysisReportspresentthe resultsof safetyassessmepts,including
analysesand testing,of launchand deploymentof the RTGs and LWRHU for the
Galileomission. The objectiveof this sectionis to summarizethe results
of the Final SafetyAnalysisReportsin terms of potentialaccidentsand the
resultingradiologicalconsequencesand risks.
The RTG Final SafetyAnalysisReportconsistsof three volumesas
follows:
Volume 1: ReferenceDesignDocument
)
Containsreferencedesigninformationthat providesa basis for Volumes
II and III. It containsdescriptionsof the RTG, the Galileo
spacecraftand missionprofile,the Space Shuttle,the InertialUpper ._
Stage (IUS),the trajectoryand flightcharacteristics,and the launch
site.
VolumeI!: Accident,Model Document
_ Summarizesthe potentialaccidentenvironmentsand associated
probabilitiesas describedby NASA in the ShuttleData Book (NASA 1988).
Presentsa summaryof failuresequencesand any resultingfuel releases
(sourceterms)based on analys_ and test data characterizingthe '/
responseof an RTG to differentaccidentenvironments.
Volume Ill: NuclearRisk AnalysisDocument
Summarizesthe radiologicalconsequencesof postulatedaccident
scenariosby missionphase. Missionrisks,by missionphase,are also
B-Ig
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quantified. The radiologtcal consequencesand risks are reported in
terms of the radiation dose and health effects incurred by the affected
population, and the levels of deposition of radioactive niaterial on the
ground.
• The analysis is supported by a series of appendices which present in
detail the methodology utilized in risk assessment; biomedical aspects of
Pu02; meteorological data; land use, oceanographic, and water characteris-
; tic_ at the KennedySpace Center; worldwide demographic, land use, and
oceanographic data; particle size considerations; and an uncertainty
analysis.
The process of information flow and analyses used in the RTGFinal
Safety Analysis Report is summarized in Figure B-5. The LWRHUFinal Safety
Analysis Report consists of an analogous three volume set.
The remainder of this section summarizes the source terms based on the
Accident Model Document(Section B.4.]), the radiological consequences
: methodology (Section B.4.2), the accident consequences(Section B.4.3), and
integrated mission risks (Section B.4.4) ba3ed on the Nuclear Risk Analysis
Documentand its appendices.
B.4.] Source Terms
C
This section summarizes the accident scenario and accident environment
that could result in a fuel release from the LWRHUs. The accident scenarios
and accident environments that could result in fuel release from the RTGs
are presented in Sections B.2 and B.3. Considerations and conclusions of
evaluating the damageto fuel containment structures are summarized.
The fuel release from an accident is called a source term. A source
term consists of the quantity of fuel released (expressed in curies of
PuO2), the location of the release, the particle size distribution of the
released PuO), and the probability of release. The methodsfor developing
the sourcet_rms are described.
The radiologicalconsequencesof an accidentare dependenton several
variables. These are the accidentscenario,releasecharacterization,
exposurepathwayparameters,and meteorologicalconditions. Each accident
case is a combinationof the variables. The total numberof combinationsis
very large,makinganalysisof all accidentcases impractical.Three cases
for each missionphase are developedand analyzed. The methodof selection '
and the sourceterm for the selectedcases are described.
For the accidentscenariosand the associatedenvironmentsspecifiedby
NASA, the considerationsand conclusionsof evaluatingthe damageto fuel
containmentare summarizedas follows:
.. I) Explosionof ExternalTank propellantson or nearthe launchpad, '_
with the subsequentimplosionof the Orbiterpayloadbay walls
aroundthe RTGsdo not resultin breachof the FueledClads.
Distortionsof the cladsgenerallyare less than the thresholdfor
breach.
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2) In a small percentage of cases, external tank propellant
explosions could result in release of Fueled Clads. The secondary
impact of the Fueled Clads on the concrete and steel surfaces
around the launch pad could result in breach of someclads.
3) Based on tests simulating range destruct or Solid Rocket Booster
case rupture, Solid Rocket Booster fragments at velocities up to
695 ft/sec in the face-on impact attitude will not breach the
Fueled Clads when struck in the full RTGconfiguration.
4) The results of Solid Rocket Booster fragment interaction tests
with Orbiter structure indicate that attenuation by passage
through the wing and payload bay wall can reduce fragment velocity
up to 46 percent and spill rate up to lO0 percent. Passagethrough
on'ly the payload bay wall can reduce velocity up to 20 percent.
i These data, coupledwith the resultsof the largeSolid Rocket
Boosterfragmenttests,indicatethat SolidRocketBooster
fragmentsin the face-onattitudeaL impactduringthe first 105
secondsof missionelapsedtimewill not cause a breachof the
FueledClads. A rangedestructof the vehicleduringthe 105 to
: 128 s_condsof missionelapsedtime are of the face-onimpacti
type.
5) Solid RocketBoosterfragmentsimpactingin an edge-onattitude
can breachthe fuelclads at velocitiesin the range of 130 to 370
ft/secdependingon the fuel and iridiumcharacteristics,and the
locationof impactwith respectto the clads,and the positionof
the FueledClads in the stackof modules.
"!
6) If reentryoccursas a resultof a spacecraftfailureduringthe
VEEGA Maneuverphase,the aeroshellsare expectedto fail and
releasethe GraphiteImpactShell (GIS)with FueledClads. The
iridiumcladswill fail from eutecticformationwith the graphite
in the GraphiteImpactShell. I_pacton a hard ground surfaceis
then assumedto releaseall the fuel in the GraphiteImpactShell.
7) Both intactand damagedFueledClads and modulesmay have some
residencetime in the fireballfrom liquidpropellantexplosions.
The effectsof the fireballwill not resultin breachof the
clads;however,the fireballwill modifythe particlesize
distributionor locationof any fuel releasedin the fireball.
8) ModulesreleasedduringOn-Orbitor PayloadDeployphase accidents
may releasesmall amountsof fuel upon impacton a rock or other
hard surfacesfor cases involvingland impactfollowingreentry.
The LWRHUsaboardthe Galileospacecraftcan be subjectedto a number
of hostileenvironments.A systematicassessmentof the responseof LWRHUs
to theseenvironmentsshows that fuelreleasewould occur only in certain
instancesduringa VEEGA superorbita_reentry(DOE 1988d,DOE 1988e).The n
probabilityof a releaseis I.OOXI_-° for the most probablecase, 5.00XI0-_
for the maximumcase, and 1.50XIO"° for the expectationcase. The value of
IXIO-"was adoptedas the lower limit in assessingcredibleaccidents. This
value shouldbe comparedwith valuesof IXIO"_ and IXIOTM often used in
safetydesigngoal analysesfor nuclearpower. The lower value was used
here becausethere have been statisticallyfar fewerspace launchesthan
B-22
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powerplants. Furthermore,all accidentsin a missionphase,irrespective
of their probability,were used in c_Iculatingthe expectationcase. In r
addition,the Galileosafetydnalysisconductedby the DOE indicatedthat l
accidentswith prnbabilitiesless than ]XIO-I did not yield any substantial
increasein overallrisk. Sincethe probabilitiesof releasefor the LWRHUs
are less than this cut off limitthey are not consideredfurther.
p
Shuttle-relatedlaunchand _scentsourceterms were calculatedusing
the LASEP.2program. LASEP-2uses a Monte Carlo approachto simulateRTG
responseto a given accidentenvironment.This is done using a minimumof
10,000trialsfor each scenarioor sub-scenarioconsidered,representing
variationson accidentenvironmentseverityand RTG componentresponses
determinedby probabilitydistributionsof conditionsbased on the accident
environments,hydrocodemodeling,and componenttest results. The LASEP-2
model directsthe calculationsto arriveultimatelyat FueledClad
distortion. Correlationsbasedon RTG componenttest data are then used by
LASEP-2to determineFueledClad crack size, the fuel releasequantity,and
particlesizedistributionof the release(DOE Ig88b).
The averageand maximumsourceterms are calculatedfor each accident
scenarioconsidered. One most probableand one maximumaccidentscenario
fromeach missionphase are analyzedin the NuclearRisk AssessmentDocument
(DOE]g8ga). In addition,an accidentexpectationcase, which
incorporatesall probabilitiesand sourceterms, is presentedfor each
phase. The definitionsof these cases are providedbelow.
Most ProbableCase
The Failure/AbortSequenceTrees for each missionphase are examined
and the singlereleasehavingthe highestprobabilityof occurrenceis
selected. All associatedreleaseswithinthe selectedsequencebranch
(e.g.,projectilebreachand impactson variousmedia of both breachedand
unbreachedFueledClads)comprisethe sourceterm (DOE198ga). The
radiologicalconsequenceof the sourceterm for each of the 42 setsof daily
meteorologicaldata, which representthe 42 days of the launchwindow,are
then calculated. The resultsare rankedaccordingto populationdose, and
the case that representsthe 50th percentileof the rankingis selectedas
the most probablecase.
MaximumCase
Withina missionphase,the maximumfuel releaseand the meteorology
thatmaximizespopulationdose throughinhalation,ingestion,and external
pathwaysare selected. The singlereleaseand all relatedreleasesin the
sequencebranchcomprisethe sourceterm (DOE1989a).
ExpectationCase
The expectationcase uses all of the averagereleasesand their
probabilitiesto definea probability-weightedsourceterm, consideringall
of the scenariospostulatedin a missionphase. The radiological
consequencesof the sourceterm for each of the 42 meteorologicalsets are
calculated. The resultsare averagedto developthe expectationcase. The
purposeof the expectationcase is to developthe componentsof a risk
analysisconsideringthe whole phaseduration. It representsa
probabilisticcombinationof all accidentscenarios(DOE1989a).
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The range from zero to most probableand maximumcases presenta
representativerange of releasesthatcould occur. The most probableis the
releaseof highestprobability,but couldbe differentconsideringit is
representativeof only one set of the variables-- quantityof release,
locationof release,particlesizedistribution,probabilityof accident
occurrence,and meteorologicalconditions.A change in any one of these,
exceptprobabilityof occurrence,could resultin a differentset of
consequences.The maximumcase, presentingthe highestconsequences,is
developedprimarilyfor emergencyplanningpurposes.
The most probable,maximum,and expectationsourceterms for each
missionphase are presentedin TablesB:g throughB-11, respectively. Each
case is describedby the type of accident,the curiesthat are estimatedto
be released,the probabilityof release,categoryof release,and
descriptionof the accident. For example,in the Phase 0 most probable
accident,the type is a fire and explosionwhich resultsin the releaseof
44 curiesof PdO2. The releasehas a probabilityof 5 in I0 million,and
will occur in th_ fireballof the explosionwhile the Shuttleis sittingon
the launchpad. The PuO_will come from FueledClads that are breachedby
impactwith steel. Each-ofthe other phasesfor the most probableand
maximumcases presentedin TablesB-g and B-IOcan be similarlydescribed.
Additionalexplanationof the PhaseI most probablecase is necessary.
The accidenttypJ is a Solid RocketBoosterfailureresultingin the lossof
thrust. The releaseof PuOp comes fromtwo categories,1) FueledClads
breachedby concretefragmeBtsin the fireball,and 2) FueledClads breached
by impactwith concreteoutsidethe fireball. The total sourceterm is 921
curieswith a probabilityof occurrenceof 3 in 10,000. The accidentoccurs
on the launchpad.
The expectationcases (TableB-I])are presented_ terms of accident
type,the categoryof release,the probabilityof release,and the amountof
PuO2 released. F_r example,for Phase0 only one accidenttype, a fire and
explosion,comprisesthe expectationcase. The releaseoccurs in the
fireballwith a probabllityof occurrenceof 5 in 10 million. The Phase I
expectationcase is made up of sevenaccidenttypes. All have releasesin
the fireball,six also have releasesat groundlevel outsidethe fireball,
and two also have releasesat an altitudebut outsidethe fireball.
The particlesizedistributionsassociatedwith these releasesare
basedon aeroshellmoduleand FueledClad impacttests conductedat Los
AlamosNationalLaboratory(DOE 1989a). For the most probableand
expectationcases,the averageof the particlesizedistributionsfor the
testsconsideredwas used as a startingpoint. Basedon the FueledClad
crack sizescalculatedby LASEP-2,the particlesizedistributionswere cut-
off at a particlesize equal to one-halfthe maximumcrack size, and then
renormalized.A similarapproachwas taken for the maximumreleasecases
exceptthat the particlesizedistributionfrom the test data thatwould
maximizeradiologicalcot_sequenceswas selectedas the startingpoint. The
particlesizedistributionswhich are the basis for these cases are
summarizedin FiguresB-6 and B-7.
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FIGURE B-6. CUMULATIVE PARTICLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION FOR MOST PROBABLE
AND EXPECTATION CASES
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Note: Numbers18 to 23 referto particle
sizecodesgivenin DOE 1989a.
FIGUREB-7. CUMULATIVEPARTICLESIZEDTST_IBUTIONFORMAXIMUMCASE
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A detaileddiscussionof the particlesize considerationsis )'_e:;ented
in AppendixD of the FinalSafetyAnalysisReport,Volume Ill (DOE i_Gga).
The resultsof this analysisshow that:
I. Stretificationof the particlesin an explosionplume is very
rapid,usuallyoccurringwithinthe first kilometer(.6 mi) of
plume movementafter an explosion.
2. The vaporizedPuO_ is a significantcomponentof dose (86 percent
of the short-term-doseand 69 percentof the long-termdose).
3. The p_imarycontributorto surfacecontaminationabove the 0.2
uCi/mc screeninglevel are particlesin the IO to 20 micron range.
B.4.2 RadioloqicalConsequencesMethodoloqy
This sectionsummarizesthe method usedto determinethe radiological
consequencesresultingfromthe most probableand maximumcases for each
missionphase. The evaluationof the radiologicalconsequencesof fuel
releasesfrom postulatedaccidentsincludethe followingsteps:
! I. Identificationof the postulatedaccident,fuel release
probability,and releaselocation.
2. Sourceterm characterizationin terms of quantity,particlesize
distribution,and volumedistribution.
3. Analysisof the dispersionof the releasedfuel in the environment
to determineconcentrationsin environmentalmedia (air,soil, and
water)as functionsof time and space.
4. Analysisof the interactionof environmentalradioactive
concentrationswith peoplethroughinhalation,ingestion,and
externalexposurepathways.
5. Evaluationof resultingradiologicalconsequencesin terms of
populationdoses and contaminatedenvironmentalmedia.
The typesof radiologicalconsequencesfor the most probableand
maximumreleasecases include:
?
1. The "short-term"ra,liationdose that resultsfrom the initial
exposure. The doses are 70-yeardose commitmentsresultingfrom
the extendedretentionof materialin the body.
2. The "long-term"radiationdose which would resultfrom continuing
exposureto materialsin the environmentover an extendedperiod
_ followingrelease. Long-termdoses includethose to offsite
KennedySpaceCenterand worldwidepopulationsdue to inhalation
of resuspendedmaterialand ingestionof contaminatedfood over a
70-yearperiod. In addition,long-termdoses to onsiteKennedy
Space Centerworkersdue to inhalationof resuspendedmaterialare
calculated for an exposure period of 35 years based on 40 hours
per week.
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3. Estimatesof land- and water-surfaceareas contaminatedby I
depositionof radioactivity.It shouldbe noted that the i
estimatespresentedhere are for illustrativepurposes. These
, estimatesare based on averageclimatologicalconditionsfor the
most probablecase, and conditionswhich maximizepopulationdose
in the maximumcase. In the event of an accident,real-time
' estimatesof advectionand depositionwould use meteorological ,
conditionscurrentat that time.
This informationis presentedin the followingterms for each
representativecase:
I. Numbersof personsestimatedto be subjectto greaterthan
specifiedlevelsof both short-termdoses and long-termdoses.
The launcharea populationdata, and worldwidepopulationdensity
data describedin Section3 are used as the basis.
: 2. Total short-termand long-termpopulationdoses. In presenting
populationdoses,the conceptof de minimishas been used, meaning
a dose level belowconcernand from which no healtheffectsare
calculated. The de minimisdose was taken to be I mrem/yrand _
;: mrem total dose commitment. Total populationdoses are reported '
both with and withoutde minimis.
3. Fhe maximumshort-termand long-termdoses to individuals.
4. Estimatesof landand surfacewater areas contaminatedabove
specifiedlevels. The screeninglevelof 0.2 uCi/mc established
by the U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency (EPA),below which no
furtherconsiderationneed be given,has been used (EPA 1977).
The radiologicalconsequencesfor each missionphasewere calculated
T_ for the most probable,maximum,and expectationcas_ using the KSC-EMERGE,
LOPAR,and HIPAR computermodels. Releasesin the trcposher_are treated
using KSC-EMERGE,and high altitudereleasesare treatedusing LOPAR for
small particles(lessthan IO micronsin diameter)and HIPAR for large
particles(greaterthan )0 micronsin diameter). The resultsfor the
maximumand most probablecasesclearlyidentifyspecificcases intendedto i
be representativeaccidentscenarios,while the resultsfor the expectation
case are used in the calculationof risk. Key featuresand assumptionsof
the analysisare summarizedbelow. Detailsof the methodologyare presented L_
in the FinalSafetyAnalysisReport (DOE 1989a).
The sourcetermswith their particlesizedistributionsare given an ;
,- initialspatialdistributionappropriateto the conditionsfor release. '
Releasesin the launchareafrom surfaceimpactsoutsidea fireballare
given an initialclouddiameterof 10 metersat a heightof 5 meters. !
-- Materialreleasedinto a fireballstartingout at groundlevel is given a
distributionirawhich 80 percentof the materialis in an elevatedcloud and
20 percentis in a verticalstem reachingtowardground.
The plume configurationresultingfromliquidpropellantexplosionsand
fire has been estimatedbased on resultsof hCgh explosivefield tests
involvingboth liquidand solid high explosives. The centerreleaseheight
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and the diameter of the stabilized cloud resulting from the explosion
fireball are correlated to the TNT equivalent yield of the explosion.
Of the thermal energy associated with the complete combustion of liquid
propellants, it is estimated that 51 percent contributes to the thermal
buoyancy of the initial fireball, ine resulting center release height and
diameter of the cloud were assumedto be representative of the most probable
case of launch pad accidents. Since lower release heights and smaller cloud
dimensions result in increased radiological consequences, the cloud
T specificationfor the maximumcase are basedon a thermalreleasethat is I0
percentof that used in the n_estprobablecase. This fallswithin the range
of observedvariationsin verticalplumeconfigurationsfor a given energy
release(DOE 198ga).
Launcharea groundlevel sourceterms resultwhen FueledClads impact
hard surfacesat speedsabove their failurethresholdsor when previously
__ breachedFueledClads impactany surfaceoutsideof the initialfireball.
: Impactpointswould be distributedaroundthe launchpad. All of these
distributedreleaseshave been assumedto be at the launchpad with an
initialheightof 5 meters and an initialIO-metercloud diameter.
Populationdoses shouldnot be significantlyaffected. The atmospheric
dispersionof the sourcetermmaterialwith the initialcloud specifications
determinedas describedin the precedingparagraphsis then calculated,
usingmodelsdescribedbelow.
The atmosphericdispersionof postulatedreleasesin the troposphere
(altitudesless than about IO km) in the vicinityof KennedySpace Center is
treatedusing the KSC-EMERGEmodel. KSC-EMERGEis a Gaussianpuff-
trajectorymodel that treatsmeteorologythat varies in time and spac_
(vertically)and accountsfor verticalplumeconfiguration;particle-size-
dependenttransport,deposition,and plumedepletion;and sea-breeze
recirculation.
Meteorologyfor the launchwindow (Octoberand November)is treatedin
termsof 24-hourhistoricalsequencesof meteorologicaldata. The launch
windowmeteorologyis representedby 42 such sequentialdata.
Releasesat high altitudeare treatedby a particletrajectorymodel
(HIPAR)in the case of large particles(greaterthan 10 microns)and by an
empiricalmodel (LOPAR)derivedfromweaponstestingdata in the case of
smallparticulatesand vapor (lessthanor equal to 10 microns).
Radiationdoses to populationsare calculatedbased on environmental
concentrations.The dose conversionfactorshave been derivedusing a model
. developedby the InteragencyNuclearSafetyReview Panel-Biomedicaland
EnvironmentalEffectsSubpanelfor the 1986SafetyEvaluationReport. In
the calculationof radiationdose, the conceptof de minimishas been used,
representinga dose level belowconcern(NegligibleIndividualRisk Level,
or NIRL) (NCRPSM1987). A de minimisdose of 1 mrem per year (50 mrem
lifetime)has been used. Populationdose is reportedin person-rem,which
is the cumulationof doses to all of the affectedpopulation.
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The assumptionsand featuresof the analysessignificantto the I
magnitudeof the resultsreportedhere are:
I. The fuel remain:in the insolublePuO2 form in the environment.
2. Particlesizedistributionsare unchangedfollowingthe accident
exceptfor the effectsof vaporizationin fireballs.
3. The initialplume configurationof ground level and elevated
releases(cloudsize, height)is importantto the results.
4. Long-termdoses containa componentdue to food ingestion. It is
assumedthat all vegetablesconsumedby the populationare grown
locally(in homegardens). This may be true for some individuals,
but is unlikelyto be truefor the generalpopulation.
The radiologicalconsequencesof the PuO_ releasesfor the most
probable,maximum,and expectationcases are aependenton the characteristics
of the modelsutilizedand valuesselectedfor key model parameters. Due to
the potentiallylarge rangeof PuO2 releasesand environmentalconditions
that could affectthe results,an uncertaintyanalysishas been performedto
determinewhat variationfrom the estimatedradiologicalconsequencesand
missionrisksmight be expected(DOE 198ga).
Importantvariableparametersor conditionsaffectingthe radiological
consequencesand missionrisks includethe following:
Accidentscenario
• Accidentenvironment
e Accidentprobability
Releasecharacterization
• Conditionalsourceterm probability
• Sourceterm
• Modificationsto the sourceterm and particlesize distribution
becauseof mechanical,chemical,and physicalinteractionprior to
deposition
o Particlesizedistribution
• Initialcloud dimensions
• Verticalsourceterm distribution
• Releaselocation
Meteorologicalconditions
• Atmosphericstability
e Wind speedand direction
• Mixing height
e Sea-breezerecirculation
• Fumigation
e Space and time variation
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Exposurepathwayparameters
• Population distribution
• Resuspension factor
• Deposition velocity
• Vegetable ingestion
• Protective action
Radiation doses and health effects
• Internal dose factors
• Health effects estimator - Potential variation in these parameters
or conditions and their effect on the radiological consequences
and mission risks are evaluated in the uncertainty analysis.
However, the approach taken is dependent on the type of
radiologtcal consequencesunder consideration which include the
following:
- Short-term population dose (with and without de minimis)
- Long-term population dose (with and without de minimis)
- Surface contamination levels
- Health effects.
Population dose health effects and risk are the primary types of
results considered in the uncertainty analysi._. The other measures are
discussed where appropriate, but are considered as being of secondary
importance from an uncertainty viewpoint.
The detailed description of the uncertainty analysis and the
methodology used are presented in Appendix H of the Final Safety Analysis
Report, Volume III (P_E 198ga). The following paragraphs present a summary
of the uncertainty analysis results.
The uncertainty factors resulting from considaration of accident
probabilities, release characterization, meteorological conditions, and
exposure pathway parameters are summarized. Based on these uncertainty
factors, the overall uncertainty associated with various types of
radiological consequencesand mission risk are determined.
The log-normal distributions of each of the individual uncertainty
factor ranges were combined, such that the overall meanuncertainty factor
was taken as the product of the individual meanuncertainty factors
affecting the resu]t type. The standard deviation of the log-normal
distribution representing the overall range was determined.
Based on the methodologyoutlined above, the resulting overall mean
uncertainty factors and associated ran;es are summarized tn Table B-I2. The
uncertainty factors represent multipliers that could be applied to the
results presented tn the following sections in order to describe the
potential effects in more precise and realistic terms. However, in all
cases but one (the Phase I mission phase risk-surface contamination area),
__
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TABLE B-12. OVERALLUNCERTAINLYANALYSISRESULTS
Owrall UncertaintyFactor
Result Type Mean Rangeb
• Radiologicalconsequencesa
Short-termpopulationdose 0.25 0.013 4.6
Long-termpopulationdose 0.22 0.0042 1.4
Total populationdose 0.23 0.0067 7.9
- Healtheffects 0.23 0.0063 8.5
Surfacecontaminationarea 0.75 0.051 5.2
• Missionphase riskb
Phase 1
,o
Short-termpopulationdose 0,42 0.061 2.9
Long-termpopulationdose 0,37 0.024 5.7
Total populationdose 0.39 0.035 4.3
Healtheffects 0.39 0.032 4.B
Surfacecontaminationarea 1.3 0.22 7.8
PhasesQ, 2-5
Short-termpopulationdose 0.25 0.055 1.1
Long-termpopulationdose 0.22 0.019 - 2.5
Total populationdose 0.23 0.029 - 1.8
Health effects 0.23 0.026 - 2.0
Surfacecontaminationareamean 1.75 0.20 - 2.9
Source:DOE 1989a
J
a. The mean uncertaintyfactorfor radiologicalconsequencesmultipliesthe
expectationcaseresults(TableB-]S) to yield a best estimatemean of
the expectationcase results. The originalexpectationcase result
" shouldalso be multipliedby the uncertaintyfactorrange to yield a
best estimateof the 5- and 9S-percentilevaluesof the range of
_ radiologicalconsequencesthat feed intothe best estimatefor the
T expectationcase results.
. b. The mean uncertaintyfactorfor missionphase risk multipliesthe
missionphase risk results(TableB-16) te yield a best estimatemean of
missionphaserisk (definedas total probabilitytimes expectaL1oncase
results). The originalmissionphase risk resultsshouldalso be
multipliedby the uncertaintyfactorrange to yield a best estimateof
the 5- and g5-percentilevaluesof the best estimatefor the mission
phase rlsk.
B-35
"Ik
1990012831-188
r4
the meanoverall uncertainty factor will reduce the public health and
environmental consequences. Therefore, it is not as conservative as the
approach used.
B.4.3 R_dtoloqlcal ConseouenceResults
The results of the radiological consequenceanalysis for the most
probable and maximumcases are summarized in Tables B-13 and B-14.
Reference should be madeto Tables B-g and B-]O in relating accident fuel
release scenarios and radiological consequences.
Tables B-13 and B-14 present the release probability, population dose
in person-rem, total and above de mini_ts, and the area with deposition
above the screening level of 0.2 uCi/m_. The deposition areas are further
divided into dry land, swamp, inland water and ocean. Fur example, for
Phase ! most probable case, the release probability is 3.30X10"_. Total
population dose is 391 person-rem with 0.03 person-rem above de minimis.
Areas with deposition are 43.3 square kilometers of dry land, 15.9 square
kilometers of swamp,25.7 square kilometers of inland water, and no ocean
areas.
The results for the most probable case showthe population doses
varying from a total person-rem range of 176 in Phase 2 to 1,010 in Phase 5. ,
The population dose above de minimis ranges from 0 person-rem in Phase 0 to
581 person-remin Phase 5. The total person-remfor the maximumcase ranges
from 7.3 in Phase 2 to 51,700in Phase5. The populationdose above de
minimisrangesfromo.g person-remin Phase 2 to 50,600person-remin Phase
5.
Individualimpactsare expressedin terms of individualdose and the
numberof personsexceedingthe lifetimedose level. These are presented
for the most probable,maximum,and expectationcases in FiguresB-8 through
B-tO.
These figuresshow, for the most probable,maximum,and expectation,
cases the numberof personswho will exceeddifferentlevels. For example,
for Phase 1 most probablecase (FigureB-8), approximately! personwill
receivea lifetimedose of 50 mrem.
- B.4.4_nteqratedMissionRisks
The missionrisks associatedwith the use of the RTGs and LWRHUsok the
Galileomissionhave been assessedbased on the sourceterms for the
expectationcases The resultingradiologicalconsequencesarisingfrom the
expectationcases are summarizedin T_ble B-15. The overallmi_siunrisks
associatedwith the RTGs are presentedin Table B-16.
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IThese resultsare based on the averagesourceterms from a11 the
postulatedaccidentsand theirprobabilities.The release,dispersion,and
dose calculationconditionsfor these (many)componentsof the expectation
sourceterms were the sameas those assumedfor the most probablerelease
cases. Since these are probabilityweightedconditions,they are
representativeof no specificscenarios. Only the "bottomline" risk
resultshave any significance.
Risk, in terms of individualrisk of cancerfatalitywithin the
affectedpopulationreceivingdoses,can be comparedwith other risksdue to
naturaland man-madehazards,as summarizedin Table B-17.
B.5 ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENTMETHODOLOGIES
The plutoniumdioxide(Pu02)releasesfor the most probable,maximum,
and expectationcases are describedin SectionB.4. Since the most probable
and maximumcases are developedto identifypopulationdose impacts,and
thereforedo not necessarilyrepresentmaximumenvironmentalconsequences.
They representan emphasison impactsto populationareas and tend to
minimizeimpactsto naturaland water areas. The expectationcase more
accuratelyreflectspotentialenvironmentalimpactsbecauseit is not .
designedto emphasizepopulationdose but ratherto representthe averageof
all releaseswithina missionphase,combinedwith the averagemeteorology
withoutregardto populationdose. In general,this will result in a
decreasein depositionon land areas and increasein depositionin water
areaswhen comparedto the most probableand maximumcases. Areas of
radioactivedepositionresultingfromthe most probable,maximum,and
expectationcases are presentedin SectionB.4, TablesB-13 throughB-15.
Accidentalreleasescan occur in the KennedySpace Centervicinity
duringPhases0 and I and at unspecifiedareasworldwideduring Phases2 -
5. Section3 of the EIS presentsa descriptionof the environmentsthat
could be affectedby radioactivedeposition. Two differentimpact
assessmentmethodologieswere developedto analyzethese releases.Both
methodologiesuse the most probable,maximum,and expectationcases. One is
for the KennedySpace CentervicinityduringPhases0 and 1. The other is
globalfor Phases? to 5. Includedwithin the KennedySpace Center
assessmentmethodologyis a discussionof the relationshipof PuO_ particle
sizedistributionto the potentialareas of radioactivedeposition. The
methndologyfor estimatingpotentialeconomiccosts resultingfrom the
accidentsis also provided.
t
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TABLE B-17. INDIVIDUALRISK OF FATALITYBY VARIOUS
CAUSESFOR THE UNITEDSTATESa
Numberof Approximate
FatalAccidents IndividualRisk
AccidentType for 1983 Per Yearc
Motor Vehicle 44,452 2 in 10 thousand
Falls 12,024 5 in 100 thousand
DrQwning 5,254 2 in 100 thousand
Fires and Flames 5,028 2 in 100 thousand
Poison 4,633 2 in 100 thousand
Water Transport 1,316 5 in I million
Air Travel 1,312 5 in 1 million
Manufacturing 1,200 5 in I million
Railway 1,073 4 in I million
Electrocution 872 4 in I million
Lightning 160. 7 in 10 million
Tornadoes 114P 5 in 10 million
Hurricanes 46b 2 in 10 million
All Other Accidents 9,311 4 in 100 thousand
All Accidents 77,484 3 in IO thousand
Diseases 1,631,741 7 in I thousand
Source: USBC 1986
a Basedon 1983 U.S. population.
b 1946to 1984 average.
c Fatality/TotalPopulation.
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B.5. KennedySpace Center and Vicinity
The methodused to assess impacts from Phase 0 and Phase I accidents
involves 3 main steps. The first step is the identification of areas wilere
there could be deposition above a specified level for each of the three
cases by mission phase (Tables B-13 through B-15). For the purposes of this
EIS, the level chosen is based on EPAguidance (EPA 1977) for contamination
of soil by unspecified transuranic elements, including Pu02, and is expressed
in mi_rocuries per square m_,;er (uCi/mC). This EPAscreening level is 0.2
uCi/mL at particlesizesless th_n 2 mm. The EPA suggeststhat areas
contaminatedabovethe 0.2 uCi/mL level shouldbe evaluatedfor possible
mitigationactions. The reco_ended screeninglevelwas selectedon the
basis of limitingthe additionalannualindividualrisk of a radiation
inducedcancerdeath to lessthan one chance in one million. Given that
: humansare generallyconsideredthe speciesmost sensitiveto radiation
effects,contaminationbelowthe screeninglevel is conservativelyjudgedto
haveminimalimpactson other plant and animalsQecies. Thus, for EIS
purposes,areas that do not exceedthe 0.2 uCi/m¢ screeninglevel are
! consideredto have negligiblepotentialfor significantenvironmental
impact,and are not analyzed.
The data presentedin T_blesB-13throughB-J5 identifythe area
contaminatedabove0.2 uCi/m for fourcategories:dry land, swamp, inland
water, and ocean. The dry land categoryincludesall non- wetlandinland ,
land cover classes,such as uplandforest,urban,and agriculturalareas.
- The swamp categoryincludesall wetlandtypes,such as coastalmarshesand
mangrove,and freshwaterm_rshesand swamps. The inlandwater category
includesall estuarine(brackish)and freshopen water. The ocean category
is any marinewaters.
The secondstep is to adjustthe dry land area categoryto reflectthe
types of land uses that occur withinthiscategory. For example,potential
impactsto naturalhabitats,withinthe dry land category,are likelyto be
quitedifferentfrom potentialimpactsto urban areas,also withinthe dry
land category. To estimateenvironmentalresourcesthat could be affected
by deposition,the dry landareas were assumedto be similarto the
percentageof urban,agriculture,and naturalvegetationland cover types in
BrevardCounty.
The percentagesfor BrevardCountyare used as an approximationof the
relativeamountsof these land cover types in any area contaminatedby a
Phase0 or Phase ] release. A data base obtainedfrom the East Central
FloridaRegionalPlanningCouncil(ECFRPC]g88b)was used to determinethe
percentageof urban area and naturalvegetation. Data on the percentageof
agriculturallandswere obtainedfrom anotherstudy (DOE1983),which
includedidentificationand tabulationof land uses within32 kilometersof
LaunchComplex39 at KennedySpace Centerand overlaidon the East Central
FloridaRegionalPlanningCouncildata base to determinethe relative
percentagesof the three cover types. The resultsof this analysisshow
thatdry land areas are composedof approximately74 percentnatural
vegetation,21 percenturban,and 5 percentagricultural.These
percentages,representedas decimalnumbers,are then multipliedwith the
dry land total presentedin TablesB-13 throughB-15 to estimatethe area of
thesecover types that is affectedfor each Phase 0 and Phase ] accident
case.
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The last step in environmental assessmentmethodology is the
identification of the nature and magnitude of the impacts in the areas
affected. A brief discussionof how PuOZ.movesthroughthe ecosystemand
how it could affectplant and animalspec;esis presentedin B.6. Potential
exposureeffectsare determinedthrougha surveyof PuO_ research
literature. In additionto effectscausedby exposureIo PuO2 in the
environment,decontaminationand mitigationactivitiesemployedto reduce
PuO2 exposurecould also affectnaturalhabitatsand human land uses.
Potentialdecontaminationand mitigationmethodsare alsopresentedin B.6,
along with an analysisof the impactsresultingfrom mitigationactivities.
BecausePuO_depositionis partiallydependentupon the distributionof
PuO2 particlesr_leasedduringan accident,two fundamentalassumptionswere
made. lhe first is that particlesof releasedPuO?will be distributedsuch
that the majorityof largeparticlesare deposited-closerto the
accident/impactsite,with the sizeof particlesdecreasingwith distance.
The secondassumptionis that the highestconcentrationsof releasedcuries
_ are closerto the releasepoint,and thatconcentrationswill tend to
decreasewith distance.
B.5.2 GlobalAssessment
Becauseareasof impactsin the latterPhases (2 to 5) are unknown,the
environmentalimpactsare discussedin generalterms. The relative
_ percentagesof naturalvegetation,urban,and agriculturalland cover types
elsewherein the world are unlikelyto match the percentagefor the KSC
vicinity. Therefore,no distinctionsare made withinthe dry land class
" presentedin TablesB-13 throqghB-15 for Phases2 to 5.
B.5.3 EconomicImpact
Due to the uncertaintyin definingthe exact magnitudeof economic
costs associatedwith the radiologicalimpacts,a range of mitigationcosts
were estimatedin orderto boundthe costswhich could resultfrom Phase 0
and Phase I accidents.The minimumeconomicimpactis based on the estimated
cost of a radiologicalmonitoringprogram. This estimaterepresentsthe
costs of equipmentand personnelneededto developand implementa
comprehensivelong-termmonitoringprogram. Ti,emaximumeconomicimpactis
definedas comprehensivemitigationactionsundertakenon all areas
contaminatedabove a 25 mrem/yrdose level. The economiccosts followinga
potentialaccidentcouldbe reasonablyexpectedto fall withinthis range.
Only economicimpactsassociatedwith the effectsof radioactivedeposition
are estimatedin this analysis.
The post-accidentmonitoringprogrambuildson the initialmonitoring
'- effort in place at the time of the launch. Beforelaunch,monitoringteams
and equipmentfrom DOE, EPA,NASA, and the state of Floridawill be in place
and commencemonitoringas part of the FederalRadiologicalEmergency
ResponseProgram,FederalRadiologicalMonitoringand AssessmentCenter,and
RadiologicalControlCenteroperations. In the event of an accident,these
teams would continuemonitoringfor at least30 days, after which EPA
assumesresponsibilityfor long-termmonitoring. A largepercentageof the
costs associatedwith this programoccur in the firstyear or two when a
programplan must be developed,equipmentmust be purchased,and personnel
must be hired and trained. After the programhas been initiatedand a
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shakedownperiod has been completed, costs decrease to a maintenance level
necessary to run the program in the succeeding years. Consultations with
experts in the radiologica] monitoring field have provided the costs for a
radiological monitoring program. The minimumcost estimates are presented
in Table B-18.
A number of factors can affect the cost of radiological decontamination
and mitigation activities, including:
e LocatiQn - Affecting ease of access to the deposition (e.g., a
steep htllslope could be more expensive to cleanup than a level
field), as can access to the site location and necessary
decontaminationresources,such as heavy equipment,water, clean
sol], etc.
e Land Cover T.ype- The characteristicsof some kinds of land covers
: make them more difficultand thereforemore expensiveto
decontaminate(i.e.,plowingand restorationof a natural
vegetationarea couldbe more costlythan using the same technique
in an agriculturalarea).
• InitialContaminationLevel - Higherlevelsof initial
contaminationcan requiremore sophisticatedand more costly
decontaminationtechniquesto meet a particularcleanupstandard
than a lower levelof initialcontamination.
i
• DecontaminationMethod- More sophisticatedmethods,such as
wetlandrestoration,are much more expensivethan simpleactions,
such as water rinses.
• Di)posalof ContBminatedMaterials- Disposalof contaminated
vegetationand soils onsitecould be much more costeffectivethan
transportationand disposalof these samematerialsto a distant
repository.
• Cleanupstandard.
In settingthe level at which specificmitigationeffortswill be taken,
the characteristicsof the materialdepositedmust be taken intoaccount. As
has been stated,PuO2 has extremelylow solubilityin water and has a low
bioaccumulationrate-withinthe foodchain; its alphaemissionsare short range,
and the primaryconcernis inhalationof respirablefines.
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TABLE B-18. MONITORINGPROGRAMCOST ESTIMATES
Period Activity Cost
Year one Transitionfrom launchmonitoring $1,000,000
activity,plandevelopment,
supplementalequipmentpurchases,
hiringof personnel.
Year two Testingand shakedownof program $ 500,000
methodsand monitoringnetwork,
monitoringof mitigationactions.
Year three Transitionto long term monitoring $ 250,000
of impactsand mitigationactions.
Year four and Programmaintenance. $ 100,000
each succeeding
year
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At this time, while contingency planning is actively underway, it is
not yet complete. Planning to date includes the following:
e In the event of an accident, the ground monitoring program will be
based upon:
- Airborne measurementsof the amountand characteristics
of the release
- Atmospheric model estimates of the amountand location
of material deposited, using recent climatological data.
It should be noted that the cleanup costs estimated for the purposes of
this EIS are based upon cleanupto a level of 25 mrem/yr. The 25 mrem/yr
levelwas selectedas a reasonablelevel for illustrativepurposes inthe
EIS on the basis of adoptionof this level by Federalasenciesfor the
protectionof radiationworkers,and the public,from releasesassociated
with the land disposalof radioactivewastes (10 CFR 61.41);from
radionuclideemissionsfrom DOE facilities(40 CFR 61.92);and as associated
with the managementand disposalof spentnuclearfuel,high levelwaste,
and transuranicwaste (40 CFR 191.15). In addition,the 25 mrem/yrlevel is
one-fourthof the 100 mrem/yrcontinuousexposurelevelrecommendedby the
NationalCouncilon RadiationProtectionand Space Measurement(NCRPSM1987,
p. 44) as an "acceptablerisk"for latentcancermortalityrisk to
individualmembersof the publicover their lifetime. Actualcleanuplevels
will dependupon a numberof factors,such as the locationand use of the
specificarea contaminated,potentialthreatto the public,evaluationof
the specificexposurepathways,and the specificparticlesize distribution
of the contamination.As statedearlier,cleanupactionswould be taken in
accordancewith the ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,Compensation,and
LiabilityAct throughwhich cleanuplevelsand actionswill be developedin
a publiclyavailabledecisiondocument.
Not withstandingthis estimate,actualmitigationactivitiesand
cleanuplevelswill be based upon a separatespecificenvironmental
analysis.
While the actualcost of cleanupassociatedwith a potentialPhase 0
and Phase I accidentcan not be predictedwith great precisiondue to the
numberof factorsinvolved(above),an approximationcan be developedfrom
data providedin an EPA report(EPA ]977). That reportindicatedthat in
1977,cleanupt_stscould range from approximately$250,000to $2,500,000
per squarekilo,,eter($1,000to $10,000per acre) if removaland disposalof
, contaminationis not required. Removaland disposalof contaminatedsoil at
a near-surfacefacilitycould cost from approximately$36,000,000to
$47,500,000per squarekilometer($]45,000to $]90,000per acre). In terms
of 1988dollars,these costs shouldbe doubled. (Cleanupwithoutremoval
and disposalwould range from $500,000to $5,000,000;and with disposal,
from $72,000,000to $95,000,000.)
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In addition,there are significantsecondarycosts associatedwith the
decontaminationand mitigationactivities,such as:
o Temporaryor longerterm relocationof residents
e Temporaryor longerterm loss of employment
o Destructionor quarantineof agriculturalproducts,including
citruscrops
e Restrictionor bans on commercialfishing
e Land use restrictions(whichcould effectreal estatevaluesand
tourismactivity)
o Publichealtheffectsand medicalcare.
In order to determinethe magnitudeof these secondaryeffects,results
from a nuclearreactorriskassessmentmodel were used. A U.S. Nuclear
Regulatorydocument(NRC 1975)presentsresultsfrom a probabilisticrisk
assessmentand an economiccostdistributionfor accidentsat commercial
nuclearpowerplants. Althoughthe kindsof radioactivecontamination
resultingfroma potentialnuclearreactoraccidentare quite differentthan
the contaminationresultingfrom an RTG accident,the decontaminationand
mitigationactivitieswould be very similar. Therefore,the NRC findings
are consideredapplicablein this study. The cost distributionstudy found
' thatdecontaminationcosts accountfor approximately20 percentof the total
economiccost of an accident. In other words,the total cost of a
radioactivecontaminationaccidentcould be as much as five times the direct
decontaminationcosts. This multiplierof 5, however,appliesonly to those
typesof areasthat would incursecondarycosts,namelythe urban and
agriculturalland cover typesdescribedin SectionB.5.1.
Using the two sourcesof informationabove,in conjunctionwith the
surfaceareas contaminatedat 25 mrem/yror greater(fromDOE Ig89a),a
rangeof economiccosts resultingfrom the decontaminationand mitigationof
Phase0 and Phase ! most probable,maximum,expectationcases can be
estimated(seeSectionB.6.2.3). The amountof area withineach of the six
major cover types in the KSC region (naturalvegetation,urban,agriculture,
etc.) that couldbe subjectto cleanupactionwas estimatedby overlaying
the "25 mrem/yror greater"area for two years after a Phase0 and a Phase I
accident(DOE Ig8ga)on the KSC regionalland use data base. The amountof
area in each of the six major cover typesthat could be encompassed,then
formedthe basis for the cleanupcost estimatesdiscussedin Section
B.6.2.3. The choiceof the "Year2" area is consistentwith draft EPA
guidance(EPA 1988)which indicatesthatcleanupactionswould occur over
the periodof I to 50 years followingthe accident. "Year I" is the period
; where monitoring,remedialactionplanning,and populationrelocation(if
needed)occurs. At _he lower end of this rangeare decontaminationand
mitigationactivitiesthat stabilizethe depositionin place,with no
removalof vegetationor soils and a lesserdegree of environmentaland
secondaryimpacts. At the highend of the range,vegetationand soilare
removed,the most highlycontaminatedstructuresare demolished,and all of
thesematerialare placedin a geologicalrepository. These actionswould
have significantenvironmentaland secondaryimpacts. Table B-Ig presents
hypotheticaldecontaminationand mitigationactionsrepresentedin the low
and high rangeof cleanupcosts.
In order to determinethe estimateddollarcost of the range of cleanup
optionsfor Phase0 and Phase I accidents,the area of depositionfor each
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landcover type is multipliedby the lowestand highestunit cnst for
cleanupdiscussedabove,$500,000and $95,000,000per squareKilometer,
respectively.For urban and agriculturalareas,this valiseis then
increasedby a factorof five,representingthe inpl,tof the secondarycosts
mentionedabove. For Phase2 through5 accidents,economiccosts of cleanup
actionswere not estimated. Given the uncertaintiesinvolvedin defining
the specifictypes of landuses that couldbe affectedif contaminated,it
was concludedthat no reasonablebasisexistsfor developingsuch estimates.
It shouldbe noted,however,that shoulddepositionoccur from an accident
in areas outsidethe UnitedStates,th_ Federalgovernmentwill respondwith
the technicalassistanceand supportneededto clean up and remediate
affectedareas and populations,_s well as to recoverthe plutoniumfuel.
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B.6 ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCES
This suction pre_ents the environmental consequencesof an accident in
which plutonium dioxide is released to the environment. A brief discussion
of how PuO2 behaves tn the environment precedes the impact analysis. The
impact analysis is divided into two major categories: 1) the potential
impacts of the representative _,,:,stprobable, maximumand expectation cases
during Phases0 and 1; and 2) the potential impacts of the representative
most probable, maximum,and expectation cases during Phases2, 3, 4, and 5.
These cases are described in Section B.4. The description of the affected
environment in Section 3 of this EIS is also used.
Results are presented for exposure impacts and mitigation impacts.
Exposure impacts are those that result from the deposition of PuO2 on
various environmental media and subsequentmovementof PuO_in th_
environment. They include impacts to natural environments_ water resources,
man-usedresources, and agricultural resources. _ittgation impacts are
those impacts caused by decontamination and mitigation activities undertaken
to reduce radioactive contamination levels in the environment. The economic
cost estimates associated with the impact analyses are also presented. The
methodsdescribed in Section B.5 are used in this assessment.
It shouldbe emphasizedthat the followingdiscussionsare providedfor
illustrativepurposesand are net intendedto reflecta definitivestatement
regardingspecificareas thatwould be contaminatedin the event of an
accidentinvolvinga releaseof plutonium. In the unlikelyevent such an
accidentoccurred,the _mountof contaminationand the specificaffected
areas would be determinedand appropriateactionstaken in accordancewith
the ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,Compensation,and LiabilityAct.
This would includeevaluationof alternativesin accordancewith the
NationalContingencyPlar and developmentof appropriatecleanuplevelsfor
contaminatedsites in a pub)iclyavailabledecisiondocument.
B.6.1 P_]utoniumDioxide_inthe EnvirPnment
The extentand mag,litudeof potentialenvironmentalimpactscausedby
PuO2 releasesresultingfrom STS/IUSaccidentsare dependenton the mobility
and-availabilityof PuOp in the environment.The mobilityand availability
of PuO2 in turn, is directlycontrolledby a numberof physicaland chemical
parame(ers,including: particlesize,potentialfor suspensionand resus-
pension,solubility,and oxidationstateof any dissolvedPuO2. It is
these factors,in cenjunctionwith the three potentialexposurepathways
(surfacecontact,ingestion,and inhalation),that determinethe impactson
aquaticand terrestrialecosystems.
The size of PuO2 p_rticlesis an importantfactor in assessingimpacts
to environmentalresourcesresultingfrom an accidentalrelease. Particle
size can affectthe rate of dissolutionof PuOZ in water and the initial
suspensionand subsequentresuspensionof particlesin air ard water. The
dissolutionand the suspension/resuspensionpotentlalultimatelycontrolthe
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mobilityand availabilityof PuO2 tr plant and animalspecies,including
man. Generallyspeaking,largerparticleshaveless potentialfor suspen-
sion and resuspension;as particlesize decreases,particlesare more easily
kept in suspension.Dependingunon the surfacearea per unit mass of these
particles,the effectof gravitymay be counter-balancedby a resultingair
resistance.Consequently,turbulencefrom air currentscan cause these
particlesto remainsuspendedfor longperiodsof time.
Particlesizeshave been predictedfor the Phase0 fireballaccident.
Distributionof the PuO2 aerosolis shown as a functionof particlesize and
is also shownas a correspondingpercentageof the total sourceterm of the
accident(thesourceterm valuecan vary for each accident).
Particlesize is correlatedwith depositionrange. For a fireball
accident,approximately94.5 percentof the releasedcurieswill be depos-
ited as particlesgreaterthan44 microns,and the greatestnumberof these
particleswill fall in an area from0 to 10 km from the accident.
Approximately1.5 percentof the releasedcurieswill be depositedas
particlesin the rangeof _0 to 44 microns,and the greatestnumberof these
particleswill fall in an area from 10 to 20 km from the accident. Approxi-
mately2.5 percentof the releasecurieswill be depositedas 10 to
30 micronsparticles,and the majoritywill fallwithinthe range of 20 to
50km fromthe accident. The smallestparticles,those lessthan 10 microns,
accountfor approximately1.5 percentof releasedcuries,and the majority
will travelgreaterthan 50 km.
For boththe fireballand groundlevelaccidents,largerparticleswill
tend to settlequicklyout of the air closeto the accidentlocation.
Smallerparticleswill remain in the air longerand may be transpcrtedsome
distanceby winds. These finerparticlescould also be more easily
resuspendedby subsequentwind action.
In aquaticsystems,largerparticleswill quicklysettleto the bottom
sediments,while smaller,silt-sizeparticlesmay remain in suspension
withinthe water columnindefinitely.Smallerparticlesmay not even break
the water surfacedue to surfacetension,insteadforminga thin layeron
the water surface_nd subsequentlybeing transportedto the shoreline
(Bartram1983). Resuspensionof smallerparticlesfrom the bottomcan occur
due to physicaldisturbanceof the sedimentsby wave action,recreational
use of the water bodies(suchas swimming,boating,and fishing),as well as
by the feedingactivityof aquaticspecies. Pluton_ dioxideparticles,as
a componentof the bottomsediments,may also be transportedtowardand
alongthe shorelineby wave actionand currentsin near-shoreenvironments.
A numberof factorscan affectthe solubilityof PuO2 in water.
Physiochemicalparametersmost importantto the solubilit)of plutonium
dioxideare the reactivesurfacearea and oxidationstate of PuO2, and the
solute(water)chemistryincludingpH, Eh, and temperature.Mass to surface
area ratiosof particlesaffectreactivityand solubility,with solubility
being inverselyrelatedto particlesize. The solubilityot plutoniumin
water has been measuredat IO Lo 13 moles/L(Looneyet al. 1987). Although
thismeasurementwas made undermildlyoxidizingconditionsat a pH of 5.0,
it servesto illustratethe low solubilityof plutoniumin aqueoussystems.
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It is also important to note that dissolved plutonium concentrations in
water can increase under the following conditions (Bartram 1983):
• Increasing pH
• Increasing dissolved organic carbon (DOC) concentrations
• Increasing oxidizing conditions
• Increasing carbonate concentrations
• Increasing nitrate concentrations
• Increasing sulfate concentrations.
Plutonium also tends to dissolve more readily in fresh water, and at
cooler temperatures. Once in solution, this plutonium can coexist in
multiple oxidation states that can affect its availability to organisms.
The solid/_olute _istribution coefficient (Kd) for plutonium has been
estimated at 10" to 10U (Looney et al. 1987, Bartfam et al. 1983). This
meansthat plutonium entering into a water/sediment system would be
preferentially taken out of solution and bound in saturated sediments in
amounts lO to lO0,O00 times greater than the amounts that would remain in
the associated water column.
• Ti,e Kd for plutonium varies based on the oxidation state of the
element. Dnder the oxidizing.conditions similar to those encountered in
most surface water bodies, Pub+ would tend to b_ the dominant species ofplutonium,and the Ka would be approximately10 . Under the reducing .
• • _ , . _ • q+
condltlonsencounteredin most bottomsedlment_and groundwater6bodles,Pu
would tend to be dominant,and the Kd would be approximatelyI0 (Bartram
1983).
Plutoniumdioxidemay be carriedinto the soil by a numberof routes,
includingpercolationof rainfalland subsequentleachingof particlesinto
the soil, animalburrowingactivity,and plowingor otherdisturbanceof the
soil by man. Migrationof the PuO_particlesintothe soilcolumn is of
concern,primarilybecauseof the _otentialfor PuO_ to reach groundwater
aquifersused as drinkingwater supplies. The opportunitywould most likely
occurwhere surfacecontaminationis depositedon primaryaquiferrecharge
zones. Plutoniumappearsto be extremelystable,however,once depositedon
soils. Soil profilestudieshave shownthat generallymore than 95 percent
of the plutoniumfrom falloutremainedin the top 5 cm of surfacesoil after
10 to 20 years of residencetime in undisturbedareas (DOE 1987).
Directcontaminationof an aquiferwhere it reachesthe surfaceis
possible,althoughit would be expectedthat clays,organics,and other
anionicconstituentswould bind most of the PuOp. The bindingof PuOpwould
occur in the flrstfew metersof sediment,thereforegreatlyreducingth_
concentrationof this constituentwith depth. This naturalfilteringof
PuO2 would probablyreduceconcentrationsto levelsthatwould be below the
PrimaryDrinkingWater Standardof 4 mrem for exposuredue to drinking
water.
It is also possiblethat surfacewater runoffcontainingPuO_ could
directlycontaminatedrinkingwater s.,ppliesfrom surfacewater bodies(DOE
I98ga). The dangerfrom this typeof contaminationis greatestdue to
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! suspendedPuO_and not fromdissolvedPuO2. Becauseof this, filteringof
the surfacew_ter beforechemicaltreatmentmay be enoughto reducethe
concentrationof total plutoniumto an exposurelevel of less than 4 mrem.
The availabilityof PuO?to biota in aquaticand terrestrial
_ environmentsdependson the _outeof PuO2 exposureto the biota and the
physicaland chemicalinteractionof PuO_with the water and soil of the
affectedarea. These interactionsdeteriinewhetherPuO? is availablefor
rootuptakeby plantsand for ingestionand inhalationb) aquaticand
terrestrialfauna. The routeof PuO)exposurediffersbetweenthe two basic
categoriesof biota,flora,and faunA. Flora,in both aquaticand
terrestrialenvironments,can be exposedto PuO2 contaminationvia surface
contamination,root uptake,and leaf absorptionT Fauna can be exposedvia
skincontact,ingestion,and inhalationof PuO2 particles.
_ Surfacecontaminationand skincontactdoes not pose a significant
dangerto the biota. The alpha radiationemittedby plutoniumhas very
littlepenetrationpower (Hobbset al. 1980). Therefore,littlepenetration
=- can occur throughthe skin of fauna. In addition,severalstudieson root
uptakeand leaf absorptionof Pu02 indicatethat very little,if any, PuO2
is absorbedby plantswhen PuOp i_ in an insolubleform (Bartramet al.
, 1983,Cataldoet al. 1976,Sch_Itzet al. 1976).
The significanceof ingestingPuO_ can vary betweenterrestrialand
aquaticfauna. Most plantshavelimiteduptakeand retentionof PuO2, and
the digestivetractsof the animalsstudiedtend to discriminateagainst
transuranicelements(Bartramet al. 1983,Cataldoet al. 1976,Schultzet
al. 1976). However,ingestionmay be significantfor smallfauna in terms
o_ total exposure. These fauna,especiallythose that burrow,ingestsoil
alongwith food material If the soil is contaminated,ingestionof PuO?
couldresult. Althoughthe transferfactorfrom the intestinaltract to-the
bloodand other organsis small,total activitypassingthroughthe tract
couldbe large.
The impactof ingestingPuO)by aquaticfauna can be significant
dependingon PuO_ availability."Forexample,studieshave found that
bioaccumulationBf PuO_does occur in benthicorganismsthat ingest
sedimentscontaminated-withPuO_ (Thompsonet al. 1980). However,most of
these studiesalso indicatedthat the bioaccumulationof PuO2 was not
criticalto the upper trophiclevels,includingman.
Inhalationis consideredto be the most criticalexposureroute for
terrestrialfauna (Wicker1980). However,inhalationimpactdependson
severalfactors,includingthe frequencyof resuspen_ionof PuO2, the
concentrationand size of resuspendedparticles,and the amountactually
inhaled(Schmel1980,Pinderet al. undated). Smallerparticleshave a
i greaterchancethan largerparticlesfor being resuspendedand inhaled.
Althoughmany of the particlesmay be subsequentlyexhaled,the smallest
particleshave the greatestlikelihoodof being retaineddeep in the lung
(Hobbset al. 1980,Thompsonet al. 1980) Howevgr,resuspendedmaterial
availablefor inhalationis on the orderof Ix]OTM of the grounddeposition,
thus high levelsof groundconcentrationwould be requiredto constitutea
risk to animalsthroughthis route.
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No definitive research has been conducted that defines the specific t
effects of PuO2 on plant and animal species, particularly at the relatively
low contamination levels resulting from potential STS/IUS accidents.
Generally speaking, however, radiation can cause three main types of
physical effects on organisms: 1) somatic injury, that is damageto the
normal morphology and functioning of the exposed organism; 2) carcinogenic
injury, that is an increase in the incidence of cancers; and 3) genetic
injury, affecting reproductive cells and causing deleterious genetic changes
in organism's offspring. Any of these three physical effects could cause
' increasedmortalityto exposed organisms. Althoughmaximallyexposed
individualorganismscoulddie as a resultof theseeffects,overall
ecosystemstructureis not expectedto change,and thereforeno significant
ecologicalconsequencesare anticipated.
B.6.2 Assessmentof Impactsto KennedySpace Centerand Vicinity
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof Phase 0,
Prelaunch/Launchand Phase I, First StageAscentaccidents. Phase 0
includesthe time periodof 8 hours beforelaunchuntil launch. Includedin
this periodis the loadingof the liquidpropellants,firingof the Orbiter
main engines,and firingof the solid rocketboosters. Phase I, First Stage
Ascent includesthe periodfromlaunchto 128 secondsof missionelapsed
time. Includedin this phase are lift off, clearingof the tower,clearing
of land, and burnoutand jettisonof the solid rocketboosters.
B.6.2.1 SurfaceAreas Contaminatedby RepresentativeAccidents
The land areas contaminatedfrom the most probable,maximum,and
expectationaccidentsin Phases0 and I are presentedin Table B-20. These
estimatesindicatethat naturalareas,wetlands,and inlandwaterswould
comprisethe bulk of the affectedareas.
The sourceterm rangesindicatethat most radioactivematerial(94.5
percent)will remainwithin 10 km of the accidentlocation(withinthe
controlledarea).
Surfacecontaminationresultingfromthe Phase0 most probablecase
producesa total areaof 18.70 kmL thatwill receivedepositionabove 0.2
uCi/mc. Th_ Phase I most probableaccidentproducesa totaldepositionarea
of 84.90 kmc abovethe 0.2 uCi/mc screeninglevel. The breakdownof these
totalsby the six land cover types (i.e.,naturalvegetation,urban,
agricultural,wetlands,inlandwater,and ocean) is shownon Table B-20.
Ocean impactsdo not occur for eitherthe Phase 0 or Phase I accident
scenarios.
=
The _hase 0 maximumcase producesa total surfaceareadepositionabove
0._ uCi/mL of 6.94 km_. The Phase I maximumcase producesan area of 5.43
. kmc. In both phases,naturalvegetation,followedby inlandwater, receives
the greatestamountof contamination(TableB-20).
The Phas_ 0 and Phase I expectationcases producetotal areas of 57.43
and 155.03km_, respectively,abovethe depositionscreeninglevel of
0.2 uCi/m_. In bothcases,naturalvegetationis the land cover receiving
the greatestcontamination.
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Areas of deposition for the expectation and most probable cases are 1
greater than the area of deposition for the maximumcase because the maximum
case maximizes dose to persons. Hence, the meteorology tends to be more
concentrated.
In all cases, 94.5 percent of released radioactive material is
contained in particles greater than 44 um and will be deposited within 10 km
of the accident/impact site. The extra energy imparted to the released
material by the explosion and fireball may scatter smaller particles beyond
10 km. Particles 10 umand smaller could travel 50 km and more.
B.6.2.2 Exposure Effects
Deposition of PuO_from Phase 0 and Phase 1 most probable, maximum,and
expectation cases will-have little direct effect on land cover. The
material will not physically alter land cover unless a particle provides
enoughheat to start a fire. Although PuO2 can affect the humanuse of
these land covers,there is no initialimpacton soilchemistry,and most of
the PuO)contaminationdepositedon the water bodiesis not expectedto
react cBemicallywith the water column. No significantconsequencesto
floraand fauna are expectedfrom surfacecontaminationand skincontact
with the PuO2, exceptwhere particleconcentrationand/orsize is great
enoughto overheatthe contaminatedsurface.
Plutoniumdioxidedepositionfrom the most probable,maximum,and
expectationcasesdo not have any directeffectson historicalor
archaeologicalresources. Itwill not physicallyalter nor chemically
degradehistoricalor archaeologicalresources.
B.6.2.3 Long-Termand MitigationEffects
Long-termeffectsfromthe depositionof PuO2 on the KennedySpace
Centerand vicinityare discussedfor the six landcovers: natural
vegetation,urban agriculture,wetlands,inland,water, and ocean. A
descriptionof potentialmitigationmeasuresand relatedconsequencesis
also presented. It is assumedthat any areawith surfacecontaminationwill
be monitoredto determinethe specificdegreeof impact.
NaturalVeqetationand Wetlands
Plutoniumdioxidedepositedon the soilwill interactwith inorganic
and organicligandsto formprimarilyinsolublecompounds. It is expected
that over 95 percentof the plutoniumwill remainin the top 5 cm (2 in) of
surfacesoil for at least 10 to 20 years. No mitigationis necessarybecause
of long-termimpactsto soil. Mitigationrequiredfor other reasonsmay
resultin significantsoil impacts.
As discussedin SectionB.6.1,surfacecontaminationand skincontact
do not pose significantdangersto biota. No significantconsequencesto
flora are expectedfrom root uptakeand leaf absorption. Ingestionby
terrestrialfauna is negligibleexceptfor small faunadue to ingestionof
contaminatedsoil. This could resultin a large total activitypassing
throughthe genBralintestinetrack. Inhalationdue to resuspendedmaterial
is small (IXI0"° of grounddeposition).No significantimpactsto biota
B-60
1990012831-213
would be expected in any of the areas receiving surface contamination.
Areas of highest concentration are the result of deposition of larger
particles or chunks, which are noninhalable.
The particulate PuO_on the surface of the water bodies is not likely
to be readily available for consumptionby pelagic aquatic fauna. The
' amountof PuO_ to be suspendedoF dissolvedin the water column is predicted
to be slightl_higherthan IXI0-_ of the concentrationof PuO_deposited
': in th_ bottomsediment. Thus, for _ny wetlandarea contaminatedat 2.0
uCi/m of PuO2, approximately2XIO- uCi/m of PuO_ will be dissolvedor
suspendedin lhe water column. This small amount6f PuO_ availablein the
water column is not consideredto have significa,ltimpaclsto the aquatic
faunathat may ingestthe dissolvedor suspendedPuO_. In addition,studies
have indicatedthat highertrophiclevelorganisms,_uch as fish, that are
likelyto livewithinthe water columnhave a low accumulationfactor (DOE
I@87,DOE 1989a).
Overall,the major potentialimpactsto the naturalvegetationand
wetlandbioticresourcesof the KSC and vicinityresultingfrom Phases0 and
I most probableand maximumreleasecase accidentsincludebioaccumulation
of PuO2 by benthicorganismsand bioaccumulationof PuO.2by the aquatic
vegetation. Becauseof the potentialfor bioaccumulatlonto occur in
aquaticvegetationand benthicorganisms,there is a potentialfor the PuO2
to travelup both the terrestrialand aquaticfood chains. However,
bioaccumulationof plutoniumdecreaseswith highertrophiclevels. Impacts
to the biologicaldiversityare not expectedto occur. Redistributionof
PuO2 is a possibleoccurrence,especiallywhen contaminatedterrestrial
fauna,includingbirds,move fromone place to another. However,it is
unlikelythat theywill createany additionalimpactsthat havenot already
been described. Recyclingof PuO2 will predominantlyoccur with vegetation
and faunahavingshort-lifespans. The bacteriathat decomposesthe organic
mattermay accumulatePuO_. However,most of the PuO_ shouldreturnto the
sediments. In the aquatiEenvironmentthis may promolethe continuanceof
bioaccumulationof PuO2 by the benthicorganismsand aquaticvegetation.
Mitigationof the impactsto flora and fauna in naturalvegetationand
wetlandareascould be accomplishedthrougha combinationof monitoringand
remedialactionbased on monitoring. The amountof PuO2 resuspendedin the
air in naturalareas determinesif PuO_ concentrationsmay pose inhalation
healthhazardsto man. If levelsare Beterminedto pose inhalationhealth
hazards,then accessto the areacould be restricteduntil monitoring
indicatesthat PuO2 concentrationswill no longerpose a potentialhealth
hazard.
Aqrlcultur_l
Citrusgroveson the _ennedySpaceCenterwill be contaminatedwith
PuO2 at or above 0.2 uCi/mL from Phase I most probable,maximum,and
expectationcases. A studyon PuO_ contaminatedcitrusgroves indicated
that the plutoniumdioxideon the fruit surfaceswas not readilywashable
with water. The PuO_could enter the human food chain throughtransferto
internaltissuesduringpeelingor in reconstitutedJuices,flavorings,et
other productsmade from orangeskins. ApproximatelyI percentof the PuO2
depositedon the orangegroveswould be harvestedin the year following
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deposition. Almost all would be from fruit surface contamination. In
contrast with the fruit, plutonium was readily washedaway from leaf
surfaces (Pinder et al. undated). Thus, if the leaf surfaces were washed,
recontamination of the fruit should not occur. Resuspensionof plutonium
from the soil via splash up was also studied. Very little, if any, reached
the fruit or leaf surfaces. This was thought to occur because splash up
generally does not reach a height greater than ] m (3 ft) above the ground.
Most orange tree leaves are over 1 m (3 ft) above the ground.
Mitigation of contaminated citrus fruit could include collection and
disposal of the contaminated fruit according to Federal and State
regulations. To prevent future contamination of citrus crops and protect
the safety of workers, the trees could be washeddownto remove PuO2 from
the leaves, and the soil around the trees could be covered with new soil to
reduce resuspension. Future citrus crops could be monitored for PuO2
contamination before sold on the market.
Other crops grown in areas off the KennedySpace Center site may be
contaminated by surface deposition. These crops would be examined and
washedto ensure no contamination. Those crops that can not be
decontaminated may be destroyed. The land on which the crops have been
grown would be monitored and scraping implemented if the monitoring shows
significant PuO2 concentrations.
Urban
The areas of land cover used by man (e.g., buildings, ro_ds, ornamental
J vegetation, and grass areas) contaminated above the 0.2 uCi/m_ level would
be monitored to determine if uecontamination or mitigation actions might be
necessary. It is possible that monitoring would indicate no cleanup is
necessary. If mitigation actions are necessary, temporary relocation of the
population from their homesand workplaces may be r_quired. Cleanup actions
could last from several days to several months. Rainfall could wash paved
surfaces and exteriors of buildings and movePuO2 into the surface soil and
surface waters.
There are several archaeological sites on the KennedySpace Center site
and vicinity that may receive deposition by Phase 0 and Phase I accidents.
In addition, KennedySpace Center facilities that have historical
significance, and are not damagedin the blast, could also have PuO2
deposited on them. Presently unknownarchaeological sites could be within
the area of deposition, and might be affected by the cleanup actions
undertaken in those areas.
The deposition also has a long-term effect on future investigations at
any archaeological site. Archaeological digs, by their very nature, disturb
the soil surface with digging and sifting operations, which could expose
workers and others to the PuO_. Radiological safety measures would need to
be taken to prevent potential-health effects to the workers and could
greatly increase the cost of investigating these sites. If investigation of
archaeological sites that have PuO_deposited on them is proposed, a safety
analysis would be completed and approval given to proceed from appropriate
Federal and/or state authorities.
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)nland Water _nd ocean
The waters surrounding Merritt Island are classified by the State of
Florida as Class II and Class III waters, with radionuclide contamination
threshold limits of 15 pCi/l. Most of the PuO) deposition is not expected
to be dissolved in the water column, thereforeT PuO2 is deposited in these
waters, and this threshold level is not expected to-be exceeded.
Someof the waters surrounding Merrttt Island are considered
Outstanding Florida Waters. These waters are designated to receive
protection which supercedes any other water classifications and standards,
and as such prohibits any activity which reduces water quality parameters
below existing ambient water quality conditions. A Phase 0 or Phase 1
accident could deposit sufficient amountsof PuO2 to result in violation of
this protection standard.
Although shellfish harvesting is prohibited or unapprove_ in some
waters surrounding Merritt Islano, deposition above 0.2 uCi/mc could impact
an area of conditionally approved shellfish harvesting.
Mitigation of PuO2 impacts to inland water bodies may include any of
the following.
.?
e All ditchesand borrowpitswith shallowdepthsand in close
proximity_tohumanactivityreceivingsurfaceconcentrationsof
0.2 uCi/m_ or greatermay need to be monitored. If the monitoring
resultsprovideevidenceof contamination,the ditchesand borrow
pitsmay need to be drainedand any contaminatedsedimentremoved
and disposedof within Federaland State requirements. Larger
areas of pondedwater in close proximityto human activitycan
also be monitored. Mitigationcould includeskimmingto remove
the surficialfilmof PuO2. Monitoringafter skimmingwill
determinethe need for wa_er and/orsedimentremoval. Measures
shouldbe employedto reducesurficialrunoffand sedimentfrom
enteringwater bodiesused by man.
o Recreationalwater activities(e.g.,swimming,boating),as well as
sport and commercialfishing,may need to be restrictedin larger
water bodiesuntilmonitoringresultsindicatethat it is safe for
them to be resumed.
Monitoringthe amountof PuO_ suspendedand/ordissolvedin the water
columnsof impactedwater bodies_ill determineif PuO_ has been deposited
in the sediments. Benthicorganisms,such as clams,s_allops,and crabs,
shouldbe monitoredfor bioaccumulationof PuO_. If bioaccumulationof PuO2
in benthicorganismsis significant,then it sBouldbe determinedif
consumptionof such organismswould pose a human healthhazard. If it is
determinedthat consumptionof such organismswill pose a human health
hazard,harvestingof such organismsshouldbe banneduntll concentration
levelswithinthe organismsno longerpose a threat.
If it is determinedthat PuO_ concentrationsare significantin either
the water or sedimentof impacted-waterbodies,then PuO_ bioaccumulationin
aquaticvegetationshouldbe monitored. If bioaccumulatlonof PuO2 in
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aquatic vegetation is found to be significant, then organisms that feed off
of these aquatic plants should also be monitored for PuO2 btoaccumulatton
and the levels of btoaccumulation determined that could pose a humanhealth
threat if such organisms are consumed.
Surface contamination levels may also impact the recharge areas of the
surficta; aquifer. The surfictal aquifer serves as the potable water source
for the cities of Titusville, Mims, and Palm Bay. In addition, manywells on
private land in the area use the surftcial aquifer as a source of water.
Plutonium dioxide may have the potential to contaminate this aquifer, but
given the fact that PuO) is essentiallyinsoluble,it is unlikelyfor any
contaminaticnto reach fhe wellheadsof municipalwater supplies. It is
also highlyunlikelythat any contaminationon the KennedySpace Centerwill
reach offsitewells, includingmunicipalwater supplywells. Transport
throughthe underlyingaquatardto the lower Floridanaquiferis considered
very unlikely.
Mitigationcould includeassessmentof the amountof contaminationin
the differentsoil horizonsin aquiferrechargeareas to determineif the
plutoniumdioxideis migratingto the water table. If the potentialfor
migrationof PuO2 to the aquiferis high, these areascould be scrapedto
below the contamlnationdepth and the spoildisposedof properly. Private
wells in the area of contaminationcould be monitoredand alternativewater
suppliesdevelopedif contaminationoccurs.
B.6.2.3 EconomicImpacts
The boundingeconomiccost of each accidentfor Phases0 and I are
presentedusing the methodsdescribedin SectionB.5.3. In all cases,the
minimumcost will be the cost of the monitoringprogram. This programis
estimatedto cost $I millionin the firstyear, $500,000in the secondyear,
$250,000in the thirdyear, and $100,000per year after the third year.
These numbersmay be somewhatless for Phase0 and somewhatmore for Phase 1
since the areas contaminatedin the Phase I accidentsare greater.
It shouldbe noted thatthe cleanupcosts estimatedfor the purposesof
this EIS are based uponcleanupto a levelof 25 mrem/yr. The 25 mrem/yr
levelwas selectedas a reasonablelevel for illustrativepurposesin the
EIS on the basis of adoptionof this levelby Federalagenciesfor the
protectionof radiationworkers,and the public,from releasesassociated
with the landdisposalof radioactivewastes (10 CFR 61.41);from
radionuclideemissionsfromDOE facilities(40 CFR 61.92);and as associated
with the managementand disposalof spentnuclearfuel, high-levelwaste,
and transuranicwaste (40 CFR 191.15). In addition,the 25 mrem/yrlevel is
one-fourthof the 100 mrem/yrcontinuousexposurelevel recommendedby the
NationalCouncilon RadiationProtectionand SpaceMeasurement(NCRPSM1987)
as an "acceptablerisk" for latentcancermortalityrisk to individual
membersof the publicover their lifetime. Actualcleanuplevelswill
dependupon a numberof factors,suchas the locationand use of the
specificarea contaminated,potentialthreatto the public,evaluationof
the specificexposurepathways,and the specificparticlesize distrioution
of the contamination.As statedearlier,cleanupactionswould be taken in
acccrdancewith the ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,Compensation,and
LiabilityAct throughwhich cleanuplevelsand actionswill be developedin
a publiclyavailabledecisiondocument.
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The majorityof contaminationresultingfrom Phase 0 most probableand
maximumcase accidentsis confinedto the KennedySpace Centersite. The
economicimpactsfrom these accidentswill thereforebe confinedto Kennedy
Space Centerfacilitiesand operations. Cleanup,as a mitigationmeasure,
appliesto areascontaminatedat 25 mrem/yror above at "Year2" as modelled
in the FSAR (DOE Ig89a). The model yieldedno areascontaminatedat this
level in PhaseO, thuscleanupcosts are noted as zero.
The Phase I most probablecase accidentshave the highestpotential
level of impactson the KennedySpaceCenterand vicinity. Table B-Z1
providesa breakdownof economiccost associatedwith the Phase I cases.
Neitherthe most probablenor the expectationcase showedcontaminationat
the cleanuplevel in "Year2", thus no cleanupcosts have been estimated.
The maximumcase has total costs rangingfrom $0.19millionto $35.63
million.
Since the majorityof the depositionis estimatedto occur on Kennedy
Space Centerproperty,the costs are estimatedto be towardthe low end of
the cost range. Secondarycosts for agriculturaland urban uses on the
KennedySpace Centerprobablywill not be 5 times the cleanupcosts. All
agricultureon the KennedySpace Centeris citrusproductionon leased land
and the urban areas are industrialareas. Impactsto naturalareas on the
KennedySpace Centercould be isolatedby controllingaccessratherthan
removaland restoration.
B.6.3 Assessmentof Global Impacts
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof Phases2, 3, 4,
and 5 as describedin SectionB.2. The methodologyof impactassessment
presentedin SectionB.5.2 is used to determineand describeimpacts.
Mitigationtechniquesthat may be used are describedalongwith the impacts
that may resultfrommitigation.
The contaminationfromPhases2 through4 will resultfrom accidentsin
which modulesimpacta hard surface. For Phase 5, the contaminationwill
come from the impactof GraphiteImpactShells. The numberof modulesor
shellsis presentedin TablesB-9 and B-IO.
Each of the modulesor GraphiteImpactShellsinvolvedin the accidents
will releasePuO)at a differentlocationseparatedby a few kilometersto
hundredsor thousandsof kilometers. Each releasepoint is independentof
the other.
Depositionfrom Phases2, 3, and 4 casesdid not exceedthe cleanup
level at "Year 2" (DOElg89a), so no costs have been estimated.
The deposition that exceeds the screening level in Phase S occurs on
dry land and inland water _Tables B-13, B-14, and B-IS). The la_d areas
impacted vary from 13.2 _mc for the most probable case to 8.9 km_ for the
maximumcase, to 14.7 kmc in the expectation case. The areas estimated to
exceed the cleanup level at "Year 2" (DOE1989a) consisted of 0.64 km_ in
the most probable and expectation cases and zero in the maximumcase.
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As noted in Subsection B.5.3, cleanup costs were not estimated for
Phase 2-5 accidents given the uncertainties involved in determiaing the
snocific land cover types potentially affected. However, should an accident
J .ur in PhasesZ through 5, resulting in deposition outside the United
States, the Federal governmentwill respond with the technical assistance
and support needed to clean up and remediate affected areas, and to recover
the plutonium fuel.
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APPENDIXC-1
_. HISTORICALCLIMATCLOGICALDATA
AND
LAUNCH WINDOW-SPECIFICMETEOROLOGICALDATA* "
FOR KSC
,=
,', *Meteorologicaldata fromDOE 1989a.
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iLAUNCHWINDOW-SPECIFICMETEOROLOGICALDATA
SURFACEDATA
releasesfrom an accidentinvolvingthe NationalSpaceTransportation
: System/InertialUpper Stage (STS/IUS)launchvehiclewere taken from the
1980-1984recordsfor t_e October7 to November25 "launchwindow." Data were
obtainedfrommeteorologicalTower 313 of the WeatherInformationNetwork
DisplaySystem (WINDS)at Cape Canaveral(seeFigureC-I). This 500 foot high
tower is locatedabout3 miles west of LaunchComplex39 and the Atlantic
Ocean. While the tower is instrumentedat six differentheights,data from
the 54-, 204-, and 492-footlevelswere utilizedfor the radiological
assessmentsin the Tier 2 Galileomissionfinal EnvironmentalImpact
_ Statement(EIS).
FiguresC-2, C-3 and C-4 illustratethe distributionsof wind speed and
directionfor the three tower levelsnoted above. The figuresutilize
standardmeteorologicalconventionin that each set of bars illustratesthe
wind speed and frequencyfrom the indicateddirection. The figuresshow
that winds from the north througheast sectorstypicallydominatethe
surfacewinds at all threetower levelsduringthe 1989launchwindow. Peak
, winds are from the north at the 54-footlevel,and from the east at the 204-
and 492-footlevels. At all levels,the dominantwinds representonshore
} flow in the vicinityof the launchpads.
The averagewind speedsfor the 5-yearperiodexaminedwere 10.0, 14.3,
_ and 17.2mph for the 54-, 204-, and 492-footlevels,respectively. Calm
- periods(i.e.,zerowind speeds)in the Tower 313 data were treatedas
missing. Previousanalysesof data collectedat the Cape CanaveralAir
ForceWeatherStationshowedan average4.4 percentcalms during the fall
season (Septemberto November)basedon 8 years of data (1961to 1968).
FigureC-5 presentsthe maximumwind directionpersistenceperiodsby
directionsectorfor each of the three tower levelsas determinedfrom the
5-yearWINDS data set. It can be seen that the longerpersistenceperiods
at all levelsare generallyassociatedwith onshoreflows. The maximum
persistenceperiodfor each level and its year/monthof occurrenceare
listedin Table C-I.
The probabilityof onshorewinds persistingfor periodsof I through44
hourswere calculatedfor the launchwindowusing 492-footwind data.
These probabilitiesare presentedin FigureC-6 which illustratesthat
persistenceperiodsgreaterthan 3 hours have less than a 50 percent
probabilityof occurrence. Furthermore,the figureshows that the maximum
persistenceperiod (44 hours)has only a 0.03 percentprobabilityof
occurrence.
Few detailedstudieshave been accomplishedto determinethe specific
characteristicsof the sea breezeat Cape Canaveral. A true sea breeze
conditionis characterizedby the following:
I. Very light synoptic(e.g.,gradient)winds usuallyassociatedwith
a high-pressuresystemover the region
C-I
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: TABLE C-1.
_. Maximum Wind Direction Persistence (Hours)
October 7 through November 25 of 1980 through 1984
" Level Nonth, Year Sector Persistence Period(Hours)
54-foot October 1982 E 34
204-foot October 1984 Sg 35
492-foot October 1984 ENE 44
ii
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2. Stronginsolation
?. Daytimeair temperaturesrisingabove sea-surfacetemperatures
4. A shiftof surfacewinds fromoffshore(perhapsdue to a land
breeze)to onshoreduringthe day
5. The presenceof a definitefront or convergencezone with
correspondingrisingair separatingsurfaceair flowswith oversea
and overlandtrajectories
6. The presenceof an unstablethermalinternalboundarylayer,that
beginsat the shorelineand increasesin depth with increasing
distanceinland
7. A discernible,thoughsometimesweak, returnflow layer aloft
(i.e.,offshorewind flows)
8. The combinationof onshoresurfacewinds,an inlandconvergence
zone, offshorewinds aloft,and subsidingair over the sea
completesthe sea breezecirculationcell.
The KennedySpace Center (KSC)WINDS data were reviewedto identify
thosedays during the launchwindowwhen sufficientland-seatemperatures
differentialexistedto supportthe potentialfor a sea breeze. A totalof
47 such days were identifiedin the 5-yeardata set. Furtheranalysisof
wind data showedthat 10 of thesecases had the potentialto be sea-breeze
occurrences.
Onshoreflowscan also occurduringgradientwind conditions. In this
case, the characteristicsea breezecirculationcell does not occur and
significantshearsof wind speedor directionin the verticalare normally
not present. Of the eight characteristicsof the sea breezenoted above,
only the occurrenceof the thermalinternalboundarylayer inducedby
insolationand/or increasingmechanicalturbulencemay be present.
Therefore,the effectson transportand diffusioninducedby the thermal
internalboundarylayermay be present,but the effectsof the circulation
cellwill not occur.
UPPERAIR DATA
Three years of KSC launchwindowrawinsondedata (1982 to 1984)were used
to developthe distributionsof wind directionand wind speed for the
pressurelevelsof 850, 500, and 350 mb (millibars)(approximately4,750,
18,250and 27,500feet, respectively,in the standardatmosphere). These
distributionsare presentedin FiguresC-7 throughC-g. These figures
demonstratea significantchangein wind directionwith height. The 4,750-
footlevel,which approximatesthe gradientwind level,continuesto exhibit
a high frequencyof onshoreflowswith winds from the northeastclockwise
througheast dominating. The minimumvalue at this level is also noteworthy
since,within the 3-yeardata period,there were no occurrencesof
northwestwind. The 18,250-and 27,500-footlevelsshowwesterlywinds to be
highlydominantwith easterlywinds occurringvery infrequently.
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!The averagewind speedsfor the 3-yeardata periodare also seento
changewith height. At 4,750 feet, averagewind speed is 15.7mph,
increasingto 25.5 and 37.2 mph at 18,250foet and 27,500feet,respectively,
Therewere no reportsof calmwinds withinthe 3_yeardata periodat any oF
_ the levelsanalyzed.
CLIMATOLOGICALDATA
Historicalclimatologicaldata for KSC can be found in Table C-2.
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APPENDIX C-2
AQUIFER RECHARGE AREAS AND
POTABLE WATER FACILITIES IN
' THI_ VICINITY OF KSC "
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TABLE C-3. POTABLE WATER FACILITIES
'R(SIRICTB'
UNITS UNIC. SERVICE
NAItE OWNERSHIP CAPACITY AREA AREA CONHENTS
! - City o( Cocoa PUBLIC 40.0 n60 OOTH NO
2 - City o( Helbourne- NorthPLant PUBLIC 4.0 HOD BOTH NO
3 - City ot Heibourne- SouthPLant PUBLIC tO.0 HOD BOTH NO
4 - City of Titusville PRIVATE 16.0 HO0 BOTH NO
5 * GeneralOevelopaentUtilities - Nalabar PRIVATE 3.0 H60 IIaC NO PSCREGULATED
6 - Pine,Bed_biLe VilLage PRIVATE 0.052HO0 UHINC YES TRAILERPARK
7 - Tiki HavenNobziePark PRIVATE 0.043H60 UNIHC YES TRAILERPARK
8 - NorthoataHobiIeRanch PRIVATE 0.200H60 UflINC YES TRAILERPARKk SUBOIVISIOX
9 -NorthOrsvard_ater System PRIVATE i.L HOD UNINC NO
tO - OakParkHobilePark PRIVATE 0,C52H60 UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
II - NobileHanorHobilePark PRIVATE 0.[44 H60 UNIHC YES TRAILERPARK
12- HibiscusNobiL_Park PRIVATE 0.036HOD UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
I] - HewHavenNobilePark PRIVATE 0.064HOD UNINC YES TRAILERPAR_
14- EveroreenflohilePark PRIVATE 0.065H60 INC YES TRAILERPARK
t5 - EnchantedLakeEstates PRIVATE 0.086HOD INC YES TRAILERPARK(HALABARi
16- CamelotHobLlePark PRIVATE 0.080HOD [NC YES TRAILERPARK(eALABAR)
I7 - SouthernComfortflobiIe Park PRIVATE 0.L25H60 UHIHC YES TRAILERPARK *
tO- IndianRiver _horesNobilePark PRIVATE 0.050NO0 UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
- SnugHarborHobiiePark PRIVATE 0.]]? HO0 UNINC YES _@ILEHONESUSDIVISION
20o FioridmCities WaterCompany PRIVATE hO H60 UNINC YES PSCREBULATEO ,
21 - RivergrovtIt NobLlePark PRIVATE 0.072 HSO UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
22- River|rove[HobiLePark PRIVATE 0,072 HSB UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
23 * SeeAdeie PRIVATE 0.030 HO0 UNINC YES CONOOfllNlnUH
24- RivervieaNobilePark PRIVATE 0.050 fiB0 UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
2_ - Breeze,myHobilePark PRIVATE 0,010 flSO UHINC YES TRAILERPARK
26- Coveof SouthBeaches PRIVATE 0.020ROD UNINC YES COHOOHINIUH
27 - Coveo( Casseakee PRIVATE 0.04RNO0 UNINC YES CQHOOHIHIUfl
29 - SouthOrevardWaterCo-op CO-OP 0.080 fiB0 UXINC YES 5UBOIVISIONSk CONOOHINIU_]
29 - layiars Reeta.rznt PRIVATE 0.020 N6O UNINC YES FOO0SERVICE
_0- Stuckey'sPecanShoppe PRIVATE 0.020fiND UNINC YES FO00SERVICEt RVPARK
]l " HoiivayVilLageR,V, Park PRIVATE 0,0_ NO0 UHINC YES RVPAAK
]2 - TheOuqoutBar k StiLL PRIVATE O.OOLHOD UNINC YES BARk FO00SERVICE
°33 Harold's Place PRIVATE O.OOLflSD UNLHC YES bARt FOOOSERVICE
34 - Hick's Rlvlrvieu HobtiePark PRIVATE 0.050NSO IMC YES TRAILERPARK
35 - PaLmShorn R.V. Park PRIVATE 0.050ROD UNINC YES RVPAAK
36- O.O.T.- Southbound PUBLIC 0.049HOD UflINC YES RESTAREA
]7 - O.O,T.- Northbound PUBLIC 0.04RNOD UNINC YES RESTAREA
36 ° Harris Corporation PRIVATE O,04SHOD _INC YES INOUSTRY ,
]9 - SumQitSLanding PRIVATE 0.20 NBO UHIHC YES flARIHA
40- Su Sebastian PRIVATE O.iO0HBD UNIHC fib PSCP_OULATEB
4t - SouthSh_res PRIVATE 0.040eBB UNINC YES PUB
42- FareUlhi( 5 OClanClub PRIVATE 0.|00 NO| UMIHC YES PUB
43_ Ckuck'oStalkHouse PRIVATE 0.040 HBO UIIINC YES FOB0SERVICE
4 - LeaI _oint Park PUBLIC 0.216abe UttINC YES COUNTYPAAK
_$- SebastianInLet PUBLIC 0.0|6 fiND UNIHC YES STATEPARK
Source: Brevard County 1988b
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FIGUREC-12. LOCATIONSOF POTABLEWATERSYSFEMS
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FIGUREC-15. WETLANDSINBREVARDCOUNTY
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TABLE C-11. POPULATIONOF BREVARDCITIES
CRy 1980 1987 # Change % Change
BREVARD .... 272,959 371,735 98,776 36.2
Cape Canaveral _ 5,733 7,744 2,011 35.1
Cocoa ........... 16.096 17,908 1,812 11.2
Cocoa Beach....... - --_- 10,926 12,6,."_ 1,712 15.7
Indialantic -: -- - ..... 2,883 3,029 146 5.1
Indian Harbour Beach 5,967 7,329 1,362 22.9
Malabar 1, i 18 1,589 471 42.1
Melbourne 46,536 58,116 11,580 24.9
Mell:_ourneBeach .....:: 2,713 3,094 381 14.0
Melbourne Village....... - 1,004 1,042 38 3.8
Palm Bay -- ...... 18,560 47,096 28,536 153.8
Palm Shores ....... 77 90 13 16.9
Rockledge-------_------- 11,877 14,260 2,383 20.0
SatelliteBeach 9,163 10.167 1,004 11.0
T_tusville 31,910 40,213 3,303 26.0
West Melbourne 5,078 8,067 2,989 58.9
UNINCORPORATED-------_ 103,318 139,353 36,035 34.9
Source: Brevard County 1988a
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FIGUREC-17. HOSPITALLOCATIONS
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FIGUREC-22. LOCATIONSOF BALD EAGLE NESTINGACTIVITIES
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TABLE C-5. FLORAAND FAUNA PROTECTEDAT KSC I
Designated Stature
Page Scie_tlfic Name Common Name _ CITES F_ t_EPA
D-? Acrostichum danaeifolium Giant leather fern T
D-8 _ balsamifers Balsam torc_ SP
D.-9 "Asclepias curtissli Curtis m/Ikwe_ T T SP
D-IO Asplenium platyneuron Ebony spleenwort T
D-If *Avicennia .germinans Black mangrove SP
P-12 kzoll._.__._acarolinians Mosquito fern T
D-13 Calamovilfa curtissii Curtiss reedgrass tR SP
D-14 Calor_gon tuberosus Grass pink (unnm.ed) II T
D-15 Cereus eriophorus vat. Fragrant wool-bearing
fragrans cereus E II Z SP
D-16 Cereus sracilis West Coast
Prickly-apple UR II E T SP
D-17 *ChrysoDhyllu_ oliva_forme Satinleaf E
D-18 Cocos nucifera Coconut palm T
: D-19 Conradina _randlflora Large-flowered
rosemary tR SP
D-20 Dichrc_ena floridensis Florida white-top
sedge SP
D-ll D___eris lu_uviciana Florida shield fern T
D-22 En_clia tampensis Butterfly orchid II T
D-23 _l__.!gDhiaalta Wild coco II T
D-24 Habenaria odontopetala Rein orchid (unnamed) II T
D-25 Habe/nariarepens Water spider orchid
or creeping orchid II T
D-26 Harrisella porrecta Orchid (unnamed) II 9'
D-27 Hexalectris i_ Crested coralroot II T
D-28 H_llis latifolia Broad-leaved spider
lily t_ SP
I)-29 llex _ Carolina holly or
sand holly T
D-30 _ cernua Nodding pinweed t1_ SP
D-31 Lycopodium alopecuroides Foxtail club moss T
D-32 Ly_i_ appressum Southern club moss T
D-33 Lycx)podiumcarolinianum Slander club moss T
D-34 Malaxi_____s Florida malaxis II T
D-35 Nel_rolepis biserrata Boston fern {unnamed) T
D-36 *Ol_iOc/lossum loalmatu_ Adder's tongue fern
(unnamed) UR E Z SP
D'37 O_ioglossum L,etiolatum A_er's tongue fern
(utu'am_) T
D-38 Opuntia ermpressa Prickly pear cactus
(unnamed) lI T
C-34
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TABLEC-5 (continued).
Desiq_ted Status
P_e Scientific Name Ccnwon Name _ CITES _ F_EP_ PIg_I
D-39 Opuntia strlc_s Prickly pear cactus
(unmun_) ZI T
D-a0 O_nda reqalis vat.
spectabil Is Royal fern C
D-41 Peperomia humilis Pepper (_/_d) E
D-42 *Peperanda obtuslfolia Florida peperomia E
D-43 Pereakia aculeata Lemon vine Zl T
D-44 Persea borbonia var. D_rf _y or
humilis redk_y l_riea _ SP
D-45 Phlebodium aure_ Golden Ix_ody T
D-46 _ _o_h.ioq,lossoides Rose pog_ia lI T
D-47 L_nthieva rac_sa Shadow witch IX T
D-48 _silotum ra_um _isk fern or
fork fern T
. _ I)-49 *Rl_izc_ra _ Red mangrove SP
1>-50 Rh!mchosia clnerea Brown-haired f'
sn_tJ_ean UR SP
D-51 Salvinia z_tundifolia Water spangles T
D-52 Scaevola plumieri Scaevola T SP
D-53 Selaqinella arenicola Sand spi_s T
D--54 Sophora _tosa Necklace pod 5P '
D-55 Spiranthes laciniata Lace-lip ladies'-
tresses or lace-lip
spiral orchid II T
I)-56 Suriana n_ritima Bay cedar E SP
D-57 Yhelypteris interrupts _spidium fern (t_,aured) T
I)-58 T_l_ri._ss palustris Marsh fern T
D-59 Thelypterls _ Aspidium fern (unnamed} T
D-60 Tillandsia simulate Wild pine or air
plant (untuned) T _,
D-_I _Tourne_orCla qna_alodes Sea lavender T SP
D-62 Verbena mritL_a Coastal vervain _R 8P
D-63 Verbena t_si s Tampa vervain ti_ SP
1>-64 Vittaria lineat_ Shoestrin_ fern T
1>-65 Wocd_rdla aerolar.a Netted chain fern T
D-66 *Zamia mbrosa East coast co.tie II C T
D-67 zeuxine stxate_r_tica Orchid (unnan_) lI
E-1 I-O e-7 E-I SP-18
lz ii c-_ s_ ---i3
46 "_ i
' C-35 '
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• TABLE C-5 (continued).
Desi,_ted Status
Pace Sciontific Name C(mronName _ CITES _
C-8 C.entroix_nus undeclmalis _ snook
_ND Ft_HIBL_S
C-9 .Alligator mississippiensis American alligator T{S/k} II $8C 6_C
C-10 *Caretts caretta caretta Atlantic loggerhead
turtle T l T T
C-If *Chelonlamyda_mydas Atlanticgreen turtle E I E E
C-12 Demochelys coriacea Leatherbackturtle E I E R
C-13 *Drymarchoncoralscouporl Easternindigosnake T T SSC
C-Z4 *_ pol_s Gopher turtle IR II SSC T
C-i5 Ere_lys l_bricata Atlantl,: hawkr_£11
Imbricata turtle E I E E
C-16 *I_pidochelyskempL Atlanticrldleyturtle E l E E
" C-I? *Nerodia fasciatataenlata Atlanticsalt marsh
wat:r snake T T E
C-18 Pituo_his melanoleucus
Florida pine snake UR S_
C-19 Rana areolata Go_er frog UR SSC
C-20 Scolot_rus _xx]ii Florida scrub lizard R
C-21 Aec:pite r _ Co(3_r'a hawk SSC
C-22 Air_.la aestivalis Bachman'a sparrow UR
C-23 _ _ liOleat_sixx_ill $92 R
C-24 *Amrospi za marltima
nigriscens Dusky mslde sparrow E E E
C-25 "kI_o] ocon_ coerulescens
coerulescens FlorJ_ ecnib jay _ T T
i
C-26 AramusE_mrauna L/raiSin SSC _
C-27 Athenecunlcularla Bur_ir R owl l_C _ ,
C-28 Buteo swalnsoni Swainson'a hawk tM
C-29 Casmerhdius albus Great eqret fkq_
C-]O Charadrius melodus Piping plover T T _C
C-31 Clrcu___._s_aneus _mricaa harrier or
' _rah hawk lI
C-32 Dendroica discolor
palodicola Florida prairie t_rbler SaC
C-33 Mqre_ta cserulea Little blue heron S_: SSC
C- ,4 F_retta r_fescens I_klLsh e_rut UR _ It
C-35 .__etta thula 8no_ egret SSC S_C
C-36
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I_I.E C-5 (continued) '° l
Duiqnated Status
Scientific _ Co.on _ _ CIT_ _
C-35 _ tri_lor Tricolor_ heron or
Ix_ulsla_aheron _ S._
C-37 FA_ida8 Eorficat_s _allo_-tail-a kite t_
C-38 E_k_clJme albus White ibis SSC
C-39 Fslco coltwbarlus Merlin or pigeon hawk II SUD
C-40 *Falco _reqrir_s tundriu$ Arctic peregrine
falc_ T l Z E
C-41 -talco s_arveriul paulus Southeastern kestrel UR II T T
C-42 Fslco mmrverius sparverius Eastern kestrel II
C-43 *_ _ Rothchildts m_gniflce_t
rothschlldi Erlgate bird T
C-44 Grus canadensis prstensis Florida I_ux]hill
crane II T T
C-45 tHaematopus palliatus American oyster-
. catcher SSC T
C-46 eHaliaeetus leucocephalus Bald Eagle E I T T
C-47 Belmltheros vem_i_rus Wona-eati_ warbler
C-48 Ixobrychus exilis exilis Least bittern _g=
C-49 Laterallus Janaicensus Black rail g/D
C-50 *Mycteria americana Wood stork E E E
C-51 Nyctanassa violacea Yellow-cro_med night
heron SSC
C-52 _cticorax .nyctlcorax Black-cro_Lod night
heron SSC
C-53 ekandion haliaetus Osprey II T
C-54 *Pelecanus occidentalis
carolinensis Eastern brown pelican S_
C-55 Picoides borealis Red-e_=ka_L_l
woodpecker E T E
C-56 Picoides villosus au_u_x_i Bairy _x_i_..=ker SaC
C-57 _ falcinel lus
falcinellus Glossy ibis SSC
C-58 Recurvirostra americana American avocet SSC
C-59 _ _ Black skimmer SSC _'
C-60 Seiurus _ot_cilla Louisiana waterthrush R
C-61 _t__._aaa ruticilla
rutici llas _merlc_n redstart R
C-62 *Sterna a.tillarum Least tern T T
C-63 Ster.__._ _spia Caspian tern SSC
C-64 _Sterna do_allii, Roseate tern UR T T
C-4S5 Sterna fuscata Sooty tern SSC
C-_ Sterna l_xi_ Royal tea
C-6? Sterna undvice_sis Sandwich tern SSC
C-68 Vireo altiloquus Black-Whiskered vireo R
C-37
' ..)'
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TABLE C-5 (contirlued).
Desiqnated Status
Scientific t_am C_mon Name _ CITES _ _ '
C-E9 felts cxxx_lor coryl Plorlda panther B I R r
C-70 Lutra c_densis River otter II
C-Tl Lynx _fu_.._._s Bdbaat II
C-72 Mustela fre_ta pe_i_l_ Florida wea_1 R
C-73 Mussels vison lutensis Florida Idnk R
(:-';4 l_ofiber alleni Rourd-tailed muskrat SSC
C-75 "l_eromyscus floridanus Florida m_se UR SSC T
C-76 eTrichechus manatus
latirostris k_est Indian manatee E I E T
C-?? Ursus americanus floridanuS Florida black bear IJR T T
E-10 I- 9 T- 9 E-'_
• - 5 II-10 _-12 T-15
T(s/a}-I _ r_c-l._ ssc-25
29 _ 2
USFt_ - United States Fish and Wildlife Servic_-: List of Endangered and
Threatened Wildlifeand Plants,50 CFR17.11-12(officialUnited
SLates List}.
CITES m Convention on International Trade _ Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora.
FGFt_ - Florida t_me and Fresh Water Fish Ccmlssi_: Section 39-27.03-.05,
F_C (official State of Florida animal list}.
Fk'w_& - Florida Conmittae on Rare and lh_dangered Plants and knlmals.
• IAstad in_ Fin_lEnvironmentalI_ Statee_nt(1979)
B- Zndan_; T= threatened;SgO- Speciesof SpecialConoern;UR= Under
Iteview{forpossibleli_i_); I- includedin;q_x I; "I- includedin
kppendix II (of CITES}; It= Rare,SUD= Status Undetcemine_, T,S/&),,
Threatem_ due to elm/arity of appearance.
(1) S_urce: Sreininger et el, 1984.
Source: _ASA 1986
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FIGURE C-25. STATE PARKS AND RECREATION AREAS
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ACQUISITIONS UNDER I- ,=o
CONSERVATION AND ..-_.-_
RECREATION LANDS PROGRAM I
AS OF 1987 F
L.\ I
PROJECTSAND THEIR LEAD MANAGING AGENCIES 1=.
2. BowerTract(Hills) 20. LlgleGatorCreek(GFWFC) _ •
3. BrownTract/BigShoalsCorridor(DACS/DNR)21. LowerApalachicola(GFWFC)
4. CanaveralIndustrialPark(DNR) 22. M.K.Ranch(GFWFC)
5. CayoCosta/NorthCapltavaIsland(DNR) 23. NewMahoganyHammock(DNR)
6. Chassahowltzl(aSwamp(GI:WFC) 24, NorthPeninsula(DNFI) [
7. ConsolidatedRanch(DNR) 25. PeacockSlough(DNR) I I e_e'/'8. CrystalRiver(DHR) 26. RookeryBay(DNR) •
9, DeeringHammock(Dare) 27. Rotsnburoer/HoleyLand(GFWFC) ..1"'_ i
10. EastEverglades(GF'WFC) 28. St. GeorgeIslan_J(DNR) L.....
11. EscombiaBayBluffs(Pen) 29. SaveOurEvergla¢les(DNR) ,e _ L =
12. EsteroBay(DNR) 30. SilverRiver(DNR) _- .... "'_
13. FakahatcheeStrap_(DNR) 31. SouthSavannas(DNR) .... 4 9_14. FortSanLuls(DOS) 32. SpringHammock(DNR)
15. Gateway(Pine) 33. TheGrove(DOS) t
16. GraytenDunes(DNR) 34 WakullaSprings(DNR)
17. GuanaRaver(GF'WFC/DNR} 35. WaclsssandAuclliaRiverSinks(GFWFCIDNR)
18. I.T.T. Hammock(DADE) 36. Wesllake(Brow)
37. WindleyKeyQuarry(DNR)
GFWFC,, SameandFreshWaterFishCommission
Hills ,, HIIIsboroughCounty
DNR = Departmenloi NaturalResources
Gads - DedeCounty
Pen ,, Cityof Pensacola
DOS ,, DepartmentofState
Pine , Pine,asCounty
DACS ,, DepartmentolAgricultureandConsumerServices
Brow -BrowarclCounty Source: State of Florida 1987b .,
I ii iii iiii
FIGUREC-30. ACQUISITIONS UNDERCONSERVATIONAND RECREATIONLANDS PROGRAM
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- WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS
: 1985
m _!4
- " 1. Apalacllee 28. J W. COrbett
2. Apalachlco_a 29. La FlorestaPetclicla"
3. Aucllla 30. LakeButler'
4. BigCypress 31. Lochloosa"
5. Black'water 32 LykesBrothersFisheatlnOCrook•
-" 6. Brown'sFarm 33. MK. Ranch
7. kll Crook 34. Nassau"
8. Camp9bindlno 35. Ocaia
9. CecilM. Webb 36, Occklental"
10. ChampionI ternational* 37. Ochk)ckonBeRiver
11. CedarKeyScrub 38. Osc4iola
12. Cltf_s 39. Perpetual
13. C¢oo_ 40. PointWaShington"
14. CypilU Creek" 41. Ralford
15. EdwardOall* 42. Relay,
16. (-vorolades 43. Richioam
17. Fannton" 44. Robert6,"Wlt*
16. FortMcCoy" 45. RockSpringsRun
19. 6eergla.Pactflc" 46. Rmnberger
20. 6meoSwamp 47. SmalnoleRanch
21. GullH4wmtOck" 48. StoiN_dchee•
22. 6.U. Parker• 49. Takluln • o
23. HaloyI,lnd 50.ThrNLakmRanch o4=IP_ ,m_
24. IM.C." 51. Tldl Swamp"
25, Jim" 52. Tonm_
26, JO0Budd 53. TO_
27. Jump_r,mk 54. Up_ Hmsbem_
• 6memm _ _am • Imwlem
Source:Stateof Florida1987b
f
FIGUREC-31. WILDLIFEMANAGEMENTAREAS
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FISH IV;,.S,NAGEMENTAREAS
1985
1. BearLake 26, LakeTarpon
2. Oeth(l_JaPond 27. LakeThonot_.aSS4
"' 3. BlueCypressLake 28. LakeVlclo(
4. CampBlinding 26. LeeAdamsI_
5, CanalsL-l, L-2,L-3 30. LoChlomlaL ke
.I. CanalsL-50,L-31 31. ManalesLake
7. ChainOfLakes 32. Me_'s MillPond
8. Fort_ Savannah 33. NewnansLake
"'_. FOxLake 34. OceanWay
10. HannaParkPonds 35. OrangeLake !
11. Hurflcan4Lake 36. PalmLake L._..
12. JuniperBayLake 31. PopeDuralEastPond
13. KarlckLake 38. PopeOuvalWeslPond
14. KooeLake 39. IkKIBeachLaka
,_: LakeCrago 40. SaOOleCn_
/
Ol s 1. _ Lake
l_. LakeGriffin 4'2. SouthLake
18. lake Jullanna 43. $1. AugustineReedPoem
19. LakeMang(mb 44. Suwann_eLake
20. LakeMaMle 45. Tan_lmtTrailCanal • o
21. LakeMoon 48, TenerocSlateIm O_I_t, .,W
22. Lake_k. 47, TlgerlailLake
23, LakeParkw 48. war.own lake
24. LakeS4n_n_e 49, We"_Lake
25. LakeSt_e 50. We60MariRts 1, 2, & 3
Source: State of Florida1987b
FIGUREC-32. FISHMANAGEMENTAREAS
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'_ NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM ,...,
i IN FLORIDA
1985 ......
I
I NATIONAL FARKS _'_
1.BCsr4yne
2. Everglades
• NATIONAL MEMORIALS AND MONUMENTS ii
I.C,IIlllIode_.'tM,zrc=_ I
2 OwsoIo
3 redCaroline
4 r-m1J_
S Fortli411,1mzcs
NATIONAL SEASHORES
t. CmM_I
2. Gull14dan_
NATIONAL PRESERVES i4 • _
t _ omr_
Source: State of Florida1987b
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FIGUREC-34. NATIONALPARK SYSTEMIN FLORIDA
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Source: State of Florida 1987b
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FIGURE C-35. WILD AND SCENTS RIVERS
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NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES
1985 i(
Source: State of Florida 1987b
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FIGUREC-36. NATIONALWILDLIFEREFUGES
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FIGUREC-37, NATIONALWILDERNESSAREAS
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OVERVIEW OF KSC
.__ RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS
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RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS
The use of radioactivematerialsat KSC requiresappropriatelicenses,
specialpermits,and/or use authorizations.All activitiesinvol,ingthe
use, handlingor decom,_issioningof radioactivesources,_ppar:tus;or wm,.
areasare strictlycontrolled,monitored,and inspectedby heal physics
personnel. Numerouscontrolsenforcedat KSC area include: (I)
establishmentof time, distance,and shieldingrequirements,as well as
personnelprotectiondevices,equipment,and measuresto restrictpersonnel
exposuresto below regulatorylimitsand to as low as reasonablyachievable
(ALARA)levels;(2) leak test,contaminationsurveys,personnel,and work
areamonitoring;(3) trainingand orientationof all personnelengagedin
activitiesinvolvingpotentialexposureto radiologicalsources;(4)
certificationand trainingof all personneldirectlyworkingwith sources,
includingtrainingin emergencyprocedures;and (5) strictcontrolover
visitorsand other non-radiologicalpersonneland workersentering
radiologicalcontrolareas_
Incidentsor accidentsduringroutinegroundoperationsresultingin
damage,rupture,or breachof major radiologicalsourcesor associatedminor
radioactivesourcesrequireimmediateactionsto protectoperational
. personnel,the generalpublic,and the environment. In the event of such an
incidentor accident,the KSC radiationprotectionofficerwould be notified
immediatelyand radiologicalemergencyresponseelementswould be initiated.
A numberof precautionsand requirementsapplicableto emergency
responseactivitiesincludethe following. Radiationair monitoring
equipmentand instrumentationwith an audiblealarmwill be availablein any
storageor use area establishedfor major sources. Portableradiation
monitoringinstrumentsand communicationsequipmentwill be availableduring
transportof major sourceson KSC. All workersand personnelengagedin
activitiesinvolvingmajor sourcesand enteringradiologicallycontrolled
areas,or in areas immediatelyadjacentto areas controlleddue to presence
of major sourceswill be oriented_e_ardingpotentialradiologicalhazards,
characteristicsof immediateevacuationwarningsignals,fire and radiation
alarms,and of the appropriateresponseto suchwarningsor alarms. Tests
of radiationdetectionequipmentalarmswill be conductedprior to
commencementof operationsinvolvingmajor radiologicalsourcesand daily
duringsuch operationsto ensurethat systemsare operableand reliable.
Radiologicalequipment,instrumentationand monitoringdevices,protective _.
clothing/equipment,and associatedsuppliesand materialswill be available
at locationsof storageor use of major sources. Emergencyresponse
personnelwill be trainedand certifiedin the use of emergencykits and
equipment. The RadiologicalControlCenter(RADCC)will be activatedfor
dealingwith any groundprocessingemergencyinvolvingmajor radiological
sources.
In addition,writtenemergencyresponseprocedures_ill be postedand
will includeproceduresto warn, instruct,and evacucteindividualsin
endangeredareas,provisionsfor shutdownof work a,'eas,facilities,and
associatedventilationand air conditioningintakesystemsupon verification
of a radiologicalrelease,and requirementsfor associatedresponse
activitiesa,d re-establishmentof radiationcontrolsand recoveryfrom the
emergencycondition.
C-53
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In the event of an accident involving a potential release, the
Radiological Control Center is the onsite focal point for contingency
operations and is the point from which direction is provided to the
radiological field teams. For accidents involving offsite areas, _ Federal
Radiological Hon]toring and AssessmentCenter has been established by the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to coordinate Federal offsite monitoring and
assessment activities. Key personnel will be predeployed at various
specified sites in the field prior to launch activities, and will be in
communication with the RADCC. All emergency response personnel will receive
training and orientation to familiarize them with the physical, chemical,
and radiological hazards, as well as radiation protection equipment and
techniques.
Three classification levels will be used to indicate the degree of
severity relative to radioactive material releases expected in a given
incident or accident situation. An "Alert" will be declared if an
incident/accident has occurred or is in progress and no release of
radioactive material has occurred or is expected to occur. An "Emergency"
status is assigned if an incident accident has occurred and a release of
radioactive material onsite has occurred or is expected to occur, but release
of radioactivematerialoffsitehas not occurredand is not expectedto
occur. A "GeneralEmergency"will be declaredif an incident/accidenthas
occurredand a releaseof radioactivematerialonsiteand offsitehas
occurredor is expectedto occur.
,L
• Upon notificationof any abnormalsituationthat could resultin a
releaseof radioactivematerial,the followingimmediateactionswill be
taken. The RADCCwill coordinateappropriatenotificationsregarding
potentialor real radiologicalincidents. Surveillanceaircraftwill make
an assessmentof airborneand groundlevel radiologicalconditions. Onsite
radiationmonitoringteams and the on-scenecommanderwill be deployedto
assist in a preliminaryassessmentof the situation. Fire, rescue,
security,and damagemeasureswill be implementedas necessary. Health
physicsrepresentativeswill defineaccesspointsto the affectedarea and
controlthe passageof responsepersonnelthroughthese accesspoints. All
personnelnot directlyengagedin damagecontrolwill be preventedfrom
enteringthe controlledarea. Emergencycrews and evacuees_eaving
radiationcontrolledareaswill be monitoredby radiologicalfield teams at
appropriatelylocatedaccesspoints.
In coordinationwith, or subsequentto, the immediateactionsdescribed
above,the followingactionswill be taken dependentupon the consequences
of the incident. If there is no breachof the encapsulatedradioactive
material,a searqhwill be initiatedand the intactdeviceswill be removed
and placedin temporarystoragecontainers. Radiationmonitoringteams will
conductthoroughareacontaminationsurveysas directedby the RADCC. The
State and offsitesupportelementswill performconfirmatorysurveysin the
offsiteareasto verifyno releaseor contamination,and the following
actionswill be taken. The onsiteand offsiteradiationmonitoringteams
will monitorthe cloudpath and identifycontaminatedareas. Radiological
assessmentaircraftwill track airborneradioactivematerial,identifythe
cloud path, and assessairborneradioactivematerialconcentrations,
Becauseof the many possiblevariationsin incidentsand circumstances,
additionalactionsto be performedby onsiteradiationmonitoringteamswill
be at the directiorof the RADCC. Procedureswi]l be determinedby the
healthphysicsstaff.
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APPENDIX D
RESPONSES TO PUBLIC REVIEW COMMENTS
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F: APPENDIXD
' RESPOII;,_$TO PUBLICREVIEWCOI_ENTS
": D.I INTRODUCTION
The U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgencypublisheda Noticeof
Availabilityfor the Galileomission(Tier2) Draft EnvironmentalImpact
Statementin the FederalRegisteron January5, 1989,and the 45-daypublic
reviewand commentperiodclosedon February21, 1989. Timelycommentswere
receivedfrom the Federal,state and localagencies,organizationsand
individualslistedbelow. Copiesof thesecommentsare presentedin the
followpages;the commentsare markedand numberedfor identificationalong
_ with NASA'streatmentof each comment. Where changesin the text were
" appropriate,such changesare noted.
/ D.2 RESPONSESTO COMMENTS
This Appendixprovidesspecificresponsesto commentsreceivedfrom:
• U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
• U.S. Departmentof State
• U.S. Departmentof the Air Force
• U.S. Departmentof Healthand Human Services
• State of Florida,Officeof the Governor
• Committeeto Bridgethe Gap/StevenAftergood
• Horst A. Poehler,Ph.D.
The commentsfromDr. Poehler,althoughreceivedafter the close of the
commentperiod,are neverthelessreprintedin thisAppendixand addressedin
detailbecausehe requestedand receivedan extensionof the commentperiod
in order to considerspecifictechnicalissuesof this EIS.
It is NASA policythat, where no extensionof the commentperiodis
requestedand granted,untimelycommentswill stillbe consideredif
possible,but the commentswill not be printedin the commentAppendix.
This policy appliedto all untimelycomments. Commentsfrom the U.S.
Departmentof Energy (DOE)fell intothis category. The DOE comments,and
NASA'streatmentof thesecomments,may bn_hbe made availableupon proper
request.
Finally,in additionto all of the above,NASA receivedseven letters
generallyprotestingthe launchof the Galileomission. Since the letters
eitherdid not addressspecificpointsin the EIS or were untimely,or both,
NASA will respondto each letteras public informationcorrespondence,but
f has not reprintedthe lettershere in the Appendix. Nevertheless,the
lettersand their responsesmay both be made availableupon properrequest..pa
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